Shafaq News – Baghdad
The Middle East enters 2026 not on the
path to resolution, but in a state of enforced equilibrium. Ceasefires have
reduced the pace of violence across several fronts, yet they have failed to
resolve the underlying political, economic, and security disputes that drive
conflict. From Gaza and Lebanon to Yemen, Syria, and
Iraq, the region is settling into a pattern of managed instability, where
escalation is contained, deterrence is constantly tested, and unresolved power
struggles leave states and societies exposed to sudden shocks.
Rather than signaling stability, the
persistence of ceasefires without political settlements points to a deeper
regional reality: crises are being postponed, not solved, as economic strain,
internal fragmentation, and rival geopolitical agendas continue to shape the Middle
East’s outlook for 2026.
Iraq: Strategic Balancing Under Sustained
Pressure
Iraq enters 2026 amid efforts to form
a new government and recalibrate its regional and international posture, while
political fragmentation and external pressure continue to shape
decision-making.
According to official budget data, the
2025 federal budget was built on an assumed oil price of around $70 per barrel
and daily exports exceeding 3.3 million barrels, underscoring the country’s
continued reliance on hydrocarbons for aboit 90% of state revenues.
Elevated oil prices in recent years have provided short-term fiscal breathing
space, but this dependence leaves public finances exposed to global energy
market volatility.
World Bank estimates place Iraq’s overall
unemployment rate at 14–15%, with youth unemployment exceeding 27%, reflecting
persistent labor-market strain despite large public-sector hiring. Poverty
rates, which declined modestly after the post-pandemic recovery, still affect
an estimated 25% of the population in some provinces, particularly in southern
and rural areas, according to Iraqi Planning Ministry data. At the same time,
the public-sector wage bill continues to consume a substantial share of annual
spending, limiting fiscal flexibility for infrastructure, health, and education
investment.
Institutional vulnerabilities remain
evident in the energy sector despite repeated pledges to improve electricity
supply. Thecountry continues to experience chronic power shortages during peak summer
demand, importing large quantities of gas and electricity from Iran (40-60%) under
time-limited waivers. Any disruption, whether due to sanctions enforcement or
regional escalation, could quickly translate into domestic unrest.
The presence of approximately 2,500 US
troops in advisory roles, alongside Iran-aligned armed factions operating
within Iraq’s security landscape, continues to place Baghdad at the
intersection of broader regional rivalries. Developments involving Iran,
Israel, and armed groups operating across borders reinforce Iraq’s role as a
potential pressure point where regional escalation could translate into
domestic strain even in the absence of direct confrontation.
At the same time, 2026 brings growing
concern over the unresolved question of disarming armed factions operating
outside full state control, mainly those within the Islamic Resistasnce in Iraq, such as Kataeb Hezbollah and Harakat Al-Nujabaa. Debate over the future of these groups has intensified, driven by international
pressure, domestic political divisions, and fears that any miscalculation could
trigger internal instability. Iraqi leaders face competing imperatives:
reassuring external partners, preserving internal cohesion, and avoiding
confrontations that could fracture the security landscape. How Baghdad manages
this file in 2026 is increasingly viewed as a key test of state authority and strategic
balance.
Taken together, Iraq’s outlook for 2026
reflects a delicate balancing act—managing economic vulnerability, political
fragmentation, and mounting external and internal pressures while attempting to
preserve stability in a highly volatile regional environment.
Read more: Three years on, Is PM Al-Sudani responsible for Iraq’s failing services?
Syria: Social Strain and Renewed Security
Risks
Syria enters 2026 facing renewed sources
of instability that extend beyond the familiar front lines of the conflict.
While large-scale nationwide fighting has largely subsided, mounting social
pressure, localized unrest, and unresolved security issues continue to pose
risks to internal cohesion and regional stability.
Recent months have seen expressions of
discontent in areas traditionally associated with the Alawite community, long
viewed as a core support base of the government. Protests and localized
tensions have been driven by economic collapse, fuel shortages, compulsory
military service, and a sharp decline in living standards, with angrowing
frustration even in regions previously insulated from open dissent. The clashes
between the community and the Syrian forces resulted in hundreds of deaths.
At the same time, Druze-majority areas in
southern Syria, particularly Suwayda province, have experienced intermittent
protests and local clashes linked to opposition to Damascus’ authority,
worsening economic conditions, and demands for greater local autonomy. These localized
movements, while fragmented, point to deeper sectarian and social strains that
could widen in the absence of meaningful economic relief or political
accommodation.
