Shafaq News
With the Federal Supreme Court ratifying
the final results of Iraq’s sixth parliamentary elections, the country has
formally crossed from the electoral phase into the far more consequential
battle of power formation. Constitutionally, the path ahead appears clear and
tightly timed. Politically, however, Iraq is entering a familiar zone of uncertainty
where deadlines often collide with entrenched rivalries, veto power, and
fragile consensus-building.
The court’s approval is not a procedural
formality. Under Article 93 (Seventh) of the 2005 constitution, it is the
decisive legal act that gives binding force to the election results and
activates the timetable for forming the three constitutional authorities: the
legislature, the presidency, and the executive branch. What unfolds in the
coming weeks will determine whether Iraq can finally translate constitutional
text into political discipline—or once again drift into prolonged paralysis.
From Certification to Parliament
With the Federal Supreme Court’s ruling
now issued, Iraq’s constitutional timetable has formally taken effect. The
constitution obliges the president to invite lawmakers to their first
parliamentary session within 15 days of ratification. In line with this
requirement, President Abdul Latif Rashid issued a republican decree setting
December 29 as the date for the inaugural session of the newly elected Council
of Representatives.
Legal expert Nawfal Al-Hayani stressed
that parliament does not legally exist before the court’s ratification,
rendering any actions taken before that point constitutionally void. Should the
president fail to issue such an invitation, the legislature would convene
automatically on the sixteenth day, chaired by the oldest member of parliament,
Tasmeem Alliance MP Amer Al-Fayez, in accordance with constitutional procedure.
The inaugural session itself carries a
narrowly defined mandate: administering the constitutional oath and electing
the speaker and two deputies. Completion of this step formally establishes the
legislative authority and unlocks the next—and far more politically
sensitive—phase of the process: electing the president of the republic.
Read more: Iraq’s new parliament: Defining the next decade
The Presidency: Iraq’s Political
Chokepoint
Legal expert Mohammad Jumaa noted that once
the Speaker of Parliament is elected, the incumbent president loses any
constitutional basis to continue exercising his duties, transforming the
presidency from a largely ceremonial role into a decisive institutional
threshold.
Under Article 70 of the constitution,
parliament must elect a new president within 30 days of its first session, a
process that requires a two-thirds majority—220 out of 329 lawmakers. While the
office itself carries limited executive authority, its role is structurally
pivotal. Without a president, no prime minister can be nominated, and the
entire government formation process comes to a standstill.
Legal analyst Abbas Al-Aqabi warned that
missing this deadline would plunge Iraq into a constitutional vacuum, freezing
presidential powers and suspending executive formation. Such a scenario, he
cautioned, could force extraordinary measures, including extending parliament’s
term or moving toward early elections.
“Previous attempts by the Council of
Representatives to bypass constitutional deadlines through the so-called ‘open
session’ tactic have been explicitly rejected by the Federal Supreme Court,”
Jumaa told Shafaq News. He added that the Supreme Judicial Council has
reaffirmed the binding nature of these timelines, leaving no legal room for
reinterpretation. Failure to elect a president within 30 days of the Speaker’s
election, he said, would automatically trigger a constitutional vacuum.
The risk is not theoretical. Since 2005,
the presidency has been allocated to the Kurdish component by political
convention, yet rivalry between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has repeatedly turned the post into a
political pressure point. Ghazi Faisal, head of the Iraqi Center for Strategic
Studies, noted that while the PUK traditionally claims the position, the KDP
argues that its electoral weight—exceeding one million votes—entitles it to
compete.
If both parties put forward rival
candidates, the two-thirds quorum requirement revives the specter of the
“blocking third,” allowing any coalition with more than 109 MPs to derail the
session by denying quorum—a tactic that paralyzed Iraq’s political process
after the 2021 elections.
Read more: Five contenders eye Iraq’s top post: PM selection looms
Shiite Majority, Internal Balancing
On paper, the Shiite Coordination
Framework enters this phase from a position of dominance. Following the
accession of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani’s Construction and
Development Coalition (Al-Ima’ar Wal Tanmiyah,) the framework claims more than 175
seats, making it the largest parliamentary bloc and constitutionally entitled
to nominate the prime minister.
Yet numerical strength does not guarantee
internal consensus. According to Shafaq News sources, the framework is weighing
multiple candidates, including Al-Sudani, former Prime Minister Haider
Al-Abadi, and a third, as-yet-unannounced figure. Earlier criteria barring bloc
leaders from the premiership were quietly eased, reopening competition among
major factions.
This internal balancing act reflects
Iraq’s executive leadership, which is rarely decided by electoral results
alone, but by negotiated accommodation within the dominant Shiite camp—often
before formal constitutional steps are completed.
Sunni Arena: Agreement or Appearance?
Within the Sunni component, the
speakership appears closer to resolution—but not without friction. Sovereignty
Party (Al-Siyada) leader Nawaf Al-Ghariri said the post had been settled in
favor of Mohammed Al-Halbousi, a claim contested by former MP Bassem Khashan, who
continues to cite a prior Federal Supreme Court ruling that removed Al-Halbousi
from office.
Although the judiciary cleared Al-Halbousi
of forgery charges in April 2025—allowing his return to electoral politics—the
controversy underscores lingering divisions. Meanwhile, the Sunni National
Political Council has narrowed its list of candidates to three names, with
reports of near-consensus around Muthanna Al-Samarrai, alongside Al-Halbousi
and Thabet Al-Abbasi.
The outcome will test whether Sunni forces
can present a unified front or whether internal rivalries will complicate the
broader power-sharing equation.
Deadlines on Paper, Delays in Practice
Iraq’s constitution establishes a
cumulative ceiling of 90 days to complete government formation—from ratification
to parliamentary confidence in the cabinet. In theory, these periods are
non-extendable. In practice, Iraq’s post-2003 experience tells a different
story.
After the 2010 elections, disputes over
the “largest bloc” delayed government formation by more than seven months. In
2020, Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi failed to form a cabinet despite being formally
designated. Following the 2021 vote, Iraq endured a nine-month political vacuum
that ended only after mass protests, deadly clashes, and Muqtada Al-Sadr’s
withdrawal from parliament, paving the way for Abdul Latif Rashid’s election
and Al-Sudani’s appointment in October 2022.
These precedents have normalized delay,
weakening the deterrent effect of constitutional deadlines.
Consensus Still Uncertain
Members of the Coordination Framework,
including State of Law Coalition figure Imran Al-Karkoushi, expressed to Shafaq
News optimism that this cycle will proceed smoothly and within legal limits.
Kurdish Democratic Party official Wafa Mohammed Karim, however, cautioned that
past failures to “respect “constitutional timelines—especially on the
presidency—remain a warning sign.
“If the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan agree on a single candidate for the presidency,
the process could move forward more quickly,” Karim told Shafaq News. “But if
both parties put forward separate nominees, they will be forced to seek
alliances with other political forces, which would inevitably prolong the
process.”
At its core, Iraq’s political system operates
on consensus across sectarian and ethnic lines, yet relies on constitutional
mechanisms that empower minorities to block outcomes. This tension—between
inclusivity and efficiency—has repeatedly produced stalemate.
The Federal Supreme Court has now done its
part. Whether Iraq’s political actors can do theirs will shape not only the
next government, but also the credibility of the constitutional order itself.
As the clock ticks, the focus shifts from what the constitution requires to
whether Iraq’s political class is willing to allow it to govern.
Read more: New term, new battle: Six candidates chase Iraq’s speakership
Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.
