
Shafaq News
The third round of nuclear talks between the United States and Iran
began Thursday in Geneva under hardened positions that suggest the negotiations
are not only about centrifuges or enrichment levels. What is taking shape is a
broader attempt to manage instability —to restrain Iran’s capabilities without
triggering either regional collapse or open war.
Washington has entered this round with a demand that alters the
structure of any potential agreement. President Donald Trump’s special envoy,
Steve Witkoff, told a private gathering that any nuclear deal must last
indefinitely, according to Axios. The message signals a durability doctrine: no
sunset clauses, no temporary freeze, but permanent limits.
Vice President JD Vance reinforced the red line, expressing hope that
Iran approaches the talks seriously while reiterating that the United States
will not allow Tehran to obtain a nuclear weapon. Trump himself continues to
say he prefers diplomacy —yet he pairs that preference with explicit warnings
that a nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable.
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Tehran, by contrast, frames the negotiations as a test of fairness
rather than permanence. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said there is an
opportunity for an “agreed, just, and balanced solution,” but ruled out
compromise on Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology. He insisted there is
“no military option” to resolve what he described as a peaceful nuclear file
and accused Israel of “seeking to drag” Trump into a conflict.
Hours before the talks opened, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian
reiterated opposition to nuclear weapons, citing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei’s long-standing fatwa banning weapons of mass destruction, “which
means unequivocally that Tehran will not build nuclear weapons.”
Yet beneath the rhetoric lies a structural contradiction. Washington is
negotiating from a position of strategic durability; Tehran is negotiating from
a position of sovereign entitlement. That gap explains why even optimism on
both sides remains carefully hedged.
Patrick Clawson, Research Counselor at The Washington Institute and
Director of the Viterbi Program on Iran and US Policy, told Shafaq News that US
calculations extend far beyond the nuclear file itself. He argued that
Washington fears not only an Iranian bomb, but also the consequences of
instability inside Iran.
“The US is concerned about the collapse of the central state in Iran,
and that the instability in Iran could spread out elsewhere,” Clawson said,
warning that several of Iran’s neighboring countries maintain close ties with
Washington, and instability spilling outward “would be a real problem.” Drawing
comparisons to Syria’s collapse and the waves of displacement that followed, he
suggested that internal breakdown in Iran would create consequences difficult
for the region —and for US interests —to absorb.
That perspective reshapes the negotiation’s real objective. While
Washington might “love to see a replacement to the regime in Iran,” Clawson
said, that scenario is “just a very difficult thing to imagine.” Instead, the
more achievable goal is weakening Iran’s ability to build advanced missiles and
sustain what he described as a dangerous nuclear program.
Asked about the possibility of war if talks fail, Clawson cautioned that
“all the options are terrible,” making predictions inherently uncertain. Still,
he identified what he sees as the most likely pathway to escalation: a deal
that addresses nuclear restrictions but leaves missile capabilities unresolved.
“That’s by far and away the most likely scenario,” he said, explaining
that Israel could act independently if it judges the missile threat intolerable
—even if Washington and Tehran reach an understanding.
From a military standpoint, however, Washington appears confident in its
capacity to manage escalation.
Former US Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs
Mark Kimmitt told Shafaq News that the United States has a “thorough
understanding of Iranian capabilities.” He added, “It is unlikely that the US
would position itself in the Strait of Hormuz or the Persian Gulf if there was
a significant risk of successful Iranian Gray Zone or asymmetric attacks.”
Iran’s doctrine relies heavily on swarm tactics, proxy networks, and
loitering munitions. Yet Kimmitt dismissed suggestions that US forces are
vulnerable or unprepared. “The United States has proven its capability to
defend its bases against conventional or proxy attacks over the years. It has
already taken appropriate Force Protection measures,” he said.
That confidence forms the other pillar of Washington’s approach.
Diplomacy is being pursued not from weakness, but from a position that US
officials believe can absorb pressure if talks falter. Military readiness, in
this view, serves as a stabilizer rather than a trigger.
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Still, an “indefinite” agreement may appeal to Washington after years of
criticism over temporary nuclear restrictions. For Tehran, however, permanence
could appear indistinguishable from surrendering strategic autonomy. At the
same time, Iran’s insistence on enrichment rights —framed as sovereign and
peaceful —collides with US skepticism rooted in capability rather than declared
intent.
If negotiations collapse, escalation may not come as immediate, declared
war. It could emerge through intensified sanctions, covert actions, proxy
clashes, or targeted strikes calibrated to avoid full confrontation. But as
Clawson suggested, once each side demands more than the other can accept,
miscalculation becomes harder to prevent.
Geneva, therefore, represents an effort to balance three risks
simultaneously: a nuclear breakout, a destabilizing collapse inside Iran, and
an Israeli-driven escalation over missiles. The talks are less about restoring
trust than about containing danger within limits that neither side fully
controls.
Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.