Security concerns also persist across
multiple fronts. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Israeli
airstrikes and incursions continued throughout 2025, with hundreds of
violations documented in southern Syria, reinforcing the country’s exposure to
regional confrontation. Separately, eastern and northeastern Syria face renewed
uncertainty as ISIS cells seek to exploit security gaps, particularly in areas
marked by overlapping control, displacement, and economic deprivation.
Clashes and tensions involving the Syrian
Democratic Forces, local armed actors, and remnants of extremist networks
underscore the fragility of existing security arrangements.
Without coordinated stabilization efforts,
Syria could see a convergence of social unrest, sectarian tension, and militant
activity in 2026, even in the absence of a return to full-scale civil war.
Lebanon: Deterrence and Internal Division
Lebanon enters 2026 under sustained
Israeli military pressure, alongside deep internal divisions over the future of
Hezbollah’s weapons and the unresolved issue of Israeli occupation of disputed
border areas. While a broader escalation has been avoided, the security
environment remains volatile and costly.
According to the United Nations Interim
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), more than 10,000 Israeli airspace and ground
violations have been recorded inside Lebanese territory since the ceasefire
agreed on 27 November 2024. The Ministry of Health recorded more than 360
deaths due to these violations.
Internally, debate over Hezbollah’s
weapons has intensified as fears grow that prolonged confrontation could draw
Lebanon into a wider regional conflict.
The prolonged security pressure compounds
Lebanon’s economic strain. Official data show annual inflation at around 14.7%
in November 2025, easing from earlier peaks but still imposing high costs on
households already affected by poverty, displacement, and service collapse.
Large areas in the south remain damaged, yet no comprehensive reconstruction
plan or funding mechanism has been formally adopted, leaving displaced
residents uncertain about return timelines and recovery prospects.
The absence of both a unified national
defense strategy and a clear reconstruction decision leaves the country exposed
to continued attrition in 2026, with limited capacity to absorb further shocks.
Gaza: Ceasefire Management and Unresolved
Governance
Gaza enters 2026 under a ceasefire that
did not pause the Israeli large-scale hostilities and left core political and security
questions unresolved. According to the Gaza Government Media Office, the total
number of killed and missing during 2025 reached 29,117, including more than
25,700 fatalities whose bodies were received by hospitals and over 3,400
missing persons, many believed to be trapped under rubble. Infrastructure damage,
mass displacement, and sharp economic contraction are expected to weigh heavily
on prospects for recovery throughout 2026.
Diplomatic efforts to move beyond the
ceasefire remain tentative. In December 2025, US President Donald Trump held
talks with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago
residence, focusing on the future of the truce and possible next steps. Trump
framed the discussions as part of advancing what he described as a “second
phase” of a peace plan, including a transition toward a Palestinian governing
body in Gaza and the start of reconstruction. He said Hamas would be given a
“very short period” to disarm under the ceasefire framework.
Israeli officials confirmed that talks
centered on arrangements for the next phase of the ceasefire, including
proposals for an international stabilization force, a temporary Palestinian
governing committee, and conditions for Israeli withdrawal from current
positions in the Gaza Strip. While the first phase of the ceasefire, launched
on 10 October 2025, paused major fighting and enabled hostage exchanges and
limited humanitarian access, the transition to a subsequent phase remains
stalled.
Netanyahu has repeatedly stated that any
new governance arrangement in Gaza depends on the complete disarmament of
Hamas, a position that continues to shape Israel’s negotiating posture. US
officials have signaled interest in maintaining momentum toward reconstruction
and political transition, but without outlining a detailed timeline or
enforcement mechanism, leaving Gaza’s future uncertain as 2026 begins.
Yemen: Fragmented Ceasefire and Diverging
Regional Agendas
Yemen enters 2026 amid renewed
uncertainty, despite the absence of sustained nationwide fighting. A sharp
escalation in late 2025 exposed widening fractures within the Saudi-led
coalition framework, particularly between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates, over influence, security arrangements, and the future political
structure of Yemen.
These tensions surfaced publicly after
Saudi-led coalition forces accused UAE-backed factions of actions that
threatened Riyadh’s security interests. In response, Yemen’s Presidential
Leadership Council declared a state of emergency, cancelled defense
arrangements linked to Abu Dhabi, and ordered the withdrawal of remaining
Emirati forces. The UAE subsequently confirmed it was ending its residual
counterterrorism mission in Yemen, describing the move as a voluntary
withdrawal aimed at safeguarding its personnel.
