Seven hundred and ten days into the war, 48 hostages are still in Gaza, and the path to their release, to defeating the Hamas terrorist organization, and to ending the war runs through Gaza City. It does not necessarily end there.
IDF forces are at a high level of readiness for the start of a ground maneuver, after roughly ten days of strikes on towers and high-rise buildings. What challenges await the IDF? Why Gaza City? And what still needs to be done that we have not yet done?
IDF operations in Gaza. Photo: IDF Spokesperson’s Unit IDF Spokesperson’s Unit
Why Gaza City?
The security cabinet decided to seize and exercise operational control in Gaza City. It faced several alternatives presented by the IDF, including capturing the central camps, encircling Gaza City, and of course the option ultimately chosen: capturing and exercising operational control in Gaza City. There are several answers to why the city option was selected.
Gaza City is a symbol, the “capital city” of the Gaza Strip. It hosts institutions and centers of governance that were still functioning and represents a “center of gravity.” No less important, Gaza City is where Izz al-Din Haddad is located. Until about a week ago he was not only the commander of the Gaza City Brigade, but also head of the military wing after the elimination of Muhammad Sinwar. Capturing the city as a symbol and defeating the city brigade along with its commander could therefore be key considerations in choosing the option to seize the city.
The challenges in Gaza City
Many challenges await the IDF in Gaza City. The enemy has prepared for a long time, in fact for about a year, since the IDF operated inside the city at the start of the maneuver. Beyond the enemy and combat challenges outlined below, between 600,000 and 800,000 civilians are present in Gaza City. They returned after the IDF withdrew from the city under the failed raid-and-pullback method. Having so many civilians in a combat zone is critical for our ability to employ fire freely, as well as to maneuver, including tank fire and demolishing infrastructure.
Therefore, the first challenge is to move the population for its own protection and to enable the IDF to use fire more freely with fewer constraints. These are strict constraints imposed on our forces throughout the fighting by the IDF Military Advocate General, and adopted by the Chief of Staff. Moving the population is carried out through the use of fire and “bringing down towers,” and mainly by making clear to Gaza City residents that Israel is determined to act in the city and that they must move for their own safety. The trend is positive, and if we continue resolutely, most of the city’s population will move.
Gaza residents amid strikes in Gaza City
The most significant challenge is, of course, fighting a sizable and ready enemy. In Gaza City there is an order of battle amounting to roughly two Hamas brigades: the Gaza City Brigade and the Northern Gaza Brigade. As our forces maneuvered and fought in Beit Lahiya, Beit Hanoun, and Jabaliya, most of the terrorists simply fled to Gaza City and linked up with the city brigade under the command of Izz al-Din Haddad.
Such a large number of terrorists, many thousands, employ abundant weaponry that includes many explosives collected from our forces’ munitions and from air force duds, anti-tank weapons, and sniper capabilities, together with collection assets from cameras networked on almost every street and through the use of drones. Hamas operates from rubble and from subterranean infrastructure and tunnels organized as a kind of “underground city.”
All of this poses a significant combat challenge for our forces, but there should be no doubt: the IDF can and must defeat Hamas.
So how do we do it?
The IDF is preparing for Operation Gideon Chariots B (recommend changing the name, after all, Gideon Chariots A did not exactly succeed, even if someone orders us to say it did) along several tracks. Reserve call-ups and unit mobilization have been completed, some units have replaced regular forces. The IDF is concentrating a force package of about three divisions opposite Gaza City, raising readiness for armored vehicles and munitions, and advancing battle procedures and planning. The level of readiness is high and we are ready for the order: “Move, move, out!”
What else needs to be done?
Even so, there are several points in the IDF plan that have not yet been addressed and that serve as “key points” for the IDF’s ability to defeat Hamas more quickly and at a lower cost. Two significant points:
Cutting Gaza City from the south by seizing the Netzarim Corridor. The purpose of the cut is to place filters on the routes from the city southward and to control the movement of civilians, to prevent the transfer of hostages and the passage of terrorists. Otherwise we will keep playing tag with thousands of terrorists who will flee to the central camps.
Once we have moved the population, even if not all of it, do not allow any aid in, especially water. Hamas has plenty of aid and food, but water is hard to store. Within about two to three weeks of fighting, without the entry of water, Hamas will come out exhausted and thirsty with hands raised and will surrender. If we do not do this, it will harm our forces’ security and wear them down, something we cannot allow. Needless to say, imposing a siege on Hamas fighters is anchored in the laws of armed conflict, and we must exhaust this measure fully.
Hamas terrorists in the Gaza Strip. Photo: EPA EPA
Military force alone is not enough. A strategy of several parallel efforts is required, but defeating Hamas in Gaza City can help bring about the defeat of the organization as a whole and the faster return of the hostages. There are risks for our forces and for the hostages. I will elaborate on that in a separate article.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Oren Solomon is a former senior official in the Prime Minister’s Office and commander of operations in the IDF Gaza Division.
