Operating at the roof of the world, the Indian Army faces challenges that few militaries encounter. Along the icy Himalayan frontier, where roads remain blocked for months and terrain denies easy access, the lifeline for soldiers is often in the air. Light, medium and heavy-lift helicopters are all indispensable for various purposes such as ferrying personnel, guns, and supplies to posts perched at 15,000 feet and above.
While light and medium-lift helicopters like the ALH Dhruv and Rudra serve important tactical roles, they cannot match the payloads or endurance required for major logistical operations.
Yet, despite the magnitude of this need, the Army does not operate any dedicated heavy-lift helicopters of its own. The task today primarily rests with the Indian Air Force’s fleet of Boeing CH-47F(I) Chinooks and Russian Mi-26s— impressive machines capable of lifting artillery and vehicles to high altitudes, but limited in number and already heavily tasked.
Add Zee News as a Preferred Source
Also Read: Indian Army Joins Rescue Operations In Uttarakhand Following Chamoli Cloudburst
Capability Gap in Harsh Terrain
An example from last year can help illustrate the gap. In February 2024, it was reported that the Chinook heavy-lift choppers had become a “game changer”, focusing on their ability to airlift the M-777 ultra-light howitzers, which have been deployed in mountainous sectors due to their usefulness in remote gun positions.
Like these howitzers, large troop movements, infrastructure material, and even essential rations often need to be delivered by heavy-lift helicopters when ground routes are snowed under.
The absence of a dedicated Army-controlled heavy-lift fleet has occasionally forced reliance on contracted civilian helicopters, which, while cost-saving during peacetime, is an arrangement that is neither sustainable nor suitable for combat scenarios.
IMRH Not An Answer Yet
India is developing its own Indian Multi Role Helicopter (IMRH), which is set to have a maximum takeoff weight of 13 tonnes. Valuable though it will be, it does not fill the Chinook-class and Mi-26 niche.
Induction of such indigenous platforms is also still years away. This means that for the foreseeable future, the Army’s requirement for rapid, heavy-lift mobility in the Himalayas will continue to outpace the availability of resources.
Also Read: Rajnath Singh Slams Pakistan Army Chief’s ‘Predatory’ Comment And Urges Defence Investments
Theatre Commands: A Path to Integration
Here lies the case for integrated theatre commands. By placing all assets within a theatre under a single operational commander, India can cut through service-specific approval chains that today delay the allocation of helicopters in crises.
If a flashpoint emerges in Ladakh, the theatre commander would have the authority to direct heavy-lift sorties immediately—whether to reposition artillery, reinforce a post, or support engineers building vital infrastructure. Such responsiveness could be decisive in conflict, where delays measured in hours may alter outcomes on the ground.
Theatre commands, therefore, offer more than organisational reform; they provide a practical mechanism to ensure that heavy-lift capabilities are deployed where they are needed most, without bureaucratic friction.
Towards Future Capability
The longer-term question remains how India plans its next tranche of heavy-lift helicopters. The armed forces together have projected a requirement for roughly a thousand helicopters of all types over the coming decade. Within that figure, ensuring adequate numbers of true heavy-lift machines—and ensuring their optimal deployment—is critical.
Even within a theatre-command framework, it is evident that the Army, as the principal user in the Himalayas, must have a decisive role in planning, employing, and eventually expanding such a fleet. Without that, India risks building joint structures that remain dependent on scarce, centralised assets.
India’s evolving operational environment makes heavy-lift helicopters more than a luxury—they are a necessity for sustaining troops, moving firepower, and building resilience in the Himalayas. Theatre commands can help overcome today’s coordination hurdles by giving commanders in the field the authority to use these assets at once.
But theatre integration alone will not close the capability gap. For India’s mountain warfighter, the eventual goal must be assured access to heavy-lift platforms tailored to Army requirements.
