CDT presents a monthly series of censored content that has been added to our “404 Deleted Content Archive.” Each month, we publish a summary of content blocked or deleted (often yielding the message “404: content not found”) from Chinese platforms such as WeChat, Weibo, Douyin (TikTok’s counterpart in the Chinese market), Xiaohongshu (RedNote), Bilibili, Zhihu, Douban, and others. Although this content archived by CDT Chinese editors represents only a small fraction of the online content that disappears each day from the Chinese internet, it provides valuable insight into which topics are considered “sensitive” over time by the Party-state, cyberspace authorities, and platform censors. Our fully searchable Chinese-language “404 Deleted Content Archive,” currently contains 2,320 deleted articles, essays, and other pieces of content. The entry for each deleted item includes the author/social media account name, the original publishing platform, the subject matter, the date of deletion, and more information.
Below is Part One of CDT’s summary of deleted content from November 2025. Between November 1-30, CDT Chinese added 30 new articles, mostly from WeChat, to the archive. Topics targeted for deletion in November included: the catastrophic highrise fire at Hong Kong’s Wang Fuk Court; criticism of Tencent for censoring investigative reporting from reputed Shanghai media outlet The Paper; Sanae Takaichi’s controversial comments on Taiwan and their effects on Sino-Japanese relations and Chinese tourism to Japan; the plight of migrant workers returning to the countryside due to sluggish job prospects in cities; and ongoing attempts by officials in Miangyang, Sichuan province to control public opinion about a serious phosphate pollution problem there. (Note that the dates in this summary refer to when an article was published on the CDT website, not when it was deleted from Chinese social-media platforms.)
“Independent Bookstores: Sustaining the Promise of Public Life,” WeChat account 蓝书屋 (Lán Shūwū, Blaues Haus Bibliothek)
November 1, 2025
In early November, there seemed a real possibility that Chengdu’s beloved You Xing Bookstore (有杏书店, Yǒu Xìng Shūdiàn) would soon close due to “force majeure.” This promoted an outpouring of tributes from customers and supporters; about a week later came the welcome news that the bookstore had received a reprieve and would stay in business. This now-deleted article from Blaues Haus Bibliothek (蓝书屋, Lán Shūwū, a Chinese-language community library, event space, and foundation in Hanover, Germany) recounts an appearance in Hanover by You Xing Bookstore founder Zhang Feng, who discussed the vital role of independent bookstores as community spaces. Zhang compares China’s urban bookstores of today to Chengdu’s traditional tea houses: vital public spaces for socializing and discussion.
“Time’s Running Out for the Supreme People’s Court To Act,” by Li Yuchen, WeChat account Spare Zhou Quan and Li Dong From Execution
November 1, 2025
This article describes the tireless efforts of Gao Fang, the wife of defendant Zhou Quan, to save him from execution. Zhou Quan and Li Dong are two migrant workers sentenced to death for what prosecutors claim was their role in a 2016 gang-related melee in Kunming that killed two men. (A number of Zhou and Li’s co-defendants were also convicted, but sentenced to lesser terms.) The defendants’ families appealed to China’s Supreme Court, claiming that the judicial process was corrupted, the men were unfairly scapegoated, the real gangsters were allowed to evade justice, and that vital exculpatory evidence (including dashcam video) was withheld or altered. In a last-ditch effort to save her husband, Gao Fang offered a one-million yuan reward to any member of the public who could help her locate the missing evidence. Li Yuchen’s article notes: “This is probably the first time in Chinese judicial history that a relative of a prisoner facing execution has publicly offered a reward for unearthing key evidence that ought to have been preserved by government authorities.” On October 31, Zhou and Li were executed.
“The Legend of Mt. Luojia Should Not Be Forgotten: Wuhan University’s ‘Liu Daoyu Era,’” WeChat account 學人Scholar (Xuérén Scholar)
November 7, 2025
A tribute to Liu Daoyu, a courageous reformer and educator who died on November 7 at the age of 92. During Liu’s tenure as president of Wuhan University from 1981-88, he fostered an open and liberal academic environment, leading some to describe him as the “Cai Yuanpei of Wuhan University.” Liu’s reforms included introducing the academic credit system; allowing students to declare major and minor courses of study, and to have more freedom in course selection; allowing transfer students; organizing loans for students with financial difficulties; and much more. After his abrupt dismissal in 1988 by political authorities, Liu maintained a busy schedule of educational research, writing, and lecturing, and continued to speak frankly about the Chinese educational system until his final years.
