Shafaq News
The return of Nouri al-Maliki to the center of Iraq’s power
struggle has reopened old fault lines inside the country and across the region.
Nominated by the Shiite Coordination Framework (CF) as its official candidate
for prime minister, al-Maliki’s potential third term has triggered a
convergence of controversy: external powers are split over his comeback, while
Iraq’s political blocs remain divided over whether he represents stability or a
revival of past crises.
At stake is not only the formation of the next government,
but Iraq’s positioning amid an intensifying US–Iran rivalry, fragile
Sunni–Shiite relations, and a Kurdish leadership that favors predictability
over experimentation.
A Nomination Timed For Maximum Sensitivity
Al-Maliki’s nomination comes as Iraq approaches a
constitutional crossroads, with parliament expected to elect a president, a
prerequisite for formally tasking the largest bloc with forming a government.
Supporters say the move reflects parliamentary arithmetic and the Coordination Framework’s
status as the largest Shiite alliance, holding roughly 185 of the 329 seats.
Critics counter that the timing is deliberate, aimed at locking in a strongman
candidate before opposition blocs can consolidate.
The decision underscores a central reality of post-2003
politics: no prime minister emerges without external calculation. In
al-Maliki’s case, those calculations diverge sharply between Washington and
Tehran.
Iran’s Calculated Endorsement: Familiar, But Conditional
For Iran, al-Maliki is a known quantity. His rise in 2006,
consolidation in 2010, and sidelining in 2014 were all shaped —directly or
indirectly— by Iranian intervention. During his first term, Tehran viewed him
as a unifying Shiite figure capable of stabilizing a fragmented post-invasion
order. By his second term, Iran actively engineered alliances to keep him in
office, overriding unfavorable electoral outcomes.
In 2014, after the collapse of Iraqi security forces and the
fall of Mosul to ISIS, Tehran abruptly shifted its backing to prevent broader
systemic collapse. The message was centered around the idea that allies are
expendable when stability is at risk.
Today, Iranian backing has returned under a new logic. With
rising US pressure and fears of renewed attempts to marginalize Iran-aligned
armed factions, Tehran sees al-Maliki as willing —and able— to resist external
coercion. Informed Iraqi sources told Shafaq News that the nomination carries
at least tacit approval from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, reflecting
Iran’s preference for tested actors over compromise figures. Still, Iranian
officials remain pragmatic; if al-Maliki fails to secure parliamentary
confirmation, Tehran is unlikely to burn bridges defending him at all costs.
Washington’s Dilemma: Opposition Without Obstruction
The United States views al-Maliki’s return with deep
skepticism. In Washington, he remains associated with policies that alienated
Sunni communities, centralized power, and indirectly facilitated the rise of
ISIS. The concern today is less historical blame than forward-looking risk.
From the perspective of Donald Trump’s circle, an al-Maliki
premiership could inflame Sunni grievances and strengthen Iran-aligned factions
at a moment when Washington seeks to curb Tehran’s regional influence. US officials
have privately warned Iraqi leaders that including commanders from Iran-linked
armed groups in the next government could trigger sanctions targeting the Iraqi
state itself, including oil revenues, according to multiple diplomatic sources.
That stance was reinforced publicly by Marco Rubio, who
cautioned in a phone call with caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani
that a government shaped by Iranian influence would struggle to prioritize
Iraq’s interests, keep the country out of regional conflict, or sustain a
balanced partnership with the United States.
Yet Washington faces a constraint of its own: overtly
blocking al-Maliki risks provoking a Shiite backlash against perceived US
interference. As a result, American pressure has focused on red lines rather
than names, seeking to shape the composition of any future cabinet rather than
veto its leader outright.
Inside Iraq: A Candidate Who Unites And Divides
Domestically, al-Maliki’s nomination has produced an unusual
political map. Kurdish parties —the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)— have largely welcomed his candidacy.
Leaders close to Masoud Barzani see al-Maliki as predictable and transactional,
capable of honoring power-sharing arrangements.
The PUK formally endorsed the nomination, urging swift
completion of constitutional procedures and the formation of a stable,
service-oriented government. For Kurdish leaders, al-Maliki’s return represents
continuity over uncertainty, particularly amid regional volatility.
The Sunni landscape tells a more complex story. While some
Sunni figures and alliances have cautiously signaled openness —arguing that
past grievances should not dictate present choices— others remain openly
opposed.
The al-Hasm and al-Azm alliances publicly backed al-Maliki’s
nomination, distancing themselves from a statement by the National Political
Council (NPC), an umbrella body representing Sunni factions, that warned
against repeating past leadership experiences. Oras al-Mashhadani, a senior
figure in the al-Azm Alliance led by Muthanna al-Samarrai, told Shafaq News
that his bloc’s position is not tied to al-Maliki as a person but to managing
the current phase, arguing that today’s political actors possess constitutional
tools to hold past offenders accountable, framing the debate as forward-looking
rather than retrospective.
According to al-Mashhadani, al-Azm informed the CF that it
would support any option that avoids deepening rifts within the Shiite
political house.
