Without a shadow of doubt, the two-state solution is a truly atrocious idea. Decades of endeavor to implement it have wrought trauma and tragedy not only on Israel and Israelis but, ironically, even more so on the Palestinian-Arabs, for whose benefit it was purportedly formulated.
A dangerously defective “alternative“
It is not my intention here to enumerate all the deadly detriments of the two-state principle and the myriad misfortunes the ill-conceived attempts to implement it have precipitated over the last four decades. I—and others—have done this repeatedly elsewhere, despite the derision and disregard of devout disciples of the Politically Correct—sadly, only to have our warnings borne out time and time again.
Fortunately, as the grave defects of the two-state notion become increasingly apparent, the search for alternatives has understandably become a priority. Yet, despite the urgency, caution and prudence are still very much called for.
For as appalling as the two-state notion is, this in no way implies that any proposal that is not the two-state idea is necessarily better than it. Indeed, some can be just as bad, if not worse—particularly in anything but the immediate short run.
Typical of such a well-intentioned, but dangerously defective “alternative” is what has come to be known as “The Emirates plan”, involving granting self-rule, of yet to be specified scope, to the dominant clan heads in 7-8 urban centers in Judea-Samaria (a.k.a. “the West Bank) and Gaza. Indeed, having been skillfully promoted by its well-intentioned advocates, it was prominently featured in a recent WSJ article, which raised the possibility of it being initially implemented in the Hebron region.
Dangerous detriments: A catalogue
While for some, this approach might have some superficial appeal, closer scrutiny reveals numerous problems that must be satisfactorily addressed before it can be seriously—and responsibly—advanced as a practical policy alternative.
For example, what would be the length of the frontiers (the lines of contact) between sovereign Israel and the (semi)autonomous enclaves (“emirates”)? Depending on their precise configuration, these wildly contorted frontiers could be anything up to 1000 kilometers long, making them almost impossible to demarcate and secure. However, if one cannot clearly demarcate and secure one’s sovereign territory, this will inevitably undermine the very essence of that sovereignty itself.
Moreover, would the residents of the “emirates” be allowed to access Israel itself? Would they be permitted to visit Israeli beaches and shop in Israeli malls?
If so, how would their return to their “emirate” be ensured? If not, the “emirates will inevitably—and justifiably—be seen as increasingly overcrowded prisons. Indeed, while Israel may euphemistically refer to them as “emirates”, most others will (correctly) call them (Arabesque) “Bantustans”, the very epitome of Apartheid in South Africa, see here.
Moreover, what if the compliant “Emir” (clan head) is replaced (kinetically or otherwise) by some less pliant successor, who reneges on his predecessor’s commitments—whether explicitly or otherwise? How would Israel respond to a new and antagonistic (semi) autonomous administration immediately adjacent to its major urban centers?
Dangerous detriments: A catalogue (cont.)
Furthermore, how would cross-border phenomena be handled and enforced? These would include issues such as untreated sewage flows, toxic industrial effluents, flows polluted by fertilizers and pesticides from agricultural irrigation, contamination of groundwater from unsealed garbage dumps, carcinogenic emissions from the widespread charcoal production, rabies control, vaccinations, control of infectious diseases, and so on and so forth.
Similarly, with regard to education, which it seems would be left to the auspices of the local “emirate” administration. Indeed, given the widely held consensus as to the need for deradicalization of Palestinian society, this raises the thorny question of who will formulate and approve the curricula for schools and educational institutions. Even more pertinent, who will ensure and enforce their implementation—and how would that be done?
After all, without an intrusive and coercive presence in the “emirates”, there is no way for Israel to ensure adequate supervision of the education system, what is imparted to the students, and/or any effective control over the propagation of inciteful radicalization.
Indeed, without such far-reaching and intrusive authority, Israel will be incapable of adequately confronting any of the crucial issues raised above, while if Israel did in fact retain authority of this kind, it would inevitably drain any semblance of substantive self-rule or autonomy, by the so-called “emirates.”
Contrived and misleading semantics
Indeed, apart from a contrived –and misleading—similarity in nomenclature, there is little similarity between the envisioned “emirates” of Palestine, on the one hand, and the genuine generic Emirates of the Arabian Gulf, on the other.
While there may indeed be some discernible traces of tribalism in Palestinian society, they seem hardly robust enough to comprise a foundation for far-reaching political structures—as shown by the dismal experience with the Village Unions, which was also based on existing clan structures, and resulted in resounding failure. Indeed, there seems to be a disturbing overlap between the failed Village Union idea and the equally flawed “emirates” proposal.
As noted, there is much that distinguishes the Gulf Emirates from the prospective “emirates” in “Palestine”. Although the former are relatively small countries (with the entire UAE in the 114th place in the global ranking of country size), they are not, like the latter, “microdot”-sized enclaves, at most dozens of kilometers in width, totally surrounded by the sovereign territory of another nation-state. Moreover, they are fully sovereign entities, with full control over their armed forces, internal governance, and resources, which afford them great affluence. It should be noted that much of the UAE’s prosperity is due to a massive number of foreign workers, who make up 90%of the entire labor force. Clearly, neither of these elements—immense petro-riches, and a vast foreign labor pool—characterizes the envisaged “emirates” in “Palestine”, making any inferences regarding the viability/stability of the latter, based on that of the former, entirely without foundation.
A political train wreck waiting to happen
But the most detrimental aspect of the “emirates” approach is that it concedes the acceptability of a permanent Arab-Palestinian presence west of the Jordan River, based on the potentially impermanent goodwill attributed to an incumbent chieftain in an increasingly anachronistic clan-based system—and his ongoing ability to maintain stability over an increasingly congested Muslim islet in a surrounding Jewish sea.
It is an approach that attempts to impart substantive content by means of semantic labels, and to restrict political rights (full sovereignty) on the basis of ethnic identity–the very epitome of apartheid.
Indeed, whatever its purported sociological rationale, it is an inevitable political train wreck waiting to happen. For Israel to adopt this approach as an alternative to the two-state solution would be unmitigated folly.
The Israeli leadership would do well to remember: Not everything that is not a two-state solution is necessarily better than the two-state notion. The “emirates” plan is—decidedly and disturbingly—a prime illustration of that dismal fact.
