Shafaq News
For years,
calls to restrict weapons to state control in Iraq have resurfaced periodically,
often framed as a technical security reform or a political slogan. But the
renewed debate over disarmament in late 2025 exposed a deeper reality: Iraq’s
most powerful armed factions are not a single bloc, nor do they respond
uniformly to pressure from the state, the judiciary, or foreign actors.
While many
of these groups operate under the legal umbrella of the Popular Mobilization
Forces (PMF) and coordinate through a shared “resistance framework”, their
reactions to disarmament proposals have diverged sharply. Some factions
signaled conditional openness to placing weapons under government authority,
while others rejected the very premise of the discussion, insisting that armed forces
remain a permanent necessity as long as foreign forces remain in Iraq.
These
divisions have drawn renewed attention from Iraqi officials of different components,
regional powers such as Iran, and Western governments, mainly the United
States, seeking to understand why disarmament remains elusive more than two
decades after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and nearly a decade after the PMF’s
formal incorporation into the Iraqi state.
At the
center of this debate lies a paradox that defines Iraq’s contemporary security
order: armed factions that are simultaneously state-sanctioned and autonomous,
coordinated yet independent, political actors and military forces, all
operating within a system that blurs the line between legality and leverage.
Beyond the
PMF: Coordination Without Uniform Command
Since their
rapid expansion during the fight against ISIS in 2014, Iran-aligned Shiite
armed factions have embedded themselves deeply within Iraq’s security and
political institutions. The Iraqi parliament’s 2016 PMF law granted these
groups legal status, salaries, and formal ranks, integrating them into the
state’s defense architecture while allowing them to retain their original
command structures, ideological identities, and external alliances.
In parallel,
these factions coordinate through what is known as the Resistance Coordination
Committee, a framework that enables aligned groups to synchronize messaging,
manage escalation, and project collective deterrence, particularly against US
and coalition forces, without dissolving their individual chains of command.
The
committee seems less like a unified command than a coordination mechanism, one
that balances shared strategic objectives with factional autonomy. This
structure has allowed different groups to calibrate their level of involvement
in military actions, political engagement, and public positioning, depending on
their interests and risk calculations.
The result
is a landscape in which factions may speak under a common “resistance banner”
while pursuing sharply different strategies on the ground, especially when
confronted with sensitive domestic issues such as disarmament, accountability,
and relations with the Iraqi state.
October 7
and Limits of Collective Action
These
internal distinctions became more visible after the outbreak of the
Israel–Hamas war on October 7, 2023. In the weeks that followed, a coalition of
Iran-aligned Iraqi factions operating under the banner of the “Islamic
Resistance in Iraq” claimed about 265 attacks against US forces in Iraq and
Syria, linking their actions to broader regional escalation.
However,
participation in these attacks was not uniform across all factions involved in
the coordination framework.
While groups
such as Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujabaa took a direct role in
military operations and publicly embraced escalation, others adopted more
ambiguous positions. Notably, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, a major Iran-aligned group with
a significant political presence, did not publicly claim or carry out attacks
against US bases during this period. At the same time, it did not issue
statements condemning the attacks or distancing itself from the “resistance
framework.”
This stance
reflected a deliberate strategy within some group that is preserving alignment
within the same camp while limiting direct exposure to retaliation or
additional international sanctions. It also underscored how coordination does
not translate into uniform behavior, a pattern that would later resurface in
the disarmament debate.
Disarmament
as a Political Test, Not a Security Measure
When Iraq’s
senior judicial authorities renewed calls in December 2025 for restricting
weapons to state control, the responses from armed factions mirrored these earlier
fault lines.
Some groups,
such as Kataib Imam Ali, framed the proposal as a potential starting point for
gradual regulation, contingent on guarantees of sovereignty and the withdrawal
of foreign forces. Others, including Kataib Hezbollah and Al-Nujaba, dismissed
the discussion outright, arguing that disarmament under current conditions
would weaken Iraq’s deterrence and expose the country to external threats.
