
Shafaq News
An emerging Turkish initiative to demilitarize the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK) has begun taking shape with a mix of symbolic gestures and
deliberate caution. On July 11, a ceremonial handover and burning of weapons by
PKK fighters near Al-Sulaymaniyah marked a rare moment of optimism in a
five-decade conflict. Yet the broader geopolitical landscape remains fraught
with risks that could delay or even derail the fragile peace process.
The image of PKK fighters descending from mountain hideouts to
surrender arms offered a striking visual against the backdrop of a 50-year
insurgency. Still, the continuity of this process hinges on the coming weeks,
as Turkiye’s pursuit of a “historic” settlement must withstand
domestic political pressures, security dilemmas, and shifting regional
calculations.
One notable gesture came when Turkish authorities allowed PKK
leader Abdullah Ocalan—held in Imrali prison since 1999—to receive a family
visit from his nephew Omar Ocalan, accompanied by his legal representative
Mazloum Dinc. In parallel, Ocalan also met with a delegation from the Peoples’
Equality and Democracy Party (HEDEP), known as the Imrali Delegation—a move
interpreted as a calibrated message to the Kurdish political base.
Observers point to the planned formation of a parliamentary
committee as a potentially more consequential move. Set to be launched in early
August, the committee is expected to accompany the peace process with
legislative initiatives that would pave the way for legal reform, national
reconciliation, and possible amnesties. Tentatively named the “Committee for
Social Peace, Justice, and Democratic Harmony,” it will comprise 51 lawmakers
from across the political spectrum, including the ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKP), Republican People’s Party (CHP), Nationalist Movement Party (MHP),
and HEDEP.
A Wider Regional Landscape
Yet the PKK disarmament process extends well beyond Turkish
political institutions. Since the Al-Sulaymaniyah ceremony, regional
actors—from Baghdad and Damascus to Tehran and Erbil—have closely monitored the
implications. The security establishment in Turkiye, the leadership of the
Kurdistan Region, European policymakers, and even the US President Donald Trump
and Israeli officials are recalibrating their approaches in light of this
potential shift.
The PKK’s role, once defined by its founding leader in the 1970s
and armed insurgency launched in 1984, has now become part of a broader
regional realignment. For Kurds in Turkiye, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, the symbolic
act in Al-Sulaymaniyah served as a reminder of the enduring hope for peace—one
that transcends the rugged mountains that once served as their shield.
Kurdistan Region’s Balancing Act
Sarkis Kassargian, a specialist in Turkish and Syrian affairs,
told Shafaq News that the PKK has entrenched military and political structures
in areas like Qandil, Makhmour, and Sinjar of Iraqi Kurdistan. This presence
has long been a source of tension—not only with Turkiye—but also with the
federal government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
“Despite Baghdad’s repeated calls for the PKK’s withdrawal,”
Kassargian noted, “Ankara maintains a firm military and intelligence footprint
across the region.” He added that Turkiye may intensify pressure on Baghdad,
Erbil, and Damascus to dismantle all PKK-linked military formations.
Meanwhile, Kurdish political factions in the Kurdistan Region face
a critical moment to reset intra-Kurdish balances in the wake of the
disarmament move. A Syrian source familiar with Kurdish affairs cautioned that
high hopes for peace do not guarantee results, emphasizing that Kurdish
political gains in past decades have often proven reversible in the absence of
comprehensive solutions.
A significant turning point came in October 2024, when Nationalist
Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli proposed reconciliation with the
PKK—on the condition that the group dissolve itself. President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan followed with uncharacteristically frank rhetoric, acknowledging past
injustices and policy failures, and estimating that the conflict had cost
Turkiye over 50,000 lives and $2 trillion.
Importantly, pressure for peace also came from beyond Turkiye. The
damage inflicted on the Kurdistan Region by the prolonged PKK–Turkiye conflict
pushed Erbil to adopt a more pragmatic and proactive stance—even before the
Al-Sulaymaniyah ceremony. Kassargian emphasized that “the KRG’s pragmatic
diplomacy allowed it to maintain strained resource-sharing ties with Baghdad
while strengthening its relations with Turkiye, the US, and key regional
players. A voluntary PKK dissolution could mark a historic turning point for
the Kurdish issue.”
Turkiye–Iraq Alignment
Observers also note that the evolving alignment between Ankara and
Baghdad—highlighted by their joint Development Road initiative—has facilitated
new possibilities. The August 2024 bilateral security agreement allows Turkish
forces to target PKK positions on Iraqi soil by officially designating the
group as a proscribed organization.
Nevertheless, uncertainty looms. Will all armed Kurdish factions
linked to the PKK—or operating independently—heed the disarmament call? Will
all PKK leadership figures commit to the endgame? Some analysts believe
splinter groups may continue the armed struggle unless a comprehensive regional
resolution is achieved, particularly in Syria and Iran.
In Iraq, Kurdish autonomy is well-established and internationally
recognized. However, in northeastern Syria—where PKK influence overlaps with
Kurdish-led self-administration—local actors face growing external pressure.
Their once-strong alliance with the US, rooted in 15 years of military and
financial support, appears increasingly fragile amid Turkish offensives and
encroachments by Syrian militias and interim government forces.
Syria’s Crossroads and the US Position
US envoy Tom Barrack recently clarified Washington’s stance on the
future of Kurdish-led governance in Syria, stating:
“We will not accept a state within a state. This does not mean we
are building a free Kurdistan in Syria. Nor an Alawite or Jewish state. There
is one Syria, now being reshaped—with its parliament, constitution, and army.
All roads lead to Damascus.”
Despite this, negotiations between the Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF) and the Syrian transitional President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s government remain
deadlocked. Turkiye has tied any progress on the PKK file to the dismantling of
Kurdish self-administration in Syria.
The recent Suwayda confrontations of Druze civilians—and Israel’s
direct military intervention, framed as protecting the Druze minority—have
further complicated talks. Some human rights groups accuse the interim
government of complicity in the massacre. As a result, the SDF has attempted to
use the fallout to gain leverage in its negotiations with Damascus.
According to Kassargian, the Turkish–Israeli rivalry over
influence in post-Assad Syria is intensifying. Ankara’s strategy now includes
both political and military components: integrating the SDF into Syria’s
national army while dissolving its autonomous structures and the YPG.
Militarily, Turkiye has threatened a joint operation against SDF zones, backed
by a July 23 defense agreement with Damascus that legitimizes Turkish presence
and initiates training for the Syrian army.
Strategic Shift or Tactical Pause?
The dramatic repositioning of regional actors—from Baghdad’s
realignment with Ankara, to Washington’s recalibrated Syria strategy under
Trump in December 2024, and the broader impact of Israel’s regional
campaigns—has forced the PKK into a defensive recalculation.
“President Erdogan is a smart and powerful man,” Trump said at the
time, “and the key to Syria will be in his hands.”
These shifts suggest the Middle East is entering a phase of
strategic reshuffling. For the PKK, the decision to disarm may reflect a
calculated pause rather than full retreat—an attempt to adapt to the storm
without losing core leverage.
While the descent from the mountains into political engagement
inspires hope, the path ahead is riddled with uncertainty. The cost of failure
may be high, but the opportunity for lasting resolution—if seized with
care—could redefine the Kurdish question for generations to come.
Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.