The most effective weapon in modern warfare doesn’t shoot. It changes what you consider to be true, your perception of reality.
Today there is another front – without trenches and maps. It runs through our news and social media – through how we understand events and make choices. This is where the battle for advantage is fought. In the NATO Chief Scientist’s Office report, this is called cognitive warfare – targeted influence on the thinking and behavior of civilians and military through information, psychological and technological tools.
For Ukraine, this is not an abstract consideration, but daily experience since 2014. In Europe it is often seen as “Ukrainian specificity,” although in reality it is a universal attack on democracies.
The war on reality
The key target of cognitive warfare is the very process of understanding reality. Who shapes our picture of the world, whom we trust, how we make sense from the chaos of events – and how quickly we can move from words to decisions.
In the NATO report, this is directly linked to the OODA cycle (observe, orient, decide, act). The adversary doesn’t necessarily try to change the final decision. It’s enough to break the first two stages – observation and orientation – so that decisions become delayed, contradictory, or politically toxic.
Russia works exactly this way. Before the full-scale invasion, it filled the information space with different, often incompatible explanations of events. Without trying to prove one “truth,” it launched several versions at once: that there would be no attack, that it was Ukraine’s provocation, that it was an internal conflict, or that the West was exaggerating everything. The goal was simple – to create fog in which any decision becomes difficult and vulnerable.
Today the adversary wages cognitive warfare simultaneously against the army and civilian population. The military are being demoralized with fakes about mass surrenders and “catastrophic losses,” civilians – with panic, despair and distrust of the state. This war involves not only official propaganda channels, but also troll factories, bot farms, media clones, pseudo-experts, fake NGOs and agents of influence who mask the state trail.
For this, the entire arsenal is used – from classic lies and conspiracy theories to coordinated social media campaigns, psychological operations and “information siege.” Real problems, such as corruption scandals, power outages, war fatigue, are systematically turned into tools for undermining trust. New technologies only amplify the effect: micro-targeting of disinformation, deepfake videos with “surrenders,” networks of Telegram channels and clones of official pages, as well as cyberattacks and data leaks. The goal of all this is not to convince, but to exhaust and deprive society of the ability to act quickly and confidently.
Influence is conducted through all channels – from Facebook and X to YouTube, TikTok, traditional media and local chats. Propaganda is disguised as entertainment, “analytics” or rumors, and together this forms a coordinated ecosystem of external information pressure.
Technologies as amplifiers of vulnerabilities
NATO emphasizes: digital technologies did not create cognitive warfare, but made it faster and more effective. Today it’s not necessary to influence everyone – it’s enough to hit the right audience at the right moment.
That’s why we see a shift from classic propaganda to complex FIMI operations – Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference. It’s not just about messages, but about networks of bots, cloned media, artificially generated speakers, “content farms” that imitate organic discussion.
Materials from the Center for Strategic Communications systematically describe this logic as information exhaustion: a constant flow of topics that undermine mobilization, sow despair, discredit partners and have a common goal – to convince that resistance is futile. This is Russia’s bet: not to win the argument, but to make society lose the ability to hold its chosen course.
Ukraine as a laboratory, EU as a target
Russian information operations in EU countries are not “internal debates” and not a side effect of freedom of speech. This is a calculated strategy aimed at dividing societies, undermining trust in the state and weakening political will.
In the Ukrainian case, the stake is to disrupt support for defense. In the European case – to make aid to Ukraine a subject of internal hostility, not strategic security. What is being worked out today on the Ukrainian audience will tomorrow be scaled to other democratic societies taking into account their local vulnerabilities.
That’s why Ukrainian experience should sound in Brussels not as a request to “help a little more,” but as a warning for the future.
NATO and Ukraine: different optics of the same war
NATO views cognitive warfare as a long-term systemic task: how to protect states’ ability to make decisions, establish inter-agency coordination and invest in advance in societal resilience. For an alliance of over thirty democracies, this is a logical approach.
The Ukrainian approach, which I represent in my work, was formed in the “here and now” war, so it is maximally practical. Its strengths are flexibility and improvisation: Telegram chats between officials and volunteers, rapid experiments.
The state does not monopolize information struggle – it coordinates, opens channels of interaction and amplifies what already works effectively in society. NATO is forced to act through coordinated mechanisms of a large alliance, which makes its reactions more balanced, but less operational in conditions of rapid information warfare.
It is civil society – volunteers, journalists, fact-checkers, experts – that forms a network of trust that often proves more resilient than any centralized system. This is a real model in which the state, media and active citizens together hold information defense.
Another difference is in the focus of action. NATO naturally concentrates on defense and resilience: protecting decision-making processes, reducing the impact of disinformation, preparing the population. The Ukrainian approach is forced to be broader.
We simultaneously defend (filter hostile content, block channels), respond (counter-propaganda in occupied territories, ridiculing the Russian Federation and trolling occupiers) and try to act proactively (identify in advance the topics the enemy is pushing and be first to provide truthful information or a positive agenda).
What follows from this for NATO and EU policy
Ukrainian experience gives allies ready solutions that should be integrated now, not after the next crisis.
First, cognitive resilience should be considered an element of defense on par with air defense and cyber protection – with constant assessment of societal vulnerabilities and readiness for information crises.
Second, NATO and the EU must move from declarations to real cooperation with civil society. Ukrainian experience shows the effectiveness of decentralized “swarm” models (“beehive”), where journalists, fact-checkers, volunteers and experts work in tandem with the state. Such interaction reduces the burden on institutions, increases flexibility and makes information defense more resilient.
Third, institutionalized cooperation with technology platforms is necessary. Direct and rapid interaction with Big Tech on issues of bot networks, coordinated inauthentic behavior and crisis response can become the basis for common protocols between NATO, the EU and platforms.
Fourth, it should be recognized that under conditions of existential threat, democratic societies require a special information regime. Ukrainian experience has shown: temporary strict measures can be acceptable if they are transparent, justified and time-limited. For example, blocking Russian media and restricting Telegram at the front. For this, NATO and the EU should develop common response criteria in advance.
Strategic conclusion
Cognitive warfare is advantageous for the aggressor because it is cheap and often invisible, can produce effects without capturing territory. But it only works where there is internal distrust, fatigue and division.
In cognitive warfare, victory doesn’t go to those with better formulations in doctrines. Victory goes to those who learn faster, adapt and maintain trust within society.
Ukraine has already gone through this learning curve – at a high price. The only question is whether allies are ready to use this experience before the war comes to their homes.
Mykola Balaban
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