“Mysterious ‘PhDs’ Infiltrate WeChat Group Chat on ‘Mianyang Government Response to Public Opinion’ and Manage to Get the Group Banned Within a Week!” WeChat account The Situation’s Complicated
November 7, 2025
Yet another deleted post about citizen efforts to raise awareness of serious industrial pollution in Mianyang, Sichuan province, from a WeChat account focused on environmental activism. (At least three posts from the same account on the same topic were censored in October.) This short post offers only a brief summary of the drama (described by the author as “a real-life game of ‘Assassin’”) behind pollution-themed WeChat group chats that were infiltrated by local officials claiming, variously, to be ordinary concerned citizens, or specialists with PhDs. At the bottom of the post, there is a link to a Tencent Document containing more information, but it now displays a message stating that the document has been blocked for violating Tencent Docs’ community rules.
“The Cadres Have Left the Group Chat, and the PhDs Have Entered,” WeChat account The Situation’s Complicated
November 7, 2025
A more detailed piece on the WeChat group chat mentioned above. Initially, a small 13-member group chat about industrial pollution in Mianyang, Sichuan, was infiltrated by several “suspicious” individuals who seemed intent on dissuading activism and stoking fear among the other members. One of these was later unmasked as Xie Jun, a local CCP committee chairman responsible for “ecological and environmental protection.” After the group chat’s organizers called him out and began addressing him as “Chairman Xie,” he promptly left the chat. This was followed by the formation of a second, larger WeChat group specifically focused on the Mianyang local government’s efforts to “manage public opinion” about the pollution problem. This group seemed to have an even larger number of infiltrators, some billing themselves as experts with PhDs. After accumulating 256 members and tens of thousands of messages within a week, the second group chat was abruptly shut down. “In this digital village of over 200 people,” writes the author, “the curtain of night has fallen. In a fog of suspicion, irony, and masquerading, who are the real concerned citizens? Who are the hired assassins? Who are the thrill-seeking onlookers? When truth becomes the scarcest resource, how can we distinguish friend from foe, or fact from falsehood?”
“Shandong’s Heating Subsidy Standards Reveal Stark Status Gaps,” by Xu Peng, WeChat account Du Fu of Huanhua Creek
November 10, 2025
This article from current-affairs blogger Xu Peng’s now-deleted WeChat account Du Fu of Huanhua Creek examines the enormous disparities between winter-heating subsidies for different groups of people in Shandong province, where heating subsidies range as high as 4,100 yuan for retired department-level government officials, and 1,700 yuan for
retired company workers. Meanwhile, impoverished urban households get 600 yuan, orphans and impoverished rural households only 300 yuan, and the unemployed a mere 185 yuan. Xu argues that these subsidies should be need-based to protect the most vulnerable, rather than status-based giveaways to the already affluent.
“A Grassroots Worker and Her Vanished Weekends During 36 Days of Mosquito Eradication,” WeChat account 极昼工作室 (Jízhòu Gōngzuòshì, “Midnight Sun Studio”)
November 10, 2025
A long article about the rigors facing local residents and grassroots mosquito-eradication workers during a recent outbreak of the mosquito-borne Chikungunya virus in Jiangmen, Guangdong province. Pseudonymous interviewees describe the daily grind of fumigation, removal of stagnant water and potted plants, door-to-door education campaigns, distribution of mosquito coils, and more. Some workers said that they had been working overtime and weekends, and had to field frequent complaints from residents unhappy about what they viewed as “pandemic-prevention overreach”—entering people’s homes without permission, for example, or discarding plants that had been placed on balconies. Although residents in Jiangmen and elsewhere are aware of the dangers of Chikungunya fever, many remain deeply wary of potential privacy violations after three traumatic years of “zero-COVID” policies in China.
