Documents authored by Brig. Gen. (res.) Guy Hazut, who heads the Ground Forces’ instruction division, assert that the manner in which the IDF plans to wage the new campaign in Gaza City lacks the essential components for victory. The document highlights clauses marked in red – key actions the military has not yet performed and does not intend to execute during the conquest of Gaza City – a complete siege, cutting off the guerrilla organization from the civilian populace, and interrupting supply lines.
The IDF document essentially concedes that the method selected for Operation Gideon’s Chariots II runs contrary to operational logic and established recommendations from the past, and that the failure to execute these steps could preclude a tangible achievement in the campaign, even in the forthcoming planned stage.
The leaked memo
In contrast to prevailing assertions within the IDF that defeating a guerrilla force is impossible, the documents contend that it can be achieved through necessary measures that have not yet been undertaken. The text states, among other things, “One must act with high intensity using diverse means, encircle an area with a maneuver, and force the enemy into close-quarters combat. Demonstrate initiative and aggressiveness, do not permit hit-and-run attacks. Dissecting the area into cells and isolating them from each other to deny the enemy freedom of movement.”
Israeli troops fighting in the Gaza war (IDF Spokesperson’s Unit)
The document, titled “How armies have defeated guerrilla organizations,” further states, “Severing the guerrilla organization from the population, combining military force with initiatives to improve the population’s lives, controlling the territory, preventing safe havens, and cutting off supply routes to the guerrillas.”
In effect, the IDF document itself indicates that the method chosen for the operation is inconsistent with operational logic and known past recommendations, and that failing to implement these measures will, with a high degree of probability, prevent the attainment of any real strategic gain in the campaign.
Brig. Gen. (reserve) Guy Hazut
Senior IDF officials responded to the assertions, saying, “The IDF encourages critical discourse, and in discussions held in the General Staff forum and among the ranks, different opinions arise concerning the operational patterns of action to be employed in the Gaza Strip. Operation Gideon’s Chariots met its objectives; during the operation, the IDF completely dismantled terrorist infrastructure where it operated. The operation intensified military pressure on Hamas and resulted in IDF control over three-quarters of the Strip’s territory and the elimination of approximately 2,000 terrorists. The commander of the Ground Forces conducted a clarification with Brig. Gen. (res.) Guy Hazut, as the presentation’s content and its findings were not authored with authority and did not represent the IDF’s official position as is expected from a document distributed to reserve forces.”
Col. (res.) Hezi Nehemia, a co-founder of the Reservists Commanders Forum, remarked that “For anyone who doubted whether the ‘conception’ is still with us, the IDF spokesperson’s response arrived and proved the flawed paradigm is here to stay. When Brig. Gen. Guy Hazut commits his conclusions to writing after twenty months leading the IDF’s learning division, the IDF summons him for a clarification. In short, why contend with the message when you can silence the messenger. We regret this, but we will persist in loudly voicing the outcry of tens of thousands of officers and soldiers.”
