Shafaq
News
Abdul
Hakim Bashar, a Syrian Kurdish leader, member of the People’s Assembly and
member of the political bureau of the Kurdistan Democratic Party –Syria, spoke
to Shafaq News about the first session of the new assembly, the level of
Kurdish representation in it, the files Kurdish deputies intend to raise, and
the limits of the agreements reached between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF).
The
interview was conducted in Arabic. It has been translated and edited for length
and clarity.
Q: How do
you assess the first session of the People’s Assembly?
A: The
current assembly is clearly different from the assemblies formed under the previous
system, particularly with the absence of the scenes of applause for the
president and the glorification slogans that used to accompany its sessions.
This change is a positive development that reflects a shift in the nature of
the political scene. Still, it is too early to judge the assembly and its
ability to establish a new political and legislative phase.
Q: What
will determine that judgment?
A: The
real test will be the assembly’s performance in the coming phase, and its
ability to respond to the aspirations of Syrians of all components and to
translate them into legislation and policies that strengthen justice,
participation, and equal citizenship.
Q: How do
you evaluate the Kurdish presence in that first session?
A: The
results were not at the hoped-for level. The Kurds are represented by 12
members belonging to different political currents and backgrounds, which means
that forming a weighty and effective Kurdish bloc needs more time and
coordination.
Q: Why do
you describe the representation as insufficient?
A: It is
below the deserved level and does not correspond to the Kurdish share of the
population, which I estimate at around 15 percent of Syria’s population, in the
absence of recent and approved official statistics. Representation matching
that proportion would have given the Kurds at least between 30 and 32 seats,
instead of the twelve they currently hold.
Q: What
produced this outcome?
A: Two
main factors. The first is the absence of a clear political agreement between
the Kurdish movement and the Syrian authorities on the Kurdish question, and
responsibility for that is shared between the two sides. The Kurdish movement
has not been politically active in Damascus to a sufficient degree, while the
Syrian authorities have not moved to launch a serious and comprehensive
political dialogue with it.
Q: And
the second factor?
A: It is
linked to the mechanism by which the assembly was formed, which did not rely on
free and direct popular elections, because of the exceptional circumstances
Syria is passing through. That affected the level of representation of the
Kurds and of the other components.
Q: Did
the timing of the selection process play a role?
A: The
selection of assembly members in the Kurdish areas took place late compared
with other Syrian areas, which gave deputies chosen earlier more time to reach
understandings and build alliances over the distribution of the assembly’s
posts and bodies. Information also circulated about certain figures receiving
support during the competition for positions, and in my assessment that was
reflected in the final results of the formation of the assembly’s bodies.
Q: Are
the Kurdish deputies working as a bloc?
A: The
Kurdish deputies have held several meetings and agreed during them to work in a
team spirit and to coordinate on general national issues, alongside files
related to Kurdish society. This coordination is still in its early stages and
needs more time and effort to reach a more effective formula for cooperation.
Collective work is the best way to strengthen the presence of Kurdish deputies
and to serve the national interest at the same time.
Q: How do
you define the balance between national and community work inside the assembly?
A:
National work must be the basis inside the assembly, and the priority must be
to serve all Syrians, away from narrow partisan, nationalist or sectarian
calculations. At the same time, the existence of parties and political currents
is a fundamental pillar of any sound political life, and the presence of a
responsible national opposition inside or outside parliament strengthens
democracy, transparency and oversight of the executive authority.
Q: What
files do the Kurdish deputies intend to raise?
A: The
priorities are divided between general national issues and others linked
directly to Kurdish rights and the particularity of the Kurdish areas, but they
all fall within the project of building a state of citizenship and justice.
Q: What
comes first?
A: A
review of the exceptional laws and measures related to land ownership in the
Kurdish areas. Large areas still lack the real estate title deeds known as the
“green tabu,” and proof of ownership rests on judicial rulings or
other documents. The deputies will also work to open the files of land
expropriation and the exceptional legislation that harmed residents of the
Kurdish areas over past decades.
Q: What
about services and the economy?
A: The
development and services file carries similar importance, particularly
improving infrastructure, securing water and electricity, developing road
networks and raising the level of education, health and public services.
Supporting the agriculture and industry sectors matters as well, in a way that
contributes to providing jobs and achieving sustainable development in areas
that suffered for years from neglect, war and declining investment.
Q: Are
there other consequences that need to be addressed?
A: Yes,
the negative effects left by the years of self-administration, among them the
dangers threatening the safety of civilians, and the environmental and health
damage caused by extracting and refining oil by primitive means.
Q: And at
the political level?
