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On 6 November 2025, Ukraine enacted a new round of sanctions targeting Russia’s key fossil fuel expansion projects in the Arctic, with further sanctions at the European Union level expected to follow.
The new package of sanctions by the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine targets particularly key individuals and entities that facilitate the Kremlin’s fossil fuel exports from the Arctic, while also driving the climate breakdown.
To explore possible ways forward for scaling such sanctions at the G7 and EU levels, Ukraine’s pavilion at the COP30 UNFCCC climate conference hosted a panel discussion with international experts.
The need to strengthen sanctions against Russian fossil fuel projects in the Arctic is now clearly a critical gap that must be closed immediately, particularly against the Arctic LNG-2 and Yamal LNG projects, as well as vessels exporting Russian fossil fuels via the Northern Sea Route.
Ukrainian pavillion at the COP30 UNFCCC climate conference. Courtesy photo
Russian gas, Ukrainian lives
A report published by Greenpeace in September reveals that between 2022 and 2024, Yamal LNG – Russia’s largest Arctic project – paid an estimated $9.5 billion in tax to the Russian federal budget.
That’s enough to buy 9.5 million artillery shells, or 271,000 Shahed drones, or 2,686 modern battle tanks.
The financial link between exports of LNG from the Arctic and Russia’s military campaign can’t be ignored any longer.
This is not theoretical. This is blood money. Every LNG tanker leaving the Arctic and exporting fossil gas carries the price of Ukrainian lives.
After Europe cut Russian pipeline gas and sanctioned Arctic LNG-2, you might think Russia’s Arctic strategy was failing. However, that is not what’s actually happening.
Yamal LNG still operates at full capacity with zero sanctions, exporting over 17 million tons of gas annually. Over 2⁄3 of Russian Yamal LNG cargoes are destined for EU buyers.
Yamal LNG remains deeply intertwined with Europe through both its buyers and logistics infrastructure: among its key long-term customers are France’s TotalEnergies — a major shareholder in the project and supplier of gas to UK government facilities — and Germany’s SEFE (formerly Gazprom Germania), a state-owned energy company mired in suspicions of maintained Russian influence.
Novatek’s two Arctic LNG facilities and shipping route to Europe and Asia with location of future transshipment hubs. Credit: Malte Humpert/High North News
TotalEnergies retains its 20% stake in the Yamal LNG project. TotalEnergies and Shell have contracts with Yamal until 2041. SEFE – until 2038.
These aren’t just business deals. They were intended as long-term strategic relationships. Such contracts and joint ventures lock Europe and Asia into Russian energy dependence for decades.
Currently, Russia is doubling down: it plans to triple LNG exports by 2035. With Arctic LNG-2 coming online this year despite sanctions, Russia’s aggressive expansion is making advances.
The Northern Sea Route allows Russia to bypass traditional chokepoints and reach both European and Asian markets. Western shipping companies – Seapeak from the UK, Dynagas from Greece, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines from Japan – operate the specialised icebreaking fleet of ARC7 tankers that makes this possible.
A Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker intended to clear path for trade ships following the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic.
Great Britain makes a gesture, but no sanctions yet
On 12 November 2025, the UK announced its intention to impose a ban on maritime services for Russian LNG. This action will significantly reduce Russian exports of LNG and directly cut off access to the UK’s world-leading maritime services. The announcement provides that “the ban will be phased in over 2026 in lockstep with our European partners.”
British company, Seapeak Maritime Glasgow Ltd, was involved in facilitating exports of 4 million tons of LNG cargoes from Yamal LNG, Russia’s key terminal in Siberia, in the first half of 2025 — accounting for 39% of total shipments in this time period.
Yamal LNG — the main export outlet for gas heading to Europe — is part-owned by TotalEnergies, the French fossil fuel giant, whose U.K. subsidiary also supplies the British public sector with gas via an £8 billion contract. At the same time, TotalEnergies declares its compliance with the U.K.’s Russian LNG import ban.
Even when adopted, there is no guarantee that EU and UK sanctions will permanently halt Russian LNG exports. The risk is that the Yamal LNG volumes can be just shifted from Europe to Asia if coordinated action is not taken in advance.
Infographic by Euromaidan Press
The cure we need: global crackdown on Russian LNG
According to estimates from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, in 2025, the EU is expected to account for 50% of Russian LNG exports, followed by China (21%), Japan (19%), and South Korea. The global nature of this business is illustrated by the fact that the logistics of Russian LNG are backed by Canadian pension money via a US-based investment fund that partners with Chinese firms through joint ventures.
Razom We stand calls for coordinated and joint decisions by the G7, the EU, and Japan, as well as Other Key Partners, that are needed to completely block LNG exports from Russia.
Japan and South Korea must also be pressured to completely abandon Russian fossil fuels from Yamal LNG and Sakhalin-2 projects.
Notably, Japan has repeatedly stated that it does not plan to cease purchasing Russian LNG, despite sanctions imposed by its European allies.
Japanese trading houses continue to hold a stake in the Russian Sakhalin-2 plant and supply LNG from there, accounting for approximately 10% of Japan’s total LNG imports. Much of the fuel is supplied under long-term contracts, and most deliveries will end between 2026 and 2033. Further decisions will depend on the future capacity of renewable energy.
The EU and G7 must synchronize their sanctions policies, monitor their compliance, and involve Asian countries as much as possible to prevent the flow of sanctioned Russian energy resources from the EU to Asia.
Particularly, sanctions should be extended beyond Arctic LNG 2 to Yamal and Sakhalin, and the origin of all energy resources should be tracked.
The Orlan drilling platform northeast of Sakhalin Island in the Sea of Okhotsk, Russia.
Photo: Rosneft.
No time for delay, no second chances
The final elephant in the room is the climate emergency.
The Arctic is warming at a rate four times faster than the global average. Projects like Arctic LNG and the construction of other fossil fuel infrastructure in the region accelerate feedback loops – melting permafrost releases methane, less ice means less reflection of solar radiation.
Russia is essentially weaponizing the Arctic twice – once to fund war, and once to destabilize the global climate.
Therefore, sanctions against Russian Arctic fossil fuels serve both security and climate imperatives simultaneously.
Without full EU and G7 sanctions on LNG tankers navigating the Northern Sea Route freely, we are effectively leaving Russia’s largest export corridor completely open, spewing fossil fuels in the hellfire of climate destruction.
There can be no excuses, and there will be no second chances: Ukraine’s allies and alleged “climate leaders” must act now to deliver a rapid and sharp decline in Russia’s revenues, forcing it to end the war in Ukraine.
Svitlana Romanko
Dr. Svitlana Romanko is the Founder and Director of the “Razom We Stand” campaign. This campaign aims to ban all fossil fuels from Russia, end the war in Ukraine, and boost a revolutionary clean energy transition worldwide.
Kateryna Kontsur
Kateryna Kontsur is an energy policy expert at Razom We Stand with over 20 years of experience in regulatory policy, EU energy law, and renewable energy systems. She advocates for Ukraine’s energy independence and supply diversification and holds advanced project management and financial analysis degrees.
Editor’s note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press’ editorial team may or may not share them.
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