Shafaq News
After settling all 853 election appeals, Iraq entered
a decisive political phase, with winning blocs preparing for a new legislature
facing extensive challenges. The next parliament will convene under a
legislative vacuum created by a November 17, 2025, ruling from the Federal
Supreme Court—the country’s highest judicial authority—terminating the mandates
of both the government and parliament.
Government formation—expected to take three to four
months—places the incoming legislature before a double test: how to fill a
critical institutional gap, and how to prevent foreign or domestic actors from
exploiting it.
Another central question also emerges: will Iraq tilt
closer to Iran, align with the US, or maintain a posture of relative
neutrality? Analysts argue that the answer will be shaped largely by the
handling of two key legislative files—the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)
Authority Law and the Federal Oil and Gas Law. Each serves as a strategic
indicator of Iraq’s foreign and domestic alignment, with consequences that
stretch far beyond parliament.
Axis Politics
Political analyst Wael Hazem views the next parliament
as inseparable from Iraq’s unresolved geopolitical posture. Speaking to Shafaq
News, he noted that the chamber’s performance will hinge on the strategic
direction Iraq chooses regarding its regional alignments. He further outlined
three potential scenarios—each carrying distinct legislative, economic, and
security outcomes.
The first is joining the “Axis Of Resistance,” a step
he warned would bring political, security, and economic pressures far beyond
current expectations. “Such alignment would translate into laws and security
arrangements empowering armed factions with resources and authority,
potentially constraining Iraq’s international partnerships and risking
sanctions should Western states perceive a threat to their interests.”
The second scenario is maintaining Iraq’s current
posture of “relative neutrality.” Challenges would continue, but at a more
manageable level compared to a realignment toward Tehran. “This approach
requires institutional discipline, legal clarity, and a strict separation of
powers—expectations that place substantial weight on parliament’s ability to
craft rules that prevent overlapping jurisdictions and reduce parallel
loyalties.”
The third scenario—“moving closer to the US
axis”—would ease several pressures, largely because a significant share of
Iraq’s foreign reserves is held in the United States, and Washington can assist
in sensitive files, including the water dispute with Turkiye.
While economically attractive—especially in terms of
encouraging US and Western investment—this path carries domestic political
costs and regional sensitivities.
“Any clear tilt toward Washington would be interpreted
internally as a realignment that could reorder parliamentary alliances and
shift legislative priorities,” Hazem added.
The Integration Test
The proposed PMF Authority Law, backed by major Shiite
factions, is officially framed as part of Iraq’s security reform agenda. It
aims to integrate the PMF—a force originally established to confront ISIS—into
the military chain of command. Supporters argue the Law is needed to
standardize ranks, regulate funding, and clarify the PMF’s position within
state institutions.
Opponents—foreign and domestic—view the draft
differently, warning it would legitimize powerful Iran-aligned factions and
institutionalize a parallel command structure shielded from civilian oversight.
The PMF was created in mid-2014 by government order in
response to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s fatwa (Al-Jihad Al-Kafa’i) after
the fall of Mosul. It attracted tens of thousands of fighters, including
members of pre-existing armed factions. In 2016, Iraq’s parliament passed the
first PMF law, formally recognizing the force but leaving its internal
structure and regulatory framework ambiguous.
While the Coordination Framework—Iraq’s current
largest parliamentary bloc with about 148 out of 329 MPs—retains significant
influence, consensus on the PMF Law remains elusive. Internal divisions,
including among Shiite parties, revolve around leadership appointments and
control over PMF deployments in Sunni-majority areas.
Kurdish and Sunni lawmakers, though less vocal
publicly, have played a pivotal behind-the-scenes role in obstructing or
supporting the bill. During a July 2025 session, both blocs withdrew in protest
after the bill was added to the parliamentary agenda, citing procedural
violations under Article 37 of parliamentary rules. The walkout also served as
a tool to increase pressure in broader negotiations.
Some Kurdish factions, according to Shafaq News
political sources, have linked their support for the PMF Law to concessions on
unresolved Federal-Regional disputes, including budget allocations, oil
revenues, and control of border crossings. Messages were reportedly delivered
through intermediaries outlining these conditions for cooperation on
“controversial legislation.”
Sunni parties remain divided. Most oppose passage of
the bill, including former Speaker Mohammed Al-Halbousi’s Progress (Taqaddum)
Party, which recently emerged as the largest Sunni parliamentary bloc with 27
seats. He voiced reservations tied to influence distribution and executive
authority.
Observers note that both Kurdish and Sunni leaders
fear the Law might consolidate what they view as a “Shiite army” with
disproportionate influence, while also recognizing the opportunity to secure
political concessions in exchange for their votes.
Meanwhile, the United States has repeatedly expressed
firm opposition to the PMF Law, with the Pentagon viewing the draft as a direct
expansion of Iran’s influence in Iraq. The US Embassy in Baghdad reinforced
this stance, warning that the legislation risks legitimizing groups the US
classifies as terrorist organizations.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in a call with
caretaker PM Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, warned that the Law would
institutionalize Iranian-backed armed groups and weaken Iraqi sovereignty.
