Testimonies from crew members of the “al-Sharwa” vessel, which attempted to smuggle strategic weapons for the Houthis in Yemen, revealed new details in recent hours about the smuggling routes used by the terrorist organization. According to the testimonies, Hezbollah operatives and Iran’s Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard operate on these routes.
The comprehensive operation, exposed through the crew’s capture during their 12th smuggling mission, demonstrates how Iranian forces systematically circumvented international sanctions by disguising ballistic missile components, drone technology, and anti-aircraft systems as legitimate commercial industrial equipment including generators, transformers, and manufacturing pumps destined for Djibouti in the Horn of Africa before final transfer to Yemen.
South Yemen security forces conducting thorough inspections of the vessel discovered the elaborate deception when they dismantled the supposed factory equipment and found sophisticated military hardware concealed within, including radar systems, missile guidance components, and strategic weapons technology that significantly enhances Houthis combat capabilities against international shipping in the Red Sea.
Armed tribesmen shout slogans while riding a vehicle with a cannon during an anti-USA and anti-Israel gathering mobilizing more Houthi fighters, on the outskirts of Sana’a, Yemen, 24 December 2024 (EPA/Yahya Arhab)
The crew testimonies identified six key Houthis officials orchestrating the entire smuggling enterprise alongside three primary trafficking corridors that served as backup routes compensating for damage inflicted on al-Hudaydah port by coordinated Israeli and American military strikes targeting Iranian weapons infrastructure in Yemen.
The primary smuggling route operates directly from Iran’s strategic Bandar Abbas port facility to al-Salif port in northwestern Yemen, while the secondary corridor utilizes Somalia’s coastline where Iranian Revolutionary Guards maintain forward positions to coordinate weapons transfers, and the third pathway employs commercial shipping cover through Djibouti under management by recruited local operatives.
Abu Jaafar al-Talbi emerges as the primary coordinator, serving as deputy defense minister for the Houthis regime with specific responsibility for military logistics operations, holding authority equivalent to a general or brigadier general rank while managing direct coordination with Iranian Revolutionary Guards and personally overseeing weapons shipment operations.
Hussein al-Attas functions as “head of the general authority for fishing in the Red Sea,” utilizing his maritime position to recruit sailors for Iranian missions while maintaining oversight of smuggling operations originating from both Somalia and Djibouti, supported by his deputy Eyad Atini who manages fishing operations at the critical al-Salif and al-Hudaydah port facilities.
The network includes Yahya Jiniya managing recruitment and smuggling coordination, Ibrahim al-Moayad overseeing financial operations and salary distributions, and Mostafa al-Sharfi serving as the essential liaison with Iranian Revolutionary Guards while providing Persian language translation services and coordinating Yemeni sailor reception in Iran alongside container shipping logistics.
Captured crew members provided detailed accounts of their smuggling operations between Yemen, Somalia, and Iran under civilian commercial cover, with several admitting to transporting “sensitive chemicals” disguised as cancer treatment pharmaceuticals that Iranian forces used for ballistic missile fuel production, while others participated in oil and weapons trafficking from Somalia and Djibouti directly to Yemen’s al-Salif port facility.
The testimonies reveal an extensive international smuggling network operating across Arab, Asian, and African nations to transport diverse combat equipment including strategic weapons systems and chemical weapons components, demonstrating the sophisticated scope of Iranian proxy operations supporting Houthis military capabilities.
The crew exposed a complex travel network enabling Yemeni smugglers to reach Iranian facilities, involving flights from Sanaa airport to Jordan, continuing to Lebanon, crossing overland to Syria, then flying to Tehran before traveling to the Bandar Abbas port region in southern Iran where Iranian Revolutionary Guards conduct training and coordination activities.
An alternative shorter route utilized the neighboring Sultanate of Oman, which frequently mediates between Houthis forces and Western governments, allowing smugglers to fly directly to Iran after crossing into Omani territory, demonstrating how Iranian forces exploit regional diplomatic relationships to facilitate weapons trafficking operations.
The crew members who revealed the route (Screenshot: Arab social media) Arab social media
Crew members revealed that smuggling vessels operated primarily during nighttime hours while maintaining close proximity to coastlines to minimize detection by international naval patrols monitoring Red Sea shipping lanes for sanctions violations and weapons trafficking activities.
Senior South Yemen officer Rakkan Ali Talyan, interviewed by “al-Jumhuriya” channel following the testimony revelations, confirmed that Houthis smugglers meeting with Hezbollah operatives and Iranian elements in Syria during Lebanon transit, with Hezbollah forces coordinating their transfer to Syria and subsequent movement to Iran, while similar coordination meetings occurred at strategic locations within the Sultanate of Oman.
The Yemeni intelligence officer revealed that smugglers assembled at a specialized Iranian training facility where Revolutionary Guards provided oversight and coordination before assigning them to operate on the three established smuggling corridors connecting Iran, Somalia, and Djibouti to Houthis-controlled territory in Yemen.
