2025-11-19T07:32:30+00:00
font
Enable Reading Mode
A-
A
A+
Shafaq News – Erbil
By Manish
Rai*
In the
recently concluded Iraqi federal legislative elections, the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) has emerged as a significant victor, obtaining over 9.4
percent of the total votes cast. KDP received over 1,080,000 votes, the
greatest total of any party in the country. Among parties in the Kurdistan
Region and disputed areas, the KDP emerged as the leading party. Furthermore,
five minority-quota candidates supported by the KDP nationwide also secured
seats, thereby enhancing the party’s influence at the federal level. Despite
obtaining over one million votes, the KDP secured 27 parliamentary seats,
whereas Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s bloc, with 1.32 million votes,
secured 46 seats. This is due to Iraq’s multi-constituency electoral system, whereby
each province functions as a distinct voting district, which persistently
disadvantages high-turnout regions such as the Kurdistan Region. Notably,
despite a boycott by Muqtada al-Sadr’s influential movement, voter
participation increased to 56%, representing a 13-point rise from the 2021 low
of 43%. This plainly demonstrates that Al-Sadr is diminishing in the widespread
support he once commanded.
To explore
in greater depth the factors responsible for electoral success, I conversed
with Mr. Aram Nasih, a political commentator and member of the KDP based in
Erbil. Mr. Nasih stated that, in his view, numerous factors have contributed to
this success. He stated that the KDP advocates a nationalist discourse and
regards itself as the guardian of the legitimate Kurdish cause, which leads the
party to vigorously defend the rights of the Kurds. This has prompted all
individuals with strong Kurdish patriotic sentiments to align themselves with
the discourse of the KDP. Nasih emphasized that KDP promoted sound governance
and prioritized infrastructure development, which was duly recognized by the
populace. He further stated that the KDP is a centralized party, which enables
it to execute policy decisions with a high degree of accuracy. Commenting
further, Nasih stated that the charisma of President Masoud Barzani
significantly contributes to the party’s success. During the election campaign,
the KDP emphasized its insistence on the complete enforcement of the Iraqi
Constitution, particularly concerning federalism and the autonomy of the
Kurdistan Region. This message resonated strongly with electors who perceive
that constitutional commitments have yet to be fulfilled. By positioning itself
as the custodian of constitutional equilibrium and the advocate for Kurdish
rights within Iraq’s federal framework, the KDP reaffirmed its position as the
defender of both regional sovereignty and national stability. Furthermore, a
significant factor contributing to the KDP’s electoral strength was its focus
on inclusivity and coexistence. The party’s outreach extended beyond Kurdish
electors, resonating with Turkmen, Christians, and Yazidis, many of whom
endorsed or supported the KDP’s List 275. This cross-community appeal
facilitated the expansion of the KDP’s support base and strengthened its
reputation as a party dedicated to collective progress, diversity, and peaceful
coexistence—values that propelled the momentum of one million votes.
These
results are likely to encourage the KDP to maintain its stance regarding the
formation of the new Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) cabinet. This, in
turn, could also impact the formation of the government in Baghdad, as the KDP
now ranks among the top three blocs in terms of seats at the federal level and
may exert considerable influence over the Iraqi presidency, a position
traditionally held by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) since 2003.
Simultaneously, negotiations concerning the new federal government in Baghdad
could expand the opportunities for the KDP and PUK, allowing them to negotiate
compromises on critical issues and ministerial portfolios that may aid in the
formation of a government within the KRG.
Iraq’s
political landscape has historically been defined by a complex triangulation
among Baghdad’s central authority, the autonomous Kurdistan Region, and various
sectarian power brokers. The electoral successes of the Kurdish Democratic
Party signify more than mere regional political developments; they indicate a
possible shift in the power dynamics that have shaped post-Saddam Iraq. Prime
Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, who has endeavoured to sustain a delicate
balance among rival factions, now confronts an empowered Kurdish bloc that may
seek increased concessions or pose a risk to the stability of his coalition
government. The enhanced standing of Barzani’s party may encourage Kurdish
calls for a greater portion of oil revenues, increased autonomy in
international oil agreements, or even renewed debates regarding independence—a
prospect that has long loomed over Iraq since the 2017 Kurdish referendum.
Political actors aiming to exert influence in Baghdad must now engage with
Erbil more assertively, possibly providing concessions that could undermine
federal authority or provoke opposition from other ethnic and sectarian
communities.
Conversely,
KDP’s supporters will also closely scrutinize the party’s performance,
particularly in its core strongholds. Within Kurdistan, voters will evaluate
the KDP’s mandate in terms of its capacity to foster stable relations with
other Kurdish parties, resolve economic challenges, and respond to public
concerns regarding governance, transparency, and opportunities for the younger
generation. Opponents and critics will assess whether the party employs its
newfound influence to exert dominance over institutions or to redefine
power-sharing based on more explicit, rule-based principles. In Baghdad, the
party’s effectiveness will be evaluated during coalition negotiations: will it
be able to establish enduring agreements regarding oil, budget allocations, and
salary assurances that mitigate recurring crises between Erbil and the federal
government? Or will it be limited by wider national negotiations involving
Shiite factions, Sunni coalitions, and external stakeholders?
*Author is a
Geopolitical Analyst and Columnist for Middle-East and Af-Pak
This opinion
does not necessarily represent Shafaq News Agency’s point of view.