For now, despite the distancing by al-Hasm and al-Azm, the
position of the NPC continues to reflect the stance of Al-Jamaheer Al-Wataniya,
led by Abu Mazen; Al-Siyada, headed by Khamis al-Khanjar; and Taqaddum, led by
former speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi. Together, these blocs maintain that the
question of the premiership should be governed by broad national acceptance,
particularly within the Sunni component, rather than parliamentary arithmetic
alone.
Mohammed al-Halbousi warned in a statement against
“returning to painful years,” citing discrimination, marginalization, and
security breakdowns during the previous tenure without naming al-Maliki
directly.
Ali al-Mahmoud of the Taqaddum party directly pointed to
al-Maliki’s earlier rule, which left a lasting imprint on Sunni provinces,
“marked by bombings, marginalization, and political exclusion.” While stressing
that the objection is not rooted in performance alone, al-Mahmoud criticized
the process that led to the nomination, noting that Sunni partners were not
consulted despite being stakeholders in the political process, contrasting it
with the broad consultations held during the selection of the parliamentary
speaker.
Al-Mahmoud also indicated fractures within the Shiite camp
itself, arguing that the decision reflected majority rule rather than full
consensus, a choice he said prioritized speed and political arithmetic over
unity.
Read more:Iraq’s Government talks reopen the 2010–2014 political memory
Shiite Calculations: Strength Over Consensus
Within the Shiite camp, al-Maliki’s nomination was endorsed
by the majority, not unanimity —an important distinction. Yet key Shiite actors
argue that Iraq’s current moment does not favor compromise candidates.
Supporters, including figures aligned with Hadi al-Amiri and
caretaker Prime Minister al-Sudani, frame al-Maliki as a decisive leader rather
than a caretaker manager —someone capable of withstanding US pressure, managing
armed factions, and navigating regional fault lines. In this reading,
al-Maliki’s choice looks like a figure with enough political weight to impose
order within the Shiite house while negotiating externally from a position of
strength.
Former MP Kamel Nawaf al-Ghariri articulated that view,
arguing that al-Maliki is uniquely positioned to lead Iraq at a time of
heightened external pressure, particularly from the United States. He told
Shafaq News that a few Iraqi politicians possess the experience required to
navigate Washington’s demands while simultaneously managing Iraq’s complex
internal files. At the same time, al-Ghariri acknowledged persistent Sunni
opposition to a third term, noting that many Sunni provinces associate
al-Maliki’s previous rule with hardship and exclusion, an association that
continues to shape resistance regardless of present calculations.
On the other side of the Framework, political sources told
our agency that Ammar al-Hakim, head of the National Wisdom Movement
(Al-Hikma), was not aligned with the option of returning Al-Maliki to the
premiership. Similar reservations were also voiced privately by Qais
al-Khazali, leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, according to the same sources. Neither
figure has publicly opposed the nomination, reflecting a pattern within the CF
in which dissent has been managed internally to preserve cohesion, even as
differences over leadership choice persist behind closed doors.
Read more:Nouri Al-Maliki: A name that still divides and tests the politics of memory
What Happens Next?
If formally tasked, al-Maliki will have 30 days to form a
cabinet and secure parliamentary confidence. Most indicators suggest he can
assemble a numerical majority, buoyed by Kurdish backing and partial Sunni
acquiescence. However, failure remains possible; in that scenario, the
Coordination Framework could pivot to a consensus alternative, potentially
retaining al-Sudani or advancing another moderate Shiite figure.
Speaking with Shafaq News, a member of the Framework, Abu
Mithaq al-Masari, noted that even if the incoming president formally tasks
Nouri al-Maliki with forming the government, securing parliamentary confidence
would not be automatic.
Al-Masari said the process could prove prolonged, stressing
that political legitimacy would hinge on achieving a broad parliamentary
consensus rather than relying solely on numerical advantage. “The government
will not pass if it fails to secure agreement.”
A source close to Sunni political forces echoed that
assessment, revealing to Shafaq News that finalizing the premiership remains
contingent on majority backing for the proposed cabinet. The source warned that
if the prime minister-designate fails to win the support of parliamentary blocs
tied to leaders who oppose his return, the 30-day constitutional deadline could
expire without a confidence vote, forcing a political reset. In that scenario,
the source said, advanced understandings with rejecting or hesitant blocs would
be essential to avoid derailment.
The implications extend beyond personalities. An
al-Maliki-led government would likely harden Iraq’s posture against US demands
on armed groups while seeking to reassure regional partners and Kurdish allies.
It would also test whether al-Maliki can transcend the legacy that divides
Sunni communities, or whether his return entrenches polarization under the
banner of stability. Therefore, his comeback is ultimately a referendum on
Iraq’s political memory.
As Iran and the United States pull in opposite directions
—and Iraq’s factions weigh pragmatism against principle— the question is not
whether al-Maliki can return, but whether Iraq can absorb that return without
reopening the wounds of the past.
Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.
