Shafaq News
The Peshmerga
occupied a unique place in the Kurdistan Region’s political consciousness long
before becoming part of Iraq’s federal framework after 2005. For the vast
majority of Kurds, the force represents far more than a military institution.
Its name, commonly translated as “those who face death”, emerged from decades
of struggle between the Kurdish national movement and central governments in
Iraq and the wider region.
Today, that
historical legacy stands at the center of a growing political dispute. As Iraq
revisits the issue of restricting weapons to state control, concerns have
surfaced over whether the Peshmerga should also fall within the scope of those
discussions. The debate has exposed deeper disagreements over federalism,
constitutional authority, and the balance of power between Baghdad and Erbil.
A Force Rooted
in History
The origins of
the modern Peshmerga trace back to the early twentieth century, before taking
shape as a more organized force through successive Kurdish uprisings and
political movements that intensified during the 1950s and 1960s.
Following the
Kurdish uprising of 1991 and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, the
Peshmerga gradually evolved into the Kurdistan Region’s official security
institution. Their position gained further recognition with the adoption of
Iraq’s Constitution in 2005, which established a broader framework
acknowledging the Region and its governing institutions, including its security
apparatus.
For this
reason, Kurdish leaders maintain that the Peshmerga cannot be treated as a
military force subject to political bargaining. In Kurdish collective memory,
the force embodies experiences ranging from the Anfal genocide, chemical
attacks, displacement, and internal conflicts to the fight against ISIS, when
large sections of Iraq’s defense lines collapsed while the Kurdistan Region
remained largely under the protection of its own forces.
That symbolism
featured prominently in recent remarks by the head of the Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani. Widely regarded by many Kurds as a
continuation of the Peshmerga’s political and military legacy, Barzani
portrayed the force’s weapons as more than a conventional arsenal, underscoring
their role as a symbol of sacrifice, dignity, and historical security
guarantees.
Read more: Kurdistan’s 10th cabinet: Interlocking alliances and persistent political differences
How the
Peshmerga Entered the Disarmament Discussion?
The backdrop to
the current controversy lies in renewed efforts to address the issue of weapons
outside direct state control. The debate returned to the forefront as the
United States and regional actors intensified pressure on Shiite armed factions
allied with Iran.
Initially
centered on the future of groups operating beyond state institutions, the
discussion gradually expanded in some political circles to encompass the
position of the Peshmerga.
Political
figures in Iraq have circulated reports of a proposal attributed to Tom
Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkiye and presidential envoy for Iraq and
Syria, suggesting that all armed formations, including certain Shiite factions
and the Peshmerga, should be brought under the umbrella of Iraq’s armed forces
and the authority of Baghdad. The proposal, however, has yet to emerge as an
officially declared US position.
Nevertheless,
the concept gained traction in domestic political discussions. According to
official statements and experts interviewed by Shafaq News, some Shiite
factions opposed to disarmament, or reluctant to place their military
capabilities entirely under Baghdad’s control, have sought to include the
Peshmerga in the same framework.
Their argument
centers on a seemingly straightforward question: if all weapons are to be
placed under state authority, why should the Kurdistan Region’s forces be
exempt?
Kurdish
officials, legal specialists, and security experts reject that comparison. They
argue that it overlooks the distinction between a regional force whose
legitimacy derives from constitutional provisions within a federal system and
armed factions that emerged or expanded under exceptional political and
security circumstances after 2003 and during the campaign against ISIS. Many of
those groups, they note, continue to face scrutiny regarding political
loyalties, military chains of command, and links to regional conflicts
extending beyond Iraq’s official decision-making structures.
Statements
issued by some factions have reinforced perceptions that efforts are underway
to shift the debate from the dilemma of armed groups to a broader comparison
involving both the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the Peshmerga.
Nazem Al-Saidi,
head of the executive council of the US-sanctioned Harakat Al-Nujaba, told
Shafaq News that the Iraqi “resistance” does not impose red lines regarding
discussions on surrendering weapons. He nonetheless tied any such process to
the withdrawal of foreign military bases from Iraq, an end to “financial and
economic dependency, and distancing the country from political decisions
dictated by the US Embassy.”
