A recent headline on this very site warned, quoting a senior military official, that “Israel is jeopardizing its national security in an unprecedented way.” Such a warning requires clarification: even when successful, war always entails risks to a country’s overall security. A state may, for example, achieve a clear military victory yet find itself mired in economic crisis or isolated on the diplomatic stage.
In wartime, especially during a prolonged conflict, the equation of national security shifts daily and demands constant review. This is an opportunity to recall the Israel Defense Forces’ definition of national security in its combat doctrine: “National security deals with ensuring the ability to effectively confront any threat to national existence and vital national interests.”
IDF soldiers in the Gaza Strip (archive), photo: IDF Spokesperson’s Unit IDF Spokesperson’s Unit
Among the consequences of the current war, and in the face of a growing international drive for a UN resolution declaring a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, including Jerusalem, Israel’s most vital interests are under severe threat. This represents a strategic trend that requires serious attention and demands new strategic direction across all dimensions. The planned offensive in Gaza must be evaluated in this context as well.
Critics of the Gaza operation argue that it cannot guarantee the war’s objectives: returning the hostages and dismantling the Hamas terrorist organization. The response to that criticism is that war, by its very nature chaotic and unpredictable, never guarantees a desired outcome.
It is therefore reasonable to acknowledge that the operation may fail to achieve its stated goals. That uncertainty is familiar to every leader faced with authorizing an offensive move. A historic example is the Yom Kippur War cabinet debate over crossing the Suez Canal. Then-IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar pressed the political leadership to clarify whether they believed the canal crossing would help achieve his aim: a ceasefire and the end of the war.
Even with Elazar’s clear objective, success could not be guaranteed once the operation began. Nor was the follow up plan, after the canal crossing, fully defined. It remained unclear whether Israeli forces reaching the west bank of the canal would turn north to encircle Egypt’s Second Army or south to encircle the Third Army. Ultimately, circumstances on the battlefield led to the decision to focus southward, surrounding the Third Army.
In 1973, doubts were also brought before the cabinet. The Sinai front during the Yom Kippur War. Photo: Dudu Greenspan
This flexibility, in my view, underpins the operational concept devised by the Southern Command and the IDF chief of staff for the next stage of Operation Gideon’s Chariots. The plan envisions a gradual capture of Gaza City, with each stage subject to real-time decisions: exploiting opportunities or halting to avoid emerging risks, including those endangering the hostages’ lives. The hope is that such a measured approach will yield cumulative achievements that bring about the defeat of Hamas, on Israel’s terms.
Managing the campaign to capture Gaza will require sensitivity not only to local battlefield conditions but also to the broader strategic environment in the region and worldwide. If conducted in this manner, the conquest and clearing of Gaza City could set the conditions for bringing the war to a decisive and successful conclusion. It is precisely in this flexibility that the answer lies to the senior officer’s warning of a potential blow to Israel’s national security.