Despite these objections, the Iraqi government has
maintained its position. An earlier statement from Al-Sudani’s office framed
the bill as a sovereign initiative consistent with legislation governing other
agencies, including the Intelligence and National Security Services. The PMF,
it noted, is a “formal military institution operating under the
Commander-in-Chief, which is the PM.”
Speaking to Shafaq News, independent politician Abu
Methaq Al-Massari expected the next parliament to encounter a different
structural environment from previous terms. But he underlined that the large
Shiite parliamentary majority gives the chamber the numerical strength to pass
long-delayed legislation. “
Still, a fast vote does not guarantee quality,” he
added, stressing that laws pushed through without strong accountability
mechanisms can deepen crises.
He argued that the PMF Law will “pass easily” this
time, noting that its delay in the previous term stemmed from “mobilizational
complications” and election-season manoeuvring—factors no longer influencing
the process.
Describing its passage as “a matter of time” reflects
the political momentum behind the bill, yet it also prompts a broader question:
What shape will the final legislation take? Will it embed strong oversight and
accountability? Or will it formalize influence structures that remain outside
meaningful state control?
Read more: Iraq’s PMF Law: A battle for state control
Resource Control Rift
The second central file is the Federal Oil and Gas
Law, intended to define resource management between Baghdad and the Kurdistan
Region, including rules for licensing, revenue sharing, and environmental and
technical governance.
Pending since 2005, the Law stipulates that Iraq’s
oilfields should be managed by a national oil company under the supervision of
a Federal Council. However, disagreements over fields in the Kurdistan Region
have persisted since 2003.
Baghdad accuses Erbil of failing to provide accurate
revenue figures and withholding proceeds from the Federal Treasury. The
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), in contrast, insists on full control over
its oilfields, including licensing, production, exports, and contracts.
The KRG’s Oil Law grants it authority over oil
operations, marketing, and contract negotiations, while allowing Federal
participation only in pre-2005 fields.
Read more: The Kurdistan Gambit: New gas deals ignite the Baghdad-Erbil divide
Iraq exports an average of 3.3 million barrels of
crude oil daily, with oil revenue making up more than 90% of national income.
Discrepancies in production costs and revenue structures between Baghdad’s
licensing rounds and the KRG’s operations have deepened friction.
In May 2023, Iraq’s Oil Ministry accused the KRG of
“legal and procedural violations” in oil sales, resulting in financial losses.
It noted that Federal licensing rounds yield higher returns (up to 96.5% of
revenue) compared to KRG operations (around 80%).
In August 2023, the Iraqi government formed a
committee—including Federal and Regional oil officials, as well as
representatives from oil-producing provinces—to finalize the draft law. The
initiative aligns with caretaker PM Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani’s recent
arrangement with the KRG to resolve contentious issues, including implementing
Article 140 on disputed territories.
Passing the Oil and Gas Law is viewed as a tilt toward
the US because a clear, investment-friendly licensing system attracts major
American and European companies—an outcome Baghdad seeks to modernize
production, import technology, and upgrade infrastructure.
Moreover, a legal framework that guarantees property
rights, cost recovery, and international arbitration mechanisms increases
Iraq’s attractiveness to companies such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Western
drilling firms.
Yet political and public concerns persist, reflecting
fears that new contracts could undermine transparency or the national interest.
Many Iraqis worry that restructuring the energy sector could grant excessive
leverage to foreign companies at the expense of national oversight.
Politically, the file has long served as a bargaining tool in broader
negotiations, keeping the Law suspended amid unresolved compromises.
Read more: No end in sight: Iraq’s Parliament drowns in delays and disagreements
More Domestic Crises
The new parliament will also face a series of
sensitive laws: legislation on the Federal Court, decentralization, and
administrative quotas. These “smaller” files can reshape power balances if
leveraged to secure posts, resources, or regional authority.
Newly elected MP Mahma Khalil—aligned with the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—argues that Iraq’s parliamentary system makes
the legislature the core of political life, responsible for both lawmaking and
oversight of the executive. This places a dual burden on MPs: they are
legislators and a constitutional safeguard against foreign influence or opaque
internal pressure.
Speaking to Shafaq News, Khalil described the incoming
term as “filled with complications,” pointing to economic strain, drought, and
political volatility. These “major problems,” he noted, demand a stronger
legislative and oversight role.
That assessment carries practical implications: a
strained budget, fluctuating revenues tied to global markets, and environmental
pressures linked to diplomatic standoffs will directly affect provincial
stability.
“The newly elected parliament must move beyond
emergency legislation toward building frameworks resilient enough to absorb
shocks and streamline governance,” he added, noting that previous parliaments
witnessed a clear decline in legislative performance.
Read more: Iraq’s Parliament: High pay, low productivity
Must Master Balance
The real test for Iraq’s political class does not lie
in rushing through laws shaped by external loyalties, nor in indefinitely
postponing legislation that could strengthen governance. It rests on drafting
laws that secure institutional accountability, economic transparency, and clear
rights protections.
If parliament aims to prevent Iraq from becoming an
arena for competing pressures, it must adopt legislation that weakens parallel
loyalties and reinforces institutions resilient to outside influence. This will
require difficult decisions—choices that will define Iraq’s direction for the
next decade.
Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.