“Reading Between the Lines of the Official Report on the ‘Naked Toddler,’” by Xiang Dongliang, WeChat account Constructive Opinions
November 11, 2025
Prolific blogger Xiang Dongliang weighs in on the case of a “naked toddler” who was filmed crawling around on the ground on all fours at a vehicle service station in Sichuan province. The viral video generated fury online, with many accusing the parents of child neglect and endangerment. Although local officials eventually cleared the parents of any wrongdoing, provided them with social support services, and allowed them to keep custody of their children, many Chinese netizens remained skeptical of the decision and of the family’s avowed “free-range” parenting style. Xiang’s article argues that the deliberately vague language used in the official report conceals genuine neglect and abuse, and calls on the government to protect the child by requiring frequent social service supervision of the family.
“A County-Level Official Lodged a Complaint Against Me for Saying It’s Highly Irregular for a County Party Secretary and Others to Be Reassigned to Deputy Bureau Chief Positions,” by Chu Chaoxin, WeChat account 衣者朝新 (Yīzhě Cháoxīn)
November 12, 2025
Former investigative journalist and current-affairs blogger Chu Chaoxin describes having his social media posts censored and being targeted with complaints for raising questions about several irregular personnel transfers in Yuncheng, Shanxi province. Despite the complaints and censorship, Chu was able to leverage his journalistic contacts and find three independent sources who confirmed that the officials were, in fact, demoted as punishment for violating Party rules on drinking and banqueting, although this fact was not made public.
“My Two Years of Being Treated as a ‘Petitioner’ in Beijing,” by Jin Wei, WeChat account 金无忌 (Jīn Wújì)
November 13, 2025
Jin Wei, a lawyer and former journalist, recounts his two-year ordeal of police harassment and security checks after being erroneously flagged as a “petitioner” by police in Beijing. Although Jin has never petitioned the government, he speculates that the error might be related to a COVID-19 vaccine issue from years prior. He describes being stopped, questioned, and delayed at subways, checkposts, and even tourist sites, which has severely disrupted his life and work. Despite Jin’s repeated complaints and official police confirmation that he isn’t actually a petitioner, he remains caught up in an infinite bureaucratic loop of constant surveillance and harassment.
“By Arbitrarily Censoring News Reports, Has Tencent Appointed Itself as ‘Editor-in-Chief’ of the Media?” by Chen Qingbai, The Paper’s official WeChat account
November 14, 2025
This article from Shanghai-based news outlet The Paper was deleted from that outlet’s official WeChat account, but remains visible on The Paper’s website. It is strongly critical of Tencent’s censorship of The Paper’s video investigative report into e-commerce livestreamers making false claims about the “height-boosting” properties of a brand of milk powder. Tencent claims that it deleted the report because it violated the image-rights of the livestreamers, despite legal provisions allowing the use of such images for news reporting. The Paper argues that Tencent is acting as an “automated editor-in-chief,” overriding legitimate journalism based solely on a complaint from a commercial entity, and warns that this practice creates a form of “soft censorship” in which a technology platform’s commercial power overrides the public value and legal rights of investigative news outlets.
“When Powerful Nations Conduct ‘Deep-Sea Fishing Expeditions’ Against China’s ‘Entrepreneurs,’” WeChat account 木蹊说 (Mù Qī Shuō, “Mu Qi Says”)
November 14, 2025
The phrase “deep-sea fishing,” which has become ubiquitous in China, refers to predatory, for-profit policing that crosses jurisdictional boundaries. In this article, blogger Mu Qi discusses how some Western nations such as the U.S. and the U.K. have begun aggressively seizing the assets of wealthy Chinese nationals who fled abroad after engaging in illicit financial activities. For example, the U.K.’s National Crime Agency, citing the Proceeds of Crime Act, seized roughly 255 million yuan [over $36 million U.S. dollars] worth of assets and properties from Chinese businessman Su Binghai, who was linked to a massive money laundering scandal in Singapore. The article also mentions the U.S. Department of Justice seizure of nearly $15 billion in Bitcoin from Chen Zhi, who was charged with running scam compounds in Cambodia, simply because some of the people he defrauded were from the U.S. Mu Qi expresses concern that these illicit funds, often the proceeds of fraud against Chinese citizens, are becoming foreign assets rather than being returned to China and used to compensate Chinese fraud victims. The article concludes with this somewhat sarcastic exhortation: “If we don’t crack down on criminals, someone else will. So hurry up and investigate! The fact that so many of these ‘big fish’ have been fattened up, only to be feasted on by Western powers, is utterly humiliating to China!”