These
contrasting reactions were not shaped solely by ideology, but by a complex mix
of factors: each faction’s relationship with the state, degree of political
integration, regional role, and reliance on armed leverage as a source of
influence.
Understanding
these distinctions is essential for grasping why Iraq’s disarmament debate
repeatedly stalls. The issue is not simply whether armed groups accept or
reject state authority, but how power is distributed within a system that
allows armed actors to operate both inside and beyond the state, coordinated,
yet fundamentally divided.
Ideological
Foundations of Armed Autonomy
Within
Iraq’s armed landscape, two factions stand out for their categorical rejection
of disarmament under current conditions: Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah
al-Nujaba. While both operate within the formal structure of the Popular
Mobilization Forces, they continue to define themselves primarily as “resistance
movements” whose weapons are not subject to exclusive state control.
Their
position is not tactical or temporary. It is rooted in ideology, regional role,
and a conception of sovereignty that places armed deterrence above
institutional subordination, particularly while foreign forces remain in Iraq
and the region.
Kataib
Hezbollah: State Presence Without State Subordination
Kataib
Hezbollah (KH) occupies a unique position within Iraq’s security architecture.
Widely described by Western governments and research institutions as one of the
most influential Iran-aligned factions, the US-sanctioned KH blends formal
integration with operational autonomy. It maintains brigades 46,46, asd 47 inside
the PMF and is widely assessed to exert influence over sensitive PMF
departments, while simultaneously operating as a core pillar of the broader so-called
resistance network.
Founded by
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who was killed alongside IRGC-Quds Force commander Qasem
Soleimani in a US strike in Baghdad in January 2020, KH openly embraces the
doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih and recognizes Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei, as its highest religious authority. This ideological alignment
underpins the group’s rejection of disarmament, which it frames as incompatible
with what it describes as an ongoing confrontation with foreign military
presence.
KH’s posture
hardened further after October 7, 2023, when it emerged as one of the factions
most visibly involved in attacks claimed under the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq”
banner. Operating within the Resistance Coordination Committee, the group
played a direct role in escalation against US forces in Iraq and Syria, while
insisting that such operations were defensive and deterrent in nature. The most
significant escalation occurred in January 2024, when a drone attack on Tower
22 in Jordan killed three US soldiers. The United States has responded with
multiple retaliatory strikes on KH targets in Iraq and Syria, including a
February 2024 targeted strike in Baghdad that killed senior KH figure Abu Bakr
al-Saadi.
The group’s
influence has also been linked to contested security dynamics in parts of Iraq,
including areas such as Jurf al-Sakhr in Babil province, where displaced
residents have remained unable to return for years after the territorial defeat
of ISIS. Iraqi officials have acknowledged that the issue carries security and
political layers beyond civilian authority, while local and human rights
reporting has raised concerns about prolonged displacement and restrictions on
access.
For KH,
disarmament is conditional not on domestic consensus, but on regional outcomes.
In public statements issued in late 2025, the group said any discussion of
placing weapons under state control could only follow the withdrawal of US,
NATO, and Turkish forces from Iraqi territory, effectively positioning armed actions
as a prerequisite for sovereignty rather than a challenge to it.
Harakat
Hezbollah al-Nujaba: A Transnational Armed Agenda Beyond the Iraqi State
If Kataib
Hezbollah represents armed autonomy within state institutions, Harakat
Hezbollah al-Nujaba embodies resistance beyond the state altogether.
Founded in
2013 by cleric Akram al-Kaabi following a split from Asaib Ahl al-Haq,
al-Nujaba is widely regarded as one of the most ideologically rigid
Iran-aligned factions in Iraq. While formally incorporated into the PMF (Brigade
12), it retains independent command, media, and mobilization structures and has
consistently rejected the notion that the Iraqi state holds ultimate authority
over its weapons.
Al-Nujaba’s
priorities are explicitly transnational. The group played a prominent role in
Syria’s war, deploying fighters alongside Syrian government forces and
Iran-backed militias, and later announced the formation of a “Golan Liberation
Brigade,” signaling an intent to confront Israel as part of a broader regional
struggle. Unlike factions that invest in parliamentary politics or local
governance, al-Nujaba does not maintain a formal political party or electoral
bloc, relying instead on ideological mobilization and armed action to assert
influence.
