A growing debate is emerging in Washington over whether President Donald Trump’s tariff-driven economic strategy is putting the United States at risk of “losing” India as a long-term strategic partner. The concern is not about India’s strategic importance — which remains undisputed — but whether Trump’s heavy use of tariffs, public threats and sanctions pressure is eroding the trust that underpinned 25 years of incremental, bipartisan progress in the relationship.
For two decades, the US–India partnership followed a steady upward arc: the civil nuclear deal under George W. Bush, expanded defence cooperation under Barack Obama, and India’s elevation as a core pillar of the Indo-Pacific strategy under Joe Biden. The relationship rested on a basic understanding — that the US would respect India’s strategic autonomy, while India would deepen security, economic and technology ties with Washington.
Trump’s second term has disrupted that trajectory. His administration has re-politicised the relationship by imposing aggressive tariffs and framing India repeatedly as a trade offender. In August 2025, the US introduced an additional 25% tariff on a wide range of Indian imports, pushing duties on some products to nearly 50%. Both Indian and American officials privately describe the relationship as having reached a new low.
Tariffs Hit India’s Key Export Sectors
The new tariff regime strikes at labour-intensive Indian industries such as textiles, leather goods, footwear, jewellery and pharmaceuticals — sectors where profit margins are tight and US demand is essential. The US was India’s largest export market in 2024, receiving goods worth almost USD 90 billion.
By raising duties to levels approaching a quasi-embargo, analysts warn that small and medium exporters could be forced out of the US market entirely. Trump has also threatened 100% tariffs on imported branded pharmaceuticals unless companies shift production to the US — a direct challenge to one of India’s most globally competitive sectors.
Publicly, the administration has justified the measures by citing old grievances over India’s tariff policies and new anger over India’s purchases of discounted Russian oil following the Ukraine war. But in New Delhi, the message appears different: Washington is now willing to weaponise trade against a partner that has moved ever closer to the US on technology, defence and China.
Sanctions Pressure Reinforces Mistrust
Beyond tariffs, India remains under the shadow of potential US secondary sanctions because of its defence and oil ties with Russia. While Trump previously issued a waiver for India’s purchase of S-400 missile systems, US officials continue to warn that deeper Russian collaboration could trigger penalties under the CAATSA sanctions law.
To Indian policymakers, this signals a deeper structural mistrust of India’s strategic autonomy — even as Washington expects India to serve as a frontline partner in the Indo-Pacific. The inconsistency has sharpened India’s internal debate on whether the US is a stable and reliable anchor for its long-term geopolitical strategy.
Warnings Inside Washington
Concern in Washington is being expressed unusually openly. At a recent Congressional hearing, Democratic Congresswoman Sydney Kamlager-Dove warned that Trump’s confrontational approach risked inflicting “long-term damage” on one of America’s most consequential partnerships. She accused Trump of taking a relationship that the Biden administration handed over “at the height of its strength” — with an invigorated Quad, new defence tech initiatives and regional supply-chain partnerships — and “flushing that progress down the toilet.”
Think-tank experts have echoed this alarm, arguing that Trump risks reversing two decades of careful diplomatic investment by dragging the relationship back into an era of transactional politics and mutual grievance. The worry is not that India will swing toward China, but that New Delhi will hedge more aggressively: strengthening ties with Russia, leaning on BRICS, and treating US partnership offers as temporary rather than foundational.
An Optics Problem in Trump 2.0
Compounding the tensions is a perception in India that it has been deprioritised in Trump’s foreign-policy machinery. The US ambassadorship to India has been vacant for months, parts of the National Security Council’s South Asia team remain understaffed, and the Quad grouping has gone largely quiet despite heightened Chinese assertiveness.
Taken together, these factors reinforce a growing view in New Delhi that the institutional backbone of US engagement is fraying — even as the US publicly describes India as indispensable.
As the debate in Washington intensifies, the central question now being asked is whether Trump’s tariff and sanctions posture risks doing lasting damage to one of America’s most strategically important partnerships of the 21st century.