At the same time, Ansarallah (Houthis)
appears to be consolidating its military and political position rather than
moving toward demobilization. The group has continued to enhance missile and
drone capabilities, strengthen internal security control, and signal readiness
to escalate if negotiations collapse or regional tensions intensify. Analysts
warn that this combination of stalled political settlement, external rivalry,
and armed preparedness leaves Yemen vulnerable to renewed conflict in 2026,
even in the absence of full-scale war.
Sudan: Prolonged War and Deepening
Humanitarian Collapse
Sudan enters 2026 engulfed in one of the
world’s most severe humanitarian and security crises, as fighting between the
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continues
into its third year with no political breakthrough in sight.
The United Nations has described the
conflict as producing the largest displacement crisis globally, with nearly 14
million people displaced inside Sudan and across borders, and more than 21
million facing acute hunger. Recent UN and humanitarian assessments indicate
that over 30 million Sudanese, nearly two-thirds of the population, now require
humanitarian assistance, including food, health care, and shelter, as
international funding continues to fall short of needs.
The violence has expanded well beyond its
initial epicenters in Khartoum and Darfur, spreading into Kordofan and other
regions. Cities such as El-Fasher and El-Obeid have become focal points of
devastation, with health systems overwhelmed, markets collapsed, and mass
displacement turning entire neighborhoods into largely abandoned areas.
Independent estimates suggest tens of thousands have been killed, with some
analysts warning that the true death toll is significantly higher once indirect
causes such as starvation, disease, and lack of medical care are accounted for.
Both the SAF and RSF have been accused by
international organizations of grave human rights violations, including
indiscriminate attacks on civilians, summary executions, and ethnically
targeted violence. Humanitarian access remains severely constrained, with aid
workers facing persistent security threats; more than 110 aid personnel were
reportedly killed, injured, or abducted in 2025 alone, while hundreds of health
facilities have been damaged or rendered non-operational.
SAF leadership has publicly rejected
mediated peace initiatives, maintaining that the conflict will end only with
the disarmament or defeat of the RSF—a position analysts say entrenches the deadlock
and prolongs civilian suffering as Sudan enters another year of war in 2026.
Iran and Israel: Deterrence, Nuclear
Pressure, and Proxy Risk
Beyond Gaza, the Iran–Israel equation
remains one of the most consequential variables shaping the region’s outlook in
2026. Neither side appears to be seeking full-scale war, but sustained
warnings, military signaling, and proxy activity underline the risk of
miscalculation.
Iran enters 2026 under continued economic
and diplomatic pressure. Currency-tracking platforms recorded the Iranian toman
at approximately 141,950 per US dollar by December 2025, reflecting persistent
inflation, sanctions constraints, and budgetary strain. Efforts to revive
elements of the 2015 nuclear agreement remain unresolved.
European Union officials and Iran’s
foreign ministry have signaled cautious openness to resuming structured talks
in early 2026, while Tehran insists on substantial sanctions relief and
guarantees against future unilateral US withdrawal. Western diplomats continue to
emphasize verification and monitoring, leaving negotiations fragile.
From Israel’s perspective, the nuclear
file remains a core national security concern. Netanyahu reiterated in December
2025 that Israel would not accept a nuclear-armed Iran “under any
circumstances,” framing potential military action as a last resort. Israeli
officials continue to link contingency planning to assessments of Iran’s
enrichment capacity, missile development, and regional activities.
Proxy dynamics across Lebanon, Syria, Iraq,
and Yemen further complicate the picture. Iran-aligned armed groups retain the
capacity to apply pressure without direct state-to-state confrontation, while
Israel has signaled readiness to act against perceived threats beyond its
borders.
Israeli domestic politics add another
layer of uncertainty as there is a possibility of early elections in May, which
has fueled concern that regional escalation, whether against Iran or on other
fronts, could be used to consolidate political support at home, particularly as
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to face legal and political
challenges.
The brief but intense exchanges earlier in
2025 reinforced concerns that localized incidents could escalate rapidly if
deterrence mechanisms fail.
A Year of Managed Uncertainty
Across the Middle East, 2026 is shaping up
as a year of unresolved questions rather than decisive change. Ceasefires
persist without political settlements, economic pressures intensify social
strain, and regional rivalries continue to frame security calculations. While
large-scale war is not inevitable, the absence of durable agreements and the
persistence of structural vulnerabilities suggest that stability will remain
conditional, fragile, and uneven across the region.
Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.