After
October 7, 2023, al-Nujaba took a direct and public role in attacks against US
targets under “the resistance umbrella,” reinforcing its position as a
frontline actor in regional escalation. Its leadership has repeatedly argued
that “armed resistance is a permanent religious and strategic obligation,”
rejecting disarmament as long as US forces remain present anywhere in Iraq or
the wider region.
The United
States has designated al-Nujaba and its leader as terrorist entities, citing
involvement in attacks against US forces. The group rejects these designations,
describing US troops as an occupying force and portraying its operations as a
legitimate defense of Iraqi and regional sovereignty.
Why
Rejection Is Structural, Not Tactical
Despite
differences in style and scope, Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah
al-Nujaba converge on a central principle: weapons are not merely tools of
security, but instruments of political leverage and ideological identity. Their
rejection of disarmament reflects three shared factors:
–Ideological
framing: Both view armed resistance as a long-term obligation rather than a
temporary response.
-Regional
entanglement: Their operations extend beyond Iraq’s borders, tying their
posture to broader regional dynamics.
–Limited
reliance on electoral politics: Unlike factions with parliamentary blocs, they
face fewer incentives to accommodate domestic pressure for regulation.
This
combination places both groups -at least for now- outside the spectrum of
factions willing to negotiate weapons control under current conditions. Their
stance also shapes the boundaries of Iraq’s disarmament debate, effectively
setting red lines that constrain how far the state can go without triggering
confrontation.
Factions
Willing to Negotiate, but Not Surrender
A second
cluster of Iraq’s armed factions has approached the disarmament debate with
conditional pragmatism rather than outright rejection. Groups such as Asaib Ahl
al-Haq, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Kataib Imam Ali have signaled
varying degrees of openness to placing weapons under state authority, while
stopping short of endorsing immediate or unconditional disarmament.
Their
positions reflect a shared calculation: armed leverage remains essential, but
political participation and institutional access require a degree of
accommodation with the state. Unlike factions that define themselves almost “exclusively
through resistance,” these groups operate at the intersection of arms,
politics, and bureaucracy.
All three
remain integrated within the Popular Mobilization Forces and coordinate with
other Iran-aligned actors through the Resistance Coordination Committee, yet
their willingness to engage publicly with judicial and political calls for
weapons regulation sets them apart.
Asaib Ahl
al-Haq: Armed Influence with Parliamentary Stakes
Asaib Ahl
al-Haq (AAH) represents the most politically embedded model among Iraq’s
Iran-aligned armed factions. Formed in 2006 after splitting from Muqtada
al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, and currently within the PMF’s 41,42, and 43 brigades, the
group has combined military activity with sustained participation in electoral
politics through the Sadiqoon bloc, now part of the Shiite Coordination
Framework.
This dual
role has shaped AAH’s posture on both escalation and disarmament. After October
7, 2023, the group remained within the resistance coordination framework but
did not publicly claim or carry out attacks against US forces in Iraq or Syria.
At the same time, it did not condemn those attacks, maintaining alignment
without direct operational exposure. This approach of deliberate ambiguity,
designed to preserve armed deterrence while limiting political and diplomatic
costs.
When Iraq’s
judicial authorities renewed calls to restrict weapons to state control, the
US-sanctioned AAH responded with cautious signals of conditional acceptance.
The group emphasized that any such process must be gradual, legally grounded,
and tied to guarantees of sovereignty, particularly the withdrawal of foreign
forces. Its stance underscored a key distinction: AAH’s weapons are a
bargaining asset, not an ideological end in themselves.
Kataib Imam
Ali: Pragmatism After Mobilization
Kataib Imam
Ali (KIA), also known as the Imam Ali Brigades, emerged in 2014 during the mass
mobilization that followed Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s call to fight ISIS.
Operating as the PMF’s 40th Brigade, the group presents itself as rooted in
Shiite religious doctrine and loyalty to Imam Ali bin Abi Taleb, while
maintaining ideological alignment with Iran.
