The “Gen Z” protest movement that toppled Nepal’s government last week has sent shockwaves around the region. Fueled by longstanding grievances over government corruption and social inequality, Nepalese youth took to the streets on Monday, September 8 to protest a government ban on 26 social media apps (including WhatsApp, Signal, Instagram, Facebook, YouTube, X, LinkedIn, Reddit, WeChat, and others). Amid escalating clashes, security forces shot and killed 19 protesters. Mass outrage ensued. By Tuesday, numerous government buildings had been set ablaze and the prime minister and four other ministers had resigned.
On Chinese social media, prominent nationalist accounts argued that the U.S. was behind the protests, while others pushed back against these claims. One WeChat article, later censored, described the source of youth discontent: “The protests are no longer simply a fight for ‘internet freedom,’ but a deeper generational awakening. Young people are not satisfied with merely restoring social media, but are demanding transparency, accountability, and real political reform.” Another article, published by “Global Citizen Jin Jianguo” on Baidu’s Baijiahao platform, dismissed claims that the unrest was a “color revolution” incited by foreign forces. The author argued instead that resistance is instinctive and a natural product of social injustice:
Conversely, if we subscribe to the “color revolution” narrative, history becomes untenable. [It implies that] the Wuchang Uprising, the Xinhai Revolution, the May Fourth Movement, and even the national independence movement that swept the globe after World War II were nothing more than upheavals fomented by “foreign forces.” No longer is world history a story of war, politics, economics, or culture, but a litany of incitement.
An overview of mass movements, both in China and abroad, reveals that all have their own internal logic. While sometimes influenced by external ideas and forces, all spring from an accumulation of discontent and damaged interests. This is true in the U.K., Poland, the Arab world, and even Nepal.
In other words, you can’t just chalk up mass movements in Asian countries to incitement, while claiming that similar movements in Western countries represent “the People’s choice.” Are all Asians puppets, while only Westerners are considered intelligent citizens?
Admit it: people will always be willing to fight for their own interests. It’s basic human instinct, and doesn’t require anyone to “incite” them—unless of course, they don’t consider themselves human. [Chinese]
Saw Chinese netizen comment under Nepal protest coverage:
水能载舟，亦能覆舟
literally, ‘water can carry the boat, but also overturn it.’
The people overturned yesterday; may we carry forward a boat of trust and renewal today/tomorrow.
— Aneka (奥妮卡） (@anekarebeccaraj) September 10, 2025
In banning numerous foreign social media apps, the Nepalese government had attempted to use a censorship playbook commonly associated with China. Analysts said the plan backfired due to overreach. Compared to populous countries such as India and China, Nepal had less political and commercial leverage to force compliance by foreign social media companies. Moreover, in a country with 20 percent unemployment and almost a third of its GDP coming from remittances abroad, many feared the bans would cut off workers from their families and hurt tourism. Ironically, with numerous government institutions literally burned down, the country debated and chose its future leaders in Discord channels.
This dramatic turn of events reflects a nightmare scenario for leaders in Beijing, who have made government control over online discourse a foundation of their regime security. Charlie Campbell at TIME Magazine described what authoritarians in China and elsewhere may have learned about censorship from Nepal’s protests:
The banning of 26 social-media platforms including Facebook, YouTube, and X was officially due to the companies’ failure to register and submit to government oversight, though protesters attributed the move as an attempt to block the crescendo of online complaints from young people furious at the luxurious lifestyles enjoyed by children of the political elite, so-called “nepo kids.”
[…] “The government in Nepal was trying to use those new social-media regulations to prevent the very thing that happened,” says Michael Kugelman, a D.C.-based South Asia analyst. “So it completely backfired.”
[…] “Beijing officials must be looking on their Kathmandu counterparts with pity and glee, counting their lucky stars that mainland Chinese netizens can’t even miss what Nepalese have fought so hard to get back,” says Sean King, senior vice president focusing on Asia for consulting firm Park Strategies.
