Shafaq News
Iraq’s new
Prime Minister, Ali al-Zaidi, entered office under the shadow of an incomplete
parliamentary mandate after the Iraqi parliament approved only 14 cabinet
ministers, leaving nine key sovereign and service portfolios unresolved,
including the ministries of Interior, Defense, and Planning.
The delay has
not been viewed as a routine political dispute over appointments. Instead, it
reflects deeper tensions tied to the restructuring of Iraq’s post-2003
political order and the future role of armed Shiite factions within the state
apparatus.
Vacant
ministries encompass some of Iraq’s most critical institutions, overseeing
security, administration, and economic planning. The Interior and Defense
portfolios, in particular, remain highly contentious because they are directly
tied to the issue of weapons control and the influence of armed factions, a
file that lies at the heart of both Baghdad’s relationship with Washington and rivalries
within the Shiite political camp.
Amid a highly
sensitive regional and international climate, Baghdad faces increasing US
pressure alongside escalating competition among factions within the
Coordination Framework. At the same time, Iraqi political forces are attempting
to craft a governing arrangement capable of containing external demands without
upsetting the country’s fragile internal equilibrium.
Read more: Iraq’s armed factions, state authority, and the battle over disarmament
Armed Factions
and the Post-2003 Order
One of the most
significant transformations in Iraq since 2003 has been the evolution of armed
factions from military actors into influential political stakeholders with
direct leverage over state institutions. Many of these groups expanded their
influence during the war against ISIS and now maintain substantial parliamentary,
political, and economic power that major Iraqi parties can no longer ignore.
Political
researcher Ramadan Al-Badran told Shafaq News that the issue of armed factions
is simultaneously a domestic Iraqi crisis and part of a broader regional confrontation.
“The factions’ relationship with Iran makes them part of the wider tension
between Tehran and Washington,” Al-Badran said, arguing that the post-2003
political system, particularly during the governments of former Prime Minister
Nouri Al-Maliki between 2006 and 2014, “effectively legitimized the presence of
these groups by presenting them as defenders of Iraq’s political order.”
He questioned
the current calls to limit factional influence, asking why parallel military
formations were established outside the traditional army structure in the first
place and why they are now being asked to retreat after years of participating
in protecting the state.
Read more: Ali Al-Zaidi sworn in as Iraq’s prime minister with a program already failed
A Consensus
Prime Minister
Observers
interviewed by Shafaq News said Al-Zaidi’s selection was less the result of
political dominance within the Coordination Framework than a compromise among
competing Shiite forces seeking a figure capable of managing internal
rivalries.
Haitham Hadi
Numan, Professor of Political Science at the University of Exeter, noted that
Al-Zaidi emerged as a consensus candidate acceptable to the major factions
inside the alliance, and the forces within the Coordination Framework now
possess relatively balanced influence that prevents any single party from
dominating. “Therefore, they chose a figure who can be politically managed.”
According to
Numan, confrontation with armed factions “remains unlikely” in the current
phase. Instead, Iraq’s ruling forces appear more inclined toward the “legal
institutionalization” of these groups within state structures.
Read more: The Shiite Coordination Framework: Can govern Iraq, but cannot agree on a primeminister
Factions Push
Back
Pillar One of
al-Zaidi’s program commits the government to consolidating all weapons under
exclusive state authority, meaning no armed group outside the formal military
and security structure should operate independently. In most countries, this
would be an unremarkable statement, but in Iraq, it is the central unresolved
dilemma of the post-2003 political order.
Signs of
resistance quickly emerged. Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba rejected suggestions
that the government’s pledge to limit weapons to state authority applies to
what it called “resistance weapons.”
The group’s
Executive Council chief, Nazem Al-Saadi, stressed that the term “uncontrolled
weapons” referred only to illegal arms that create “chaos,” insisting that it
did not include weapons held by fighters who “defended Iraq, its holy sites,
and its people during the most difficult circumstances.”
At the same
time, new fractures appear to be emerging within the Coordination Framework
itself.
A well-informed
source revealed to Shafaq News that five influential Shiite leaders are holding
advanced discussions to establish a new parliamentary alliance that could
significantly reshape Iraq’s ruling coalition landscape.
The figures
involved include Nouri Al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law Coalition; Hadi
Al-Ameri, leader of the Badr Organization and head of the Fatah Alliance; Faleh
Al-Fayyad; Humam Hamoudi; and Ahmed al-Asadi.
According to the
source, the proposed bloc could include between 75 and 100 lawmakers,
potentially making it one of the largest organized opposition forces in
parliament despite originating from within the Shiite political establishment
itself.
If formed, the
alliance would signal not only dissatisfaction with Al-Zaidi’s government
arrangements but also deeper competition over the future leadership of the
Coordination Framework and the distribution of influence inside the Shiite
camp.
Washington
Pressure and Baghdad’s Balancing Act
In recent
months, Washington has intensified sanctions targeting individuals linked to
armed factions while repeatedly stressing that restricting weapons to state
control remains a prerequisite for deeper bilateral cooperation with Baghdad.
Iraqi political
sources have also spoken of an undeclared American veto against the
participation of armed factions in government institutions.
The US
Department of State has indicated that its relationship with the new Iraqi
government will be judged “by actions, not words,” placing Baghdad in a
difficult position. The Iraqi government must preserve the cohesion of its
internal alliances while simultaneously avoiding confrontation with Washington,
whose support remains critical for Iraq’s economic stability, security
cooperation, and international relations.
Read more: Ali al-Zaidi named Iraq’s prime minister: Easy nomination, harder road ahead
Iraq’s
Unresolved State Dilemma
According to
analysts, the troubled birth of Al-Zaidi’s government underscores a structural
crisis that extends far beyond cabinet formation or ministerial quotas.
At its core,
the conflict concerns the nature of the Iraqi state itself: the limits of armed
faction influence, the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and
Baghdad’s relationship with competing regional and international powers.
Caught between
American pressure, Iranian calculations, and the internal balance of the
Coordination Framework, the new prime minister faces a defining challenge:
either engineer a new political settlement capable of reorganizing the
relationship between the state and armed factions or enter another prolonged
phase of political paralysis.
One notable
indicator of the current compromise is the absence of any explicit commitment
in the government program regarding the future of the PMF or its weapons. That
omission raises a central question now dominating Iraq’s political debate: can
the PMF become the foundation for a broader political settlement between the
state and the factions, or has the issue already moved beyond the limits of
purely Iraqi solutions?
Read more: Iraq’s new political equation: Armed groups’ gains put pressure on US
Written and
edited by Shafaq News staff.