Unlike
factions that reject state authority outright, KIA has shown signs of pragmatic
adjustment in recent years. In December 2025, it joined other politically
engaged factions in signaling conditional acceptance of restricting weapons to
state control. Its leadership framed the issue as one of sequencing rather than
principle, arguing that regulation must follow guarantees of national security
and sovereignty.
This
position reflects KIA’s trajectory from emergency mobilization to institutional
actor. Having secured formal status and state resources through the PMF, the
group faces incentives to avoid confrontation with judicial and political
authorities, even as it retains armed capabilities and regional ties.
Kataib Sayyid
al-Shuhada: Entrenched Influence, Selective Engagement
Kataib
Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS), operating as the PMF’s 14th Brigade, represents a
faction whose influence is widely viewed as durable but whose public
positioning is carefully managed. The group emerged publicly in 2013 amid the
Syrian war and later integrated into the PMF structure after the 2014 anti-ISIS
mobilization, receiving formal legal recognition under Iraq’s 2016 PMF law.
KSS has
sustained a military presence beyond Iraq, particularly in Syria, where it has
operated alongside Syrian government forces, Lebanese Hezbollah, and other
Iran-backed groups. After October 7, 2023, it joined operations claimed under
the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” banner, underscoring its integration into the
wider resistance ecosystem coordinated through the Resistance Coordination
Committee.
When the
disarmament debate resurfaced in late 2025, the US-sanctioned KSS officials
publicly said that the public calls by several parties to limit weapons to the
hands of the state and move toward political engagement reaffirm an existing
reality and a long-standing principle: that these weapons “should not operate
outside the framework of the state.”
This could
be interpreted as a balancing act: resisting domestic pressure for state
authority while avoiding internal friction within the broader resistance camp.
Why
Conditional Acceptance Stops Short of Disarmament
Despite
their willingness to engage rhetorically with calls for weapons regulation,
these factions converge on a shared red line: none endorses immediate or
irreversible disarmament. Their conditional flexibility is shaped by three
factors:
–Political
exposure: Parliamentary blocs and public-facing leadership increase sensitivity
to domestic pressure.
–Institutional
embedding: Formal PMF integration creates incentives to appear responsive to
state authority.
–Retained
leverage: Weapons remain a safeguard against political marginalization and
regional uncertainty.
This
category illustrates why Iraq’s disarmament debate produces signals of progress
without decisive outcomes. Engagement does not equate to surrender, and
accommodation does not eliminate armed autonomy.
Ambiguous
Actors and Facade Groups
Not all
armed factions in Iraq engage the disarmament debate directly. A third category
operates in ways that blur responsibility, dilute visibility, and complicate
any attempt to restrict weapons to state control. This group includes factions
that maintain entrenched influence but avoid clear commitments, as well as
so-called “facade groups” that claim operations publicly while masking the role
of stronger parent organizations.
To date,
about 16 Iraqi “resistance” groups have publicly declared their formation to
“confront the US presence,” including: Qasim al-Jabbarin, Saraya Awliya al-Dam,
the International Resistance Faction, Saraya 1920 Revolution, Ansar Allah
Al-Awfiya, Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds, Usbat al-Thaerin, Ulu al-Azm, Katibat
al-Sabiqoon, Liwa Khyber, Tha’r al-Muhandis, Quwat Dhu al-Fiqar, Aba al-Fadl
al-Abbas, Saraya al-Muntaqim, al-Shaheed Karim Daraam, Ashab Al-Kahf, Liwa
Muntaqimoon, and Liwa al-Thaerin.
Two cases,
which have the largest members compared with others, illustrate the problem
clearly: Ansar Allah Al-Awfiya and Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds, a rebranded front
group whose primary presence is online rather than on the ground.
Together,
these actors highlight a structural constraint confronting Iraqi
decision-makers: even when a disarmament debate gains traction politically,
opacity and deniability mechanisms can keep armed power beyond enforceable
state control.
