Shafaq News
For more than fifteen years, the sudden “retirements” and
repeated political maneuvers of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the
Patriotic Shiite Movement (formerly Sadrist), have dominated Iraq’s political
scene, each announcement reshaping power within the Shiite camp and influencing
the broader national landscape.
From being a reluctant ally of former Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki to later demanding his removal, and from leading protests with chants
of “Eradicate Them”, a slogan he used to target the political elite he blamed
for government mismanagement and corruption, to repeatedly withdrawing and
returning, al-Sadr has remained an unpredictable force. He often announces his
retirement at the peak of a crisis, only to reemerge and reshape the political
game in unexpected ways.
The First Crisis
Al-Sadr’s confrontation with the political establishment
dates to 2010, when he opposed al-Maliki’s second term after clashes in 2008
between Iraqi forces and his Mahdi Army (Saraya Al-Salam), an armed faction he
later disbanded.
Following months of deadlock after the 2010 election, the
Shiite National Alliance, which includes
major parties, reached an agreement on
October 1, 2010, to back al-Maliki for another term. Al-Sadr’s bloc, with 39
seats, joined al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition, which held 89 seats, a move
that proved decisive for al-Maliki’s return to office.
The alliance quickly unraveled. Al-Sadr later aligned with
efforts to withdraw confidence from al-Maliki, raising concern in the
government and effectively splitting the Shiite bloc. The reversal turned their
relationship into a defining rift within Shiite politics.
Storming the Zone
In March 2013, al-Sadr threatened to withdraw from
parliament, describing the legislature as “feeble.” By August, he formally
announced his retirement from politics. A year later, in February 2014, he
reiterated the decision, ordering his movement’s offices closed even though it
had won 36 seats in parliament.
What many Iraqis described as frustration over corruption
and inadequate services soon brought al-Sadr back to the streets. Protests
began on May 31, 2015, in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square and grew into weekly rallies.
When al-Sadr joined in March 2016, chants of “Eradicate
Them” spread, and he encouraged sit-ins at the gates of the Green Zone, the
fortified district in central Baghdad housing government offices and foreign
embassies. Days later, he pitched a tent inside the compound, while his
supporters camped outside its walls.
The confrontation escalated on April 30, 2016, when
thousands of his supporters stormed the Zone after parliament blocked Prime
Minister Haider al-Abadi’s proposed cabinet reshuffle. They withdrew the
following day.
Read more: Al-Sadr tightens grip from outside politics, sets high bar for return
Cyclic Retreats
On October 4, 2018, al-Sadr announced another withdrawal
from politics, emphasizing that his Sairoon Coalition would not nominate
candidates for the new government. In December 2019, he ordered his movement’s
institutions shut for a year, including the social media accounts of his close
aide Mohammed Saleh al-Iraqi, known as “al-Sadr’s minister.”
On July 15, 2021, al-Sadr announced his seventh withdrawal,
stating he would not participate in elections due to corruption. Within three
months, he reversed course, allowing his bloc to contest the October 2021 early
election, where it secured the largest number of seats.
The election followed mass protests in 2019 that forced
Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi to resign. Demonstrations, fueled by anger over
corruption, unemployment, and poor services, had swept Baghdad and southern
provinces.
It was on June 15, 2022, when al-Sadr left politics again,
directing his 73 lawmakers to resign after his bloc failed to form a
government. Two months later, he declared what he described as his “final”
retirement, closing his offices except for family shrines and heritage
institutions. He pledged not to participate in politics again.
In recent weeks, the cleric reaffirmed his boycott of the
November 11 parliamentary election. Responding to a letter from President Abdul
Latif Rashid urging him to reconsider, Al-Sadr affirmed: “I will not be a
partner of the corrupt,” adding that his call to boycott was not aimed at
delaying or cancelling the vote but at protesting endemic corruption.
Read more: Iraq’s political crossroads: Al-Sadr’s boycott,Al-Hakim’s mediation
Plot and Paths
Tensions intensified in the last days, after activist Ali
Fadhil claimed that there was a plot to assassinate al-Sadr during a visit to
his father’s shrine in Najaf, using an armed drone allegedly linked to State of
Law MP Yasser Al-Maliki.
The claims prompted deployments by Saraya al-Salam,
al-Sadr’s military wing, in several provinces. al-Maliki issued a statement
rejecting the allegations, describing them as “fabrications aimed at sowing
strife,” further indicating he would pursue legal action.
Al-Sadr responded by urging calm, warning that his movement
would not be drawn into disorder. “Such leaks will not cause sedition,” he
emphasized, highlighting that his movement relied on “the awareness and
patriotism of its supporters.”
Read more: Concerns and boycott: Will the Iraqi November elections proceed on schedule?
A contact close to al-Sadr informed Shafaq News that al-Sadr
has increasingly isolated himself, consulting only a narrow circle of
confidants. His recent messages, the contact noted, point to a more cautious
yet sharper assessment of Iraq’s political crisis.
Al-Sadr is reportedly weighing three potential paths:
returning to the streets with protests and sit-ins that could disrupt the
election; allowing the vote to proceed while urging a boycott, which could
depress turnout and challenge its legitimacy; or holding back until regional
developments push toward a postponement.
According to the contact, al-Sadr appears to be counting on
implicit international backing to withhold recognition of the results if
turnout is too low—particularly with banned armed factions expected to
participate. Such a scenario could pave the way for an emergency government,
with Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani potentially replaced by a figure
such as former premier Mustafa al-Kadhimi.
In parallel, the Coordination Framework, al-Sadr’s main
Shiite rival bloc, dispatched an envoy offering him the chance to nominate the
next prime minister, in return for staying out of the election. Al-Sadr
dismissed the offer, keeping his own options open.
Even in retreat, al-Sadr’s presence hangs over Iraq’s
politics—never entirely visible, never absent, yet leaving unresolved questions
about how far his influence truly reaches.
Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.
Read more: Leaks and smear politics: Iraq’s elections underthe shadow of distrust