[…] At the least, the hope is that the nation’s political class learns to heed criticism rather than just silence it. Unfortunately, the reverse lesson for authoritarian states—and those aspirationally so—is the existential risk of relinquishing control, because not only can you never put the genie back in the bottle, but trying to often just fuels the fire. [Source]
In reaction to the protests, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian “expressed hope that all parties in Nepal can properly address domestic issues, and restore social order and national stability as soon as possible,” as reported by the Global Times. On Sunday, China’s foreign ministry then congratulated Nepal’s new interim leader, former chief justice Sushila Karki. This tumultuous transition also could become geopolitically challenging for China, as the outgoing Nepalese Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli was widely seen as leaning towards Beijing, and analysts argued that his fall could serve as both a setback for Beijing and a potential opening for New Delhi. Just days before the protests, Oli attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit and military parade in China, and held talks with Xi Jinping. China and Nepal also began joint military drills that weekend. Zhao Ziwen at the South China Morning Post compiled other reactions from Chinese analysts about the broader impact of the protests for China and the region:
Liu Zongyi, a senior fellow and director of the Centre for South Asia Studies at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, said the unrest could affect the belt and road plan but activity may pick up later.
“During periods of turmoil, there will certainly be an impact on the Belt and Road Initiative. However, after the turmoil, if their development and prosperity issues cannot be resolved, only China’s Belt and Road Initiative can help them address problems such as having enough to eat and living better lives,” Liu said.
[…] Zhang Jiadong, director of the South Asian Studies Centre at Fudan University, said the social unrest in Nepal was part of the new internal order in South Asia, where “public awakening, economic difficulties and the rise of social media have collectively driven political changes in the region”, adding that he urged Beijing to “pay attention”.
[…] “Beijing, just like any other government in the world, will need to have regular reality checks on the ground, find ways to meet people’s expectations and defuse public dissatisfaction as early as possible and fight corruption as harshly as possible. It can just look around to see what will happen if you fail to address people’s needs,” [said Alfred Wu, an associate professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore]. [Source]
These geopolitical calculations have become familiar for China following political upheaval elsewhere in the region over recent months. Last August, under similar circumstances, a student-led protest movement toppled the government of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who then fled to India. One month later, the Marxist leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake won Sri Lanka’s presidential election, with many analysts predicting he would strengthen relations with China. And over the past two weeks, Indonesia has been engulfed in its own nationwide anti-government protests over corruption, inequality, and police brutality. The unrest forced President Prabowo Subianto to cancel his SCO trip, although he did travel to Beijing for the military parade, where Xi reaffirmed his support for Prabowo’s governance. The visit sent mixed signals to Indonesians. Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat and Yeta Purnama wrote an article on Thursday for the Australian Institute of International Affairs unpacking Prabowo’s decision to travel to China amid the unrest:
For many Indonesians, Prabowo’s appearance in Beijing risks undercutting his credibility at home. He had pledged to stay in Indonesia during the protests, even suggesting he would forgo international engagements out of solidarity with a population demanding fairness and accountability. By attending the parade anyway — even if briefly — he exposed himself to criticism that he is prioritising foreign optics over domestic grievances. That perception could fuel further anger among protesters who already see the political elite as disconnected.
Conversely, for China, Prabowo’s attendance offered reassurance. Although he skipped the SCO summit, his physical presence at the parade alongside other world leaders signalled that Jakarta still values its ties with Beijing. It also demonstrated Indonesia’s willingness to remain engaged with China, despite turbulence at home.
[…] How China interprets the protests is also noteworthy. Some Chinese and Russian outlets hinted at the possibility of “foreign interference,” echoing narratives often applied to unrest elsewhere. Indonesian analysts, however, have been clear that these protests are rooted in local grievances — inequality, corruption, and the death of a delivery driver run over by a police vehicle — rather than geopolitical scheming. [Source]
Additional translation by Cindy Carter.