Ansar Allah
al-Awfiya: Quiet Alignment, Conditional Compliance
Harakat
Ansar Allah al-Awfiya (AAA), operating as the PMF’s 19th Brigade, occupies a
narrower public profile but follows a similar strategic logic. Formed in 2013
and later integrated into the PMF after the 2014 anti-ISIS mobilization, the
group maintains political activity through affiliated movements while keeping
its military operations largely insulated from public scrutiny.
Following
the October 2023 escalation, the US sanctioned AAA joined attacks claimed under
the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” banner, placing it more firmly within the
armed escalation track than AAH. Yet despite this role, the group appeared
among those signaling willingness in late 2025 to place weapons under
government control, following statements by Iraq’s senior judicial leadership.
This
position seems transactional rather than transformative. AAA’s conditional
openness reflects an effort to navigate domestic pressure without relinquishing
its capacity for armed action, particularly as long as regional confrontation
and foreign troop presence persist.
Kataib
Sarkhat al-Quds: A Front Group Built for Messaging
Kataib
Sarkhat al-Quds (KSQ), also known as the Jerusalem Cry Brigades, represents a
different phenomenon: a group defined less by visible infrastructure and more
by communicative and operational ambiguity.
KSQ emerged
through the rebranding of Ashab al-Kahf, which appeared in 2019 and announced
its transformation into Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds in August 2024. Research
institutions describe Ashab al-Kahf, and by extension KSQ, as a “facade group,”
designed to claim responsibility for attacks while obscuring the involvement of
larger, better-established factions.
Unlike major
groups with formal PMF brigades, KSQ does not maintain a significant and
verifiable military presence inside Iraq. Its operations are expressed
primarily through online statements and media claims, a model analysts say
provides plausible deniability for established armed actors conducting
sensitive operations.
After the
January 2020 killing of Qasem Soleimani, Ashab al-Kahf increased its claimed
attacks, including rocket and IED operations against US-linked targets.
Following the October 7, 2023, regional escalation, the rebranded KSQ adopted
an even more explicitly transnational language, issuing threats against Israeli
and regional targets, though independent verification of such operational
capacity remains limited.
In practical
terms, KSQ’s relevance to the disarmament debate is indirect but significant.
If Iraqi authorities attempt to regulate weapons through formal PMF channels,
facade groups can continue to claim attacks, shift attribution, and complicate
legal enforcement, because the public-facing actor may not be the operational
decision-maker.
Why
Ambiguity Undermines Disarmament
AAA and KSQ
represent two different obstacles to disarmament:
–Entrenchment
with denial: a formal PMF actor that resists public commitments and remains
shielded by institutional and regional ties.
–Plausible
deniability: an operational front that can absorb blame, claim attacks, and
obscure the chain of command.
These models
help explain why Iraq’s disarmament debate often produces statements without
enforceable outcomes. Even if a political consensus forms around restricting
weapons, the mechanisms that protect armed autonomy, denial, opacity, and proxy
branding remain intact.
What These
Factions Share, and What Divides Them
Iraq’s armed
factions are often presented as a single Iran-aligned bloc operating under the
PMF umbrella. In practice, they form a shared ecosystem, coordinated through
the Resistance Coordination Committee and intertwined through political,
security, and financial networks, yet they are not uniform actors. Their
differences matter because they determine who can bargain with the state, who
refuses bargaining altogether, and who can evade accountability through
deniability.
The
disarmament controversy illustrates this clearly. It has not produced a clean
split between “state” and “militias,” but rather a spectrum of positions shaped
by each group’s ideology, degree of political integration, regional role, and
reliance on armed leverage.
What They
Share
Despite
their differences, the factions share several core features that define Iraq’s
post-2014 security order:
1)
Institutional cover through the PMF
Most of these
factions operate formally within the Popular Mobilization Forces, holding
brigade designations, receiving state resources, and benefiting from legal
recognition. This status complicates efforts to treat them purely as illegal
armed actors, even when their command structures remain independent.
