The “Zapad-2025” military exercises, whose active phase lasted from September 12-16 primarily on Belarusian territory, were positioned by organizers as “defensive.” However, they were accompanied by a series of provocations against neighboring states. The most notable—drone attacks on Poland and violations of Estonian airspace by Russian fighters—occurred before and after the official conclusion of the exercises, respectively. The Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security analysed the information support of the Russian-Belarusian exercises and related provocations and explains why the Kremlin resorts to them.
Airspace Violations and Other Provocations
On the night of September 9-10, during a combined attack on Ukraine (using over 400 drones and 40 missiles), about twenty Russian unmanned aerial vehicles violated Polish airspace. Some of them flew through Belarusian territory. Both national air forces and NATO rapid response aviation consisting of F-16 and F-35 fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and tankers from the Netherlands and Italy were involved in defending Polish skies.
In response to the attack, Poland blocked its border with Belarus and invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. On September 12, NATO’s “Eastern Sentry” operation began to enhance air defense of the Alliance’s eastern flank countries.
It was precisely during this operation that Russians demonstratively violated the airspace of Romania and Estonia. On September 13, a Russian drone attacking Ukraine crossed the Romanian border, and on September 20, three MiG-31s of the Russian Aerospace Forces remained in Estonian skies for 12 minutes. The next day, NATO interceptors escorted a Russian Il-20M reconnaissance aircraft moving without a flight plan and radio contact in international airspace over the Baltic.
Such incidents can by no means be called coincidental: routes of Russian UAVs during attacks on Ukraine have repeatedly been laid through Romanian and Moldovan territory, and Russian aviation has been regularly violating Baltic countries’ airspace at least since 2014. In 2025 alone, Russian military aircraft and helicopters have already crossed the Estonian border four times.
Additionally, in September, EU civil aviation faced problems with GPS and GNSS navigation systems due to their jamming and coordinate spoofing. These problems are linked to Russian military activity in the Baltic region and Belarus in connection with the “Zapad-2025” exercises. The most high-profile incident was the forced landing of an aircraft carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Bulgaria due to navigation system failure on August 31.
Information Support of the Exercises: Manipulations, Fakes, and Threats
The Kremlin resorted to hybrid tactics for information support of the exercises, which included:
Formal compliance with the OSCE Vienna Document by inviting foreign observers to demonstrate the “transparency” of the exercises;
Filling the information space with contradictory reports regarding the number of Russian and Belarusian military personnel involved in the exercises, units, format of foreign state participation, their number and level of representation;
Saturating the information space of Russia, Belarus, and other countries with fakes, manipulations, and anti-Western pseudo-analytics aimed at promoting narratives about an “aggressive NATO bloc,” “exposing” Polish, Estonian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian “provocations”;
Generating information triggers aimed at provoking discussion of Russian weapons, including nuclear ones, Russia’s capability to create threats to NATO and EU countries, strengthening strategic narratives about Russia’s “invincible army” and the “weakness” and “indecisiveness” of the EU and NATO;
Interference in foreign states’ information space.
Official Belarusian and Russian statements regarding the number of military personnel involved in the exercises, foreign countries, and the level of their involvement differed significantly. Since the beginning of the year, Belarus’s Ministry of Defense had several times announced participation in the exercises of either 13,000 or 6,850 Russian and Belarusian military personnel. Meanwhile, Russia’s Ministry of Defense named a different figure—50,000 and more. Later, Putin doubled it to 100,000, and his statement was uncritically spread by both Russian media and world media. Simultaneously, the international information space was filled with assessments from analytical centers that mostly operated with figures in the range of 20-30,000 exercise participants.
Russian and Belarusian statements about the number of exercise participants
A similar situation existed with information about foreign state involvement: Minsk claimed 23, Moscow—25 delegations.
Facts of foreign military contingent participation in the exercises (primarily from India) and the presence of observers from NATO countries in Belarus—the US, Turkey, Hungary—predictably received increased attention. Putin and Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zakharova made complimentary statements about India’s involvement, also aimed at provoking confrontation between this state and the US and the “collective West” as a whole.
Заява Захарової «на захист Індії»
At the same time, New Delhi emphasized that India’s participation in the Russian-Belarusian exercises had no anti-Western orientation.
