On Monday, Reuters reported on the story of a man who tried to flee Gaza by crossing the border into Egypt and then flying to China in order to seek asylum, only to be denied and sent back. As his case illustrates, China’s well-known rhetorical support for Gaza has in many ways not translated into concrete action. In fact, China has appeared to soften its stance towards Israel over the past year. Its criticism over what a U.N. Commission of Inquiry described this week as genocide is directed more at the U.S. and other Western states that undergird Israel’s campaign, rather than at Israel itself. This selectivity serves to undermine the U.S.’ standing relative to China in the eyes of some other countries, while preserving China’s interests in Israel. However, Israel’s increasingly aggressive actions—including recently bombing Qatar’s capital—risk finally pushing Beijing to adopt a more confrontational stance backed by material consequences.
Le Monde Diplomatique published an article this month titled, “Why won’t China confront Israel?”, which argued that “despite rhetorical support and diplomatic gestures, [China is] reluctant to bring its weight to bear on Israel.” One example cited in the article is China’s arms-length relationship with the Hague Group, a coalition of eight Global South states working “take ‘coordinated legal and diplomatic measures’ against Israel’s violations of international law.” China has not become a member of the group, and while it was among 30 countries attending the group’s July summit in Bogotá, it refused to join the 12 signatories of the summit’s joint statement calling for concrete measures against Israel, such as imposing arms embargoes, blocking exports of dual-use technology, and cutting off public financial support to the occupation. Instead, Chinese state media highlighted the summit and critiqued Western support of Israel without mentioning whether China supported the group’s actions.
In a policy memo published this week by the Palestinian think tank Al-Shabaka, Razan Shawamreh summarized China’s position as one of “strategic distance.” She stated that “Washington’s unconditional support for Israel has enabled the violence to continue, giving China space to pose as a principled power while taking no meaningful action”:
By calling for Palestinian unity without exerting pressure on the Israeli government, Beijing shields its ties with the Zionist state under the guise of restraint. In addition, it deflects responsibility for stopping the genocide onto the UN Security Council (UNSC), casting ceasefire, humanitarian access, and prisoner release as obligations for others in order to absolve itself of direct accountability.
Despite presenting itself as a prominent representative of the Global South, China has refrained from assuming a front-line role in confronting Israeli war crimes in Gaza. In contrast to the Hague Group—a coalition of Global South states that leverages international law to contest Israeli impunity—Beijing has avoided taking measures, such as recalling its ambassador, downgrading relations, imposing sanctions, or suspending agreements.
China’s policy is most evident in its refusal to recognize the Gaza crisis as genocide, underscoring its prioritization of domestic and geopolitical interests over meaningful action to halt mass violence against Palestinians. Despite possessing the global standing and political leverage to take a firm stance, Beijing confines itself to performative gestures, such as affirming before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that Palestinians hold an inalienable right to armed resistance. China has not complemented such rhetorical statements with concrete legal or political action. [Source]
The Chinese government’s “strategic distance” appears in stark contrast to previous periods of staunch solidarity with Palestine over the past century. In an article published earlier this year in the Transnational Institute, Zhang Sheng outlined in detail how the Chinese government historically supported Palestinian liberation for decades with diplomatic, financial, and military backing. Even while painting a largely sympathetic picture of Chinese solidarity, Zhang noted significant limitations to the Chinese government’s support of Palestine in the present day:
Lack of understanding of the situation on the ground and unwillingness to put its trade with Israel at risk, the Chinese government is not willing to accept the painful fact that the two-state solution is becoming increasingly unfeasible and China’s goal of becoming a common friend to both Palestine and Israel no longer fits a reality in which Palestinians are facing existential threats. Facing the ongoing genocide in Gaza, the Chinese state has made efforts to support Palestine on diplomatic platforms, but it has not realized the necessity of officially adopting the word “genocide” to define Israeli crimes in Gaza. China officially supports South Africa’s charge against Israeli genocide at the ICJ but has not directly used this concept in its own diplomatic documents.