2) Alignment
within an Iran-linked resistance framework
These groups
converge around a narrative that emphasizes confronting Israel and the US
military presence, framing armed action as deterrence and sovereignty
protection. Coordination through the Resistance Coordination Committee allows
them to align politically and, in some cases, operationally, without dissolving
autonomy.
3) Armed
leverage as a political instrument
Across
categories -rejectionist, conditional, ambiguous -the central constant is that
weapons are not simply battlefield tools. They are leveraging: shaping
negotiations with the state, influencing political outcomes, deterring rivals,
and securing long-term influence.
4) Regional
entanglement beyond Iraq
Several
factions have operated in Syria and positioned themselves within wider regional
confrontations. This expands their security logic beyond Iraqi domestic
considerations and makes their posture responsive to regional escalation, not
only Iraqi state priorities.
What Divides
Them
The
disarmament debate exposes four key dividing lines that shape behavior more
reliably than labels such as “PMF” or “Iran-aligned.”
1) Ideology:
Wilayat al-Faqih vs Pragmatic Power
Other
factions may align ideologically with Iran and maintain close ties, but operate
with greater pragmatism, adjusting language and timing to domestic political
constraints. This does not make them moderate; it makes them adaptive.
2) Political
Integration: Who Has Electoral Stakes
Groups with
parliamentary influence and public-facing political wings, particularly Asaib
Ahl al-Haq and, to a lesser degree, actors such as Ansar Allah al-Awfiya
through affiliated fronts, face incentives to navigate domestic legitimacy.
This helps explain why they can signal conditional acceptance of regulating
weapons under state authority, especially when pressure comes from senior
judicial institutions.
By contrast,
factions such as al-Nujaba, which avoid formal electoral participation, have
fewer reasons to compromise rhetorically or institutionally.
3)
Operational Geography: Iraq-Centered vs Transnational
The most
consequential distinction is whether a faction views Iraq as its main arena or
as one front in a broader regional struggle.
-Transnational
framing: al-Nujaba’s Syria deployment and “Golan Liberation Brigade” messaging
underscores a regional orientation.
-Hybrid
transnational posture: Kataib Hezbollah and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada combine
Iraq-based institutional presence with regional operations.
-Limited
on-ground footprint but transnational messaging: facade groups like Kataib
Sarkhat al-Quds adopt regional confrontation language while remaining largely
online-driven.
The more
regional the mission, the less likely a group is to accept state constraints
tied to Iraqi domestic politics.
Managed
Containment, Not Disarmament
The current
controversy reveals three broad tracks:
–Principled
rejection: Kataib Hezbollah and al-Nujaba reject disarmament unless foreign
forces withdraw, treating armed deterrence as a prerequisite for sovereignty.
–Conditional
negotiation: Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Kataib Imam Ali
signal flexibility tied to guarantees, sequencing, and sovereignty conditions, engaging
without surrendering autonomy.
–Denial and
ambiguity: Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada denies disarmament discussions outright,
while facade groups like Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds complicate enforcement by
obscuring who controls operational decisions.
Taken
together, the positions outlined above suggest that Iraq is unlikely to witness
comprehensive disarmament of armed factions in the foreseeable future. What is
emerging instead is a familiar reality: managed containment, a process in which
the state seeks to regulate, absorb, or neutralize armed power incrementally
without confronting it head-on.
The
late-2025 debate revealed the limits of what Iraqi institutions can
realistically enforce. Even when senior judicial authorities raise the issue of
restricting weapons to state control, implementation depends on political
consensus, factional consent, and regional conditions that lie largely outside
Baghdad’s control. The resistance ecosystem, coordinated yet fragmented, retains
sufficient leverage to block any move perceived as threatening its strategic
depth.
What the
Iraqi State can do is to shape the discourse by framing weapons control as a
legal and sovereign issue rather than a political confrontation. It can also
pursue selective regulation, including tighter oversight of PMF financing,
deployment mandates, and chain-of-command formalities.
However,
what it cannot do, at least under current conditions, is to impose unilateral
disarmament on factions that define their weapons as existential or dismantle
coordination frameworks that link domestic armed actors to regional deterrence
strategies.
Written and
edited by Shafaq News staff.