A:
Recognition of the national rights of the Kurdish people remains a main
priority and should be fixed in the new Syrian constitution, in a way that
acknowledges national and cultural plurality and guarantees equal citizenship
for individuals and ethnic groups. The form of the Syrian state must be an
essential part of the national and constitutional dialogue, in a way that
preserves the unity of the country and establishes sound governance and a
decentralized system that guarantees the participation of all components.
Q: What
specific demands does that include?
A:
Reconsidering the official name of the state so that it expresses all Syrians,
recognizing the Kurdish language as an official language alongside Arabic in
Kurdish-majority areas, and addressing the effects of the Arab Belt project
according to a just national vision. It also includes completing the treatment
of the issue of Kurds deprived of citizenship, fixing the legal status of those
who have regained it, and guaranteeing effective Kurdish participation in any
committee tasked with drafting the new Syrian constitution.
Read more: Kurds in Syria: From marginalization to a defining political force
Q: Can
the assembly deliver on these demands?
A: Some
demands related to the form of the state, language and national recognition go
beyond the direct powers of the People’s Assembly and are tied to the
constitutional process and to national political understandings. The assembly
can, however, prepare the political and legislative ground for these files and
open a serious national discussion leading to just and sustainable solutions.
Q: Has
the relationship between the Kurdish forces and the government moved to
institutional work?
A:
Speaking about such a transition requires first defining what is meant by the
Kurdish forces, given the multiplicity of currents and projects inside the
Syrian Kurdish political scene.
Q: How do
you read the SDF’s approach?
A: In my
view, the political approach of the Syrian Democratic Forces is not based on a
Kurdish national project in the traditional sense, but rests on the concepts of
the democratic nation and the brotherhood of peoples, and calls for moving
beyond closed national identities.
Q: What
has that meant for the negotiations with Damascus?
A: The
negotiations focused on the future of the military, security, and civil
institutions belonging to the forces and the self-administration, and on the
mechanism for integrating them into the institutions of the Syrian state, more
than on recognition of Kurdish identity and national rights. The core of the
negotiations revolves around the nature of the integration, the distribution of
powers and posts inside state agencies, and the arrangement of leadership and
administrative structures.
Q: Does
the agreement resolve the Kurdish question?
A: The
agreement with the SDF does not resolve the Kurdish question and does not
guarantee the political rights of the Kurds or their representation in state
institutions. It moves within financial, security, military, and administrative
arrangements, and it cannot be a substitute for a comprehensive political
solution to the Kurdish question in Syria.
Q: Where
do the other Kurdish parties stand?
A: The
Kurdish National Council and other Kurdish parties proceed from a different
vision that focuses on fixing Kurdish rights within the framework of the Syrian
state. Their communication with the authorities has so far been limited to
meetings between the council’s leadership and some Syrian officials, among them
the foreign minister and transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa. These meetings
are important steps toward opening channels of communication, but they remain
far from the level of political negotiations that could produce a clear
institutional framework for the relationship between the Kurds and the state.
Q: So how
would you describe the current stage?
A: What
Syria is witnessing now is the beginning of negotiating tracks and uneven
political contacts between different parties, not a comprehensive institutional
agreement defining the nature of the future relationship. Building a stable
institutional relationship needs a political dialogue that includes the various
concerned forces, followed by legal and constitutional arrangements that
guarantee rights and define responsibilities and powers. Institutions are not
built only through merging existing structures, but through a political
consensus that determines the form of the state and the relationship of its
components to it.
Q: What
role has the Kurdistan Region of Iraq played?
A: The
Kurdistan Region and Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani played an influential role
in bringing the viewpoints of the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic
Forces closer, and in contributing to opening channels of communication between
the two sides. Erbil’s role stood out during sensitive stages through efforts
to avoid military escalation in the Kurdish areas and to limit the
transformation of political disputes into a wider Arab-Kurdish clash. That role
has made the Kurdistan Region an important station for regional and
international parties concerned with Syria’s stability and the future of the
relationship between Damascus and the Kurdish forces.
Q: What
about outside mediation?
A: The
efforts of the Kurdistan Region were accompanied by direct American mediation
and French support for the negotiations, with the aim of reaching a formula
that prevents a return to confrontations and opens the way to clearer political
and institutional arrangements. But the success of the coming understandings
does not depend on external mediation alone. It is linked above all to the
ability of the Syrian parties to reach a comprehensive political agreement that
addresses questions of power, administration and rights.
Q: What
is required now?
A: What
is required is turning the temporary understandings into a sustainable
institutional framework that guarantees Syria’s unity and the rights of all its
components and prevents the country from returning to the conflicts and
divisions that accompanied it during past years.
Read more: Kurds: International betrayal victims