Accusations against NATO countries of intentions to disrupt “Zapad-2025” were a component of information preparation and support for the exercises. Specifically, as early as May, Russian internet resources spread planted stories about Polish military and intelligence services preparing terrorist attacks or even a “special military operation in Belarus.”
Russian planted stories about “Polish threat to Belarus”
During the Russian drone attack on September 10, the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security recorded malicious interference in Polish information space. The purpose of the interference was to disorient and demoralize the audience and strengthen anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland.
READ ALSO: Russia Embarks on Blitz of Disinformation in Conjunction With Attack on Poland
On the eve of the exercises in August-September and directly during the active phase, the information space of Russia and Belarus was filled with materials that ridiculed security measures in Poland and the Baltic countries, as well as “refutations” of “Ukrainian,” “Polish,” “Lithuanian,” and other “fakes.”
“Refutation of foreign fake”
That is, the potential adversary—the NATO bloc and its participants—according to military propaganda traditions, was portrayed as treacherous and dangerous while simultaneously weak and incompetent.
Ridiculing NATO countries’ security measures and promoting the narrative about the Alliance’s “panic”
Meanwhile, organizers’ assurances about the defensive nature of the exercises were accompanied by measures aimed at intimidating citizens of EU and NATO states:
Provocations in Polish, Estonian, Romanian airspace and in neutral skies over the Baltic;
Demonstrative deployment of strike weapons in the Kaliningrad region—Russia’s Baltic exclave bordering Poland and Lithuania on land;
Practicing offensive measures using strategic aviation, the hypersonic “Zircon” missile, statements about “Oreshnik” deployment;
Simulating tactical nuclear weapons use.
Spreading information about the nuclear component of the exercises
Publication about deploying “Iskander” missiles in Kaliningrad region
“Zapad-2025,” the “Gerasimov Doctrine,” and the Kremlin’s Strategic Objectives
The “Zapad-2025” exercises and accompanying provocations, like other Russian army maneuvers, fully correspond to the so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine.” The Russian General Staff chief presented the concept of hybrid warfare in 2013, which involves combining military and non-military means of influencing the enemy in conflict conditions. Exercises on the border with NATO countries, violations of their airspace, and demonstration of weapons that pose potential threats to these countries are examples of applying military means within the framework of the mentioned doctrine. The Kremlin attempts to enhance their effectiveness through informational, diplomatic, and other formally non-military instruments.
Table from the article “The Value of Science in Foresight,” which outlines provisions of the “Gerasimov Doctrine”
The application of these influence measures is part of Russia’s strategy aimed at maximum weakening and destruction of NATO and European Union unity. The Kremlin seeks to:
Convince the world of NATO and EU inability to ensure member countries’ security and unwillingness to defend each other from potential military aggression;
By creating threats directly to NATO and EU countries, blackmail them and force them to weaken military, economic, and diplomatic support for Ukraine, preventing its inclusion in the European and Euro-Atlantic security perimeter;
Strengthen Russia’s international positions and confirm the Kremlin’s claims to geopolitical pole status with its own sphere of influence in Europe and other continents.
By combining aggressive actions and juggling contradictory statements, the Putin regime and its Belarusian satellite attempt to influence anxiety levels in European countries’ societies. Especially considering that Russia already has experience using military exercises as a preparatory stage for armed aggression: the Russian-Belarusian exercises “Zapad-2021” (September 2021) and “Allied Resolve” (February 2022) were followed by a full-scale invasion of Ukraine from Russian and Belarusian territory. Similarly, the “Caucasus-2008” exercises escalated into Russian aggression against Georgia in August 2008.
The Kremlin’s strategic goal is to destroy the international law system, Euro-Atlantic collective security structures, and form a new geopolitical reality. In this reality, forcible border changes and armed conflicts are the norm, sovereignty is ensured exclusively by military force, and there is no place for a united Europe.
The Putin regime tests reactions and seeks weak links in the collective security system by attacking the information and cyberspace of EU and NATO countries and violating the sovereignty of states on the Alliance’s eastern flank.
Only joint efforts of European countries and their partners and allies, consistent support for Ukraine and full security and economic integration with the EU and NATO, and increased pressure on Russia can stop Russia’s current aggression, minimize risks, and secure Europe and the world from new wars.
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