Shafaq News
Syria has emerged as the epicenter
of the Middle East’s booming captagon trade, serving both as a production hub
and a transit corridor feeding a narcotics market estimated at more than $2
billion annually. From the Jordanian border to the Iraqi frontier, and from
Mediterranean ports to routes through Turkiye, trafficking networks operate
with growing sophistication and reach.
Syria’s Central Role
The United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC), in its June 2025 assessment, confirmed that Syria remains
the leading manufacturing center despite shifting political and security
dynamics. Small-scale clandestine facilities across rural areas provide
industrial-level output, making seizures only a fraction of total production.
Southern Syria has become the most
active trafficking corridor, particularly in Daraa and Suwayda provinces, where
smugglers push shipments into Jordan. Jordanian authorities report dozens of
recent interceptions, noting the involvement of “organized armed groups” that
reinforce smuggling operations. To the north, Turkiye’s border serves as a key
gateway for captagon flows to European markets, especially through Idlib and
rural Aleppo.
The network is not confined to Syria
alone. According to UN sources, it extends across Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and
Turkiye, relying on complex logistics and cross-border coordination. Analysts
warn that revenues from this trade are now deeply entangled with armed groups,
linking narcotics directly to regional security threats.
Crackdowns and Arrests
Security agencies across the region
have escalated operations to dismantle trafficking rings. In Syria, authorities
have targeted captagon production sites in Damascus countryside, Daraa, and
Homs—areas once labeled by international observers as a “drug industry state.”
More than one million pills have been destroyed in recent months, along with
manufacturing equipment.
Damascus has also moved against
influential figures. Among them is Wassim al-Assad, cousin of former president
Bashar al-Assad, who faces charges of supervising trafficking operations.
In July, Syria’s Interior Ministry
announced the seizure of a shipment bound for Iraq, tracing it to a regional
network that had previously used routes through Turkiye and the Kurdistan
Region. On August 8, Syrian and Turkish security forces captured Amer Jdaya
Al-Sheikh, one of the region’s most wanted traffickers, after months of joint
intelligence work.
Iraq has stepped up its campaign. In
March, security forces—acting on intelligence shared with Saudi
Arabia—intercepted 1.1 tons of captagon concealed in a truck that crossed via
Turkiye. The following month, thermal imaging technology foiled an attempt to
move 400,000 pills along the Euphrates River. Iraq’s Interior Ministry reported
over 10 tons of narcotics seized and more than 6,000 arrests in 2024 alone,
with another 3,000 suspects detained in the first quarter of 2025.
Lebanon has also intensified
efforts. A recent raid in the Beqaa Valley killed several wanted traffickers,
including a figure known as Abu Salla, signaling a tougher stance on entrenched
networks.
Demand and Market Value
The primary markets for
Syrian-produced captagon remain the Gulf states, where consumption levels are
among the highest in the world. Wholesale prices range from $5 to $10 per pill,
with retail values considerably higher, especially in Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates.
European markets are also
increasingly affected. Smuggling routes through Turkiye and Lebanon funnel
shipments into southern Europe, while North Africa is emerging as a new target
zone. UNODC estimates, combined with regional seizure data, put the trade’s
annual value at over $2 billion—a figure that rivals Syria’s legal exports and
highlights how narcotics now function as a parallel economy.
Political Economy of Trafficking
Analysts argue that the captagon
trade cannot be viewed solely as a law-enforcement challenge. Revenues provide
vital funding for armed groups, militias, and local power brokers. In many
areas, narcotics smuggling substitutes for absent state institutions, binding
communities into shadow economies that resist external control.
At the same time, the trade has
become a bargaining chip in Syria’s diplomacy. Arab states seeking to normalize
ties with Damascus have pressed the government to demonstrate commitment
against captagon production. Jordan and Saudi Arabia, in particular, have made
drug control a central condition for reintegration. Yet many remain skeptical,
viewing Damascus’s recent arrests as selective moves against rivals rather than
a genuine dismantling of the trade.
Mazen Khalaf, a Syrian security
expert, told Shafaq News that the problem is “a complex political and security
issue, amplified by its internationalization.” He argued that easing sanctions,
restoring diplomatic ties, and improving investment conditions could support
anti-narcotics efforts, provided they are paired with stronger international
cooperation. “Poverty, hardship, and the lure of illicit profits drove many to
engage in or tolerate the narcotics trade,” he added.
As enforcement tightens, networks
may fragment but are unlikely to disappear. Instead, they adapt—shifting
routes, forging new alliances, and exploiting instability. The result is a
durable underground economy that entangles criminal enterprises with political
structures, complicating both regional security and the prospects for Syria’s
reintegration.
Written and edited by Shafaq News
staff.