“Who Should Bear Responsibility for 200 Mu of Lost Cabbage? Farmer Left Destitute After State Media Reposts Rumors,” by Xu Peng, WeChat account Huanxisha Du Fu
November 14, 2025
Commentator Xu Peng criticizes a local state-media outlet for spreading the unsubstantiated rumor that a farmer’s 200-mu (33-acre) cabbage field in Chifeng, Inner Mongolia was free for the taking. After the Hongshan Evening News (红山晚报, Hóngshān Wǎnbào) broadcast the claim, a huge crowd showed up to loot the crops, causing the farmer to lose nearly a million yuan [$142,000] worth of napa cabbage. Afterward, the local media outlet deleted the video, but did not offer an apology or financial compensation. Xu writes that while it was the original rumor-monger who lit the match, it was state media’s absence of fact-checking that fueled the fire and caused things to get out of control: “The whole scene is a microcosm of the current chaotic media environment. With fewer journalists doing on-site reporting or verifying facts, their work has devolved into scrolling through footage, recycling popular content, and editing video clips. They’re all chasing clicks and working at speed, and have forgotten that the most important thing is the truth.”
“Eight Arrested in Lujie Food Scandal; Larvae Found in Shrimp Came From ‘Overseas,’” by Zhang Yunsu, WeChat account Incorrect
November 15, 2025
An article about a major food safety scandal involving Shanghai Lujie, a catering company accused of bid-rigging in 86 school cafeteria contracts and attempting to cover up larvae found in school meals containing shrimp by claiming they were “shrimp intestines” or “silt.” While eight company executives were arrested, the official report blamed the presence of larvae on “overseas production processes” rather than on any local failures in food hygiene. Zhang is skeptical of this explanation and of the fact that no local educational officials were punished; he warns that there will likely be repeated school-meal quality problems unless monopoly, corruption, and bid-rigging within the system are eliminated.
“How Did The Paper Become an ‘Unreliable’ Media Outlet?” WeChat account He Dudu
November 15, 2025
Another article about the flap over Tencent censoring an investigative report by The Paper, a respected Shanghai media outlet. The author defends The Paper’s reporting and argues that Tencent overstepped by infringing upon the public’s right to know. The author also expresses shock at overwhelming online hostility toward The Paper, and laments the decline of traditional media and the ascent of powerful online platforms that prioritize traffic over journalistic integrity.
“I Went Back to My Rural Hometown, but I Hasten to Clarify: It’s Not Some ‘Large-Scale Return to Stagnate in the Countryside,’” WeChat account 人格志 (Rén Gé Zhì)
November 16, 2025
WeChat blogger Ren Ge Zhi, who focuses on current events and the Chinese stock market, writes about returning to his rural hometown to help his relatives plant the wheat crop. This occurred the same week that an agricultural policy-maker, raising the alarm about migrant workers deserting urban areas due to a lack of work, stated it was essential to “prevent a large-scale influx of returnees from stagnating in the countryside.” This statement echoes government warnings made before Chinese New Year in 2022 against “malicious homecomings.” See also CDT coverage of such terms as “malicious mourning” and “malicious commenting.”
The author notes that Chinese social media was filled with sarcastic responses to this statement and says that while it was good that the government acknowledged the impact of the economic downturn on migrant workers, advocating that they be “prevented” from returning to their families and hometowns is both cold and condescending. Instead of “rubbing salt in their wounds,” he writes, a better way to address the problem of unemployed migrant workers would be to offer them material, or at least moral, support. The piece concludes with a sardonic clarification that the author’s visit was not some “large-scale return,” nor does he intend to “stagnate in the countryside.”
Part Two will follow soon.