In addition, the Chinese government has been too obsessed with holding dialogue on its own diplomatic platforms in Beijing as a way of boosting its global reputation, and it has not fully realized that charging Israel through international legal platforms such as the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court, as South Africa did, could in fact be the best way to create a reputable image for China. Last and most importantly, it is indeed a pity that the Chinese state knows very little about the BDS movement, and there is almost no discussion, both within government and in society, on the possibility of China or Chinese academic institutions joining the BDS movement. [Source]
Israeli media and analysts appear to have picked up on China’s contradictory posture, with some suggesting that China’s reluctance to impose material pressure on Israel opens space for both countries to continue, if not deepen, their engagement. In an article published last month in The Jerusalem Post titled, “Is China waking up to Israel’s strategic importance? Beijing rethinks Middle East strategy,” Anat Hochberg-Marom observed that “China’s diplomatic pivot” is “strengthening ties with Israel.” She went on to highlight potential benefits of this evolution for Israel, including a chance to “enhance Israel’s prestige and global image” in the context of Gaza. The outlet published a similar article over the summer. Also last month, Amanda Chen at the ChinaMed Project published an article on Israeli analysts’ perceptions of China’s changing role in the Middle East, particularly over the past few months. Chen found that while most Israeli analysts would still not consider China as the best mediator for the region, a growing number are in favor of a rapprochement, given China’s softening stance toward Israel:
The Israeli media debate on China during and after the war with Iran revealed a notable shift of tone compared to the previous year, as documented in our report, China in the Shadow of October 7: Israeli Media Coverage of China in 2024. Although the extensive media coverage of Beijing’s alleged military support for Tehran reflected lingering estrangement toward China within Israeli public opinion, several China and security experts interpreted the conflict as an opportunity to reassess bilateral ties.
Among those publicly advocating for a rapprochement with China was Ravit Baer, Israel’s consul to Shanghai, who emphasized the importance of preserving bilateral trade relations, which “did not deteriorate significantly despite the conflicts since 2023,” and whose continuity may assist in sustaining Israel’s economy during wartime. The reemergence of a more pragmatic outlook toward China among some Israeli experts, however, was shaped not only by economic considerations but also by diplomatic factors, in particular, the efforts of China’s new ambassador to Israel Xiao Junzheng (肖军正) and Beijing’s subsequent softening of its rhetoric toward Tel Aviv.
[…] Yet resilient economic ties and diplomatic considerations have not translated into a shift in Israeli public perceptions of China. Overriding concerns about national security, coupled with enduring skepticism rooted in China’s initial response to the current war in Gaza and its ties with Iran, remain present, sentiments that are also shared by most Israeli experts. Consequently, while a growing number of analysts support expanding cooperation with China, few extend that optimism to Beijing’s much-discussed aspirations to act as a mediator in the Middle East. [Source]
At the same time, volatile events on the ground may change China’s calculus. Israel’s ongoing invasion of Gaza City and airstrikes in Qatar have elicited particularly strong global condemnation. Al-Monitor stated last week that “China’s response reflects more than run-of-the-mill diplomacy,” adding that sustained instability could prompt Chinese companies to “reconsider risk, adjust plans or slow the rollout of new projects,” given China’s growing economic interests in the region. One Chinese analyst warned that continued Israeli aggression might eventually push Gulf states to consider a “pivot to China” for their security guarantees, which could complicate Israel’s relationship with China. Hinting at the official position, a China Daily editorial this week on the topic of Israel’s strikes in Qatar focused as usual on the U.S. instead of China (“Countries with special influence on Israel should fulfill their responsibility”), and framed its critique of Israel’s actions by appealing to Israeli self-interest (“The true well-being of the Israeli people…” and “Expanding the Gaza crisis into a wider regional conflict serves no party’s interests, including Israel’s own”).
Aware of the shifting tide of global public opinion against Israel as a result of these escalatory actions, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu lashed out this week. He alleged that Israel’s increasing isolation is partly due to efforts of countries “like Qatar and China” to “influence western media with anti-Israel agenda, using bots, artificial intelligence and advertisement,” citing TikTok as an example. Meanwhile, the Israeli government has attempted to conduct its own influence campaigns in Chinese media. An article published earlier this year in the Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies analyzed Israel’s “New Media Public Diplomacy” in China, which aims to leverage social media to shape narratives that improve Israel’s national image.
