Shafaq News
Several leading Iran-aligned Iraqi armed faction leaders unexpectedly
announced their acceptance of disarmament initiatives, a subject that until
recently sparked some of the sharpest divisions in Iraq’s political arena. Not
all factions joined the move, as Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba
reaffirmed their refusal to relinquish their weapons.
Previously, these initiatives had faced intense opposition
from faction leaders and influential political figures aligned with them. Until
recently, the proposals were condemned as conspiratorial attempts aimed at
undermining Iraq’s political system, particularly Shiite influence, as a
prelude to its destabilization.
The sudden shift has prompted debate over whether it
reflects a coordinated political maneuver, internal disagreements among
factions, or a reassessment by groups such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which appear to
regard their enhanced presence within state institutions as sufficient
protection without arms. Analysts note that the development is part of a long
trajectory that has now reached a critical juncture.
Read more: Iraq’s armed factions, state authority, and the battle over disarmament
Regional Context
Regional developments have significantly shaped the new
discourse. Following the announcement by the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq”
factions to suspend operations against US forces in Iraq and the broader region
in late January 2024, the status quo began to change amid escalating regional
tensions triggered by Gaza-related operations after October 7.
Most factions withdrew from operations targeting US bases,
and subsequent US strikes killed senior Kataib Hezbollah figures without
provoking retaliatory action. These strikes were in response to a drone attack
that killed American soldiers near the Iraqi-Syrian-Jordanian border.
Setbacks elsewhere in the region further influenced faction
calculations. Hezbollah suffered a major military and security blow in Lebanon,
demonstrating the potential consequences for Iran’s allies if conflict spread
to their areas of operation. The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in
December 2024 marked another strategic setback for Iran and its regional
partners, constricting their political and military maneuvering space.
Within Iraq, discussions intensified over disarming factions
to prevent a potential conflict from spilling into the country. This coincided
with increased US sanctions on Iraqi figures accused of ties to Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps and the suspension of sanctions waivers on Iranian
gas imports, Iraq’s primary electricity source.
While a degree of stability prevailed during the
parliamentary election period, it was widely seen as temporary. The election
outcomes largely favored moderation, with Shiite forces retaining a comfortable
parliamentary majority, yet the issue of limiting weapons to state control
resurfaced decisively.
Renewed momentum followed the appointment of US envoy Mark
Savaya to Iraq, who consistently emphasized weapons restrictions as a top
priority for Washington.
Complex Calculations
Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba’s continued refusal
to disarm was predictable, given their superior military and security
capabilities compared to factions like Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Ansar Allah Al-Awfiya,
Kataib Al-Imam Ali, and Kataib Sayyid Al-Shuhada. While Asaib Ahl Al-Haq
remains a significant force outside state authority, analysts highlight a clear
imbalance of power, with the factions firmly opposing disarmament.
Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba are leading
Iran-aligned Iraqi Shiite armed factions and core components of the “Islamic
Resistance in Iraq,” operating in close coordination with Iran’s IRGC-Quds
Force.
Both groups are ideologically rigid, adhere to Shiite
doctrine and Wilayat al-Faqih, and frame armed struggle as a permanent
religious obligation tied to broader Islamic governance and resistance
objectives.
Each is formally incorporated into Iraq’s Popular
Mobilization Forces, granting legal status, state funding, and institutional
access, while simultaneously retaining independent command structures and
strategic autonomy from the Iraqi state.
Kataib Hezbollah was founded by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and is
currently led by Ahmad Mohsen Faraj Al-Hamidawi, while al-Nujaba was founded
and continues to be led by Akram al-Kaabi, with both leaders designated as
terrorists by the United States.
Militarily, the two factions field multiple combat brigades,
maintain strongholds across Baghdad and other strategic Iraqi provinces, and
possess rockets, drones, and missile capabilities with cross-border reach.
Both groups have expanded their operational footprint beyond
Iraq, particularly into Syria, and emphasize transnational resistance rather
than exclusive territorial defense of the Iraqi state.
Since October 2023, Kataib Hezbollah and al-Nujaba have
played central roles in or claimed association with rocket and drone attacks
targeting US forces, often under a shared resistance banner.
Each organization relies on PMF-linked resources and Iranian
support, remains outside or only indirectly engaged in formal Iraqi politics,
and is designated a terrorist organization by the United States.
Read more:Zero-sum game: Can the Iran-Israel conflict push Iraq toward frontline?
Absorptive Maneuver or New Stance?
Although rhetoric is evolving, it remains premature to
evaluate the trajectory of disarmament definitively. Iran has yet to issue a
public stance and is unlikely to do so formally. The political framework
accompanying any disarmament effort remains in early stages, with no certainty
that it will proceed as envisioned by supporters.
Time is required to verify whether guarantees sought by
factions willing to disarm will be honored. Meanwhile, factions opposing
disarmament face unprecedented pressure due to internal divisions, the
Coordination Framework’s support to disarmament, Iran’s reluctance to escalate
regionally amid potential conflict with Israel, and the deteriorating position
of allied groups across the region.
Another likely scenario involves a distribution of roles
among factions, keeping the issue in negotiation rather than forcing a decisive
outcome. This mirrors the Lebanese model, where Hezbollah surrendered weapons
south of the Litani River while retaining arms elsewhere, balancing political
maneuvering with capability retention. A similar path in Iraq could result in a
prolonged mix of political negotiation and security tension, contingent on
Washington’s willingness to accept this arrangement.
Read more: Diverging views emerge on disarming Armed Factions in the Middle East
Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.