Al-Saidi
further stated that factions which had relinquished their weapons may have
chosen to move from the “resistance project” toward participation in the
political process, stressing that Harakat Al-Nujaba believes weapons should not
be surrendered “except to Imam Mahdi,”* given what he characterized as the
dangers and challenges surrounding Iraq.
He also
questioned why pressure remains concentrated on factional and PMF weapons
while, in his view, no equivalent attention is directed toward “the weapons of
extremist groups or the Peshmerga forces.”
Kurdistan’s
Constitutional Position
For Kurdish
officials, this is precisely where the Peshmerga became part of a debate not
initiated by Erbil. They interpret references to the force as an attempt either
to broaden the discussion or to portray American and governmental pressure as
selective. In Erbil’s view, the comparison deliberately conflates two
fundamentally different issues in law, politics, and history.
Security expert
Jabar Yawar, a former senior official in the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs and
a prominent observer of security relations between Baghdad and Erbil, dismissed
discussions about dissolving or disarming the Peshmerga as lacking any legal or
practical basis.
Speaking to
Shafaq News, Yawar stated that neither Iraqi nor international officials have
issued formal or informal calls for such measures, emphasizing that current
discussions focus on specific factions, including Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, Kataib
Hezbollah Iraq, Harakat Al-Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, and Kataib Imam
Ali— not the Peshmerga.
Yawar pointed
to Article 121 of the Iraqi Constitution, which grants regions the right to
establish and organize internal security forces, including police, security
services, and regional guards. On that basis, he argued that the Peshmerga
constitute the Kurdistan Region Guard, operating within a constitutional
framework rather than outside state authority.
Consequently,
any attempt to alter the force’s status could not be accomplished through
political agreements, external pressure, or arrangements between Baghdad and
armed factions. Such a move, according to this interpretation, would require a
complex constitutional and legislative process because the Peshmerga are not
governed by an ordinary federal law that can be amended in the same manner as
legislation regulating other formations.
At the
legislative level, Iraqi lawmaker Sarwa Mohammed likewise asserted that any
effort to dissolve the Peshmerga would violate the Constitution and contradict
the principles of Iraq’s federal system, which guarantees the Kurdistan Region
the right to maintain its own security institutions.
She described
the Peshmerga as a constitutional and professional force responsible for
protecting the Kurdistan Region’s borders, security, and stability, affirming
that it should not be included in debates concerning weapons outside state
institutions.
“Confusing the
Peshmerga with armed factions does not resolve the weapons issue,” Mohammed
said, “It opens the door to a constitutional crisis between Baghdad and Erbil.”
At the same
time, she disclosed the existence of an initiative proposed by the State of Law
Coalition, led by Nouri al-Maliki, aimed at addressing the status of certain
armed factions through integration into Iraq’s official military and security
institutions. Noting the ongoing discussions between the Iraqi government and
several factions regarding mechanisms for surrendering weapons or incorporating
fighters into formal structures, she stressed concern that armed groups
operating outside official institutions do not involve the Peshmerga.
Read more: Opinion: KDP, PUK, and the fracturing of Kurdish political partnership in Iraq
Washington’s
Perspective
From
Washington, Kurdish affairs and US foreign policy researcher Delovan Barwari
said the Peshmerga cannot be viewed as a temporary force or an armed group
established outside the state. Instead, he described it as a recognized
regional guard force fulfilling an acknowledged security role.
In remarks to
Shafaq News, Barwari characterized proposals advocating the dissolution of the
Peshmerga as both unconstitutional and irrational because they conflict with
the constitutional framework through which Iraq recognized the Kurdistan Region
and its right to maintain regional security forces within a federal system.
He recalled the
period following the fall of Saddam Hussein, when the Kurdistan Region
preserved a degree of stability while much of Iraq experienced violence and
institutional breakdown. Barwari also highlighted the Peshmerga’s role in
confronting extremist organizations ranging from Al-Qaeda to ISIS and
cooperating with international coalition partners to safeguard Iraq and the
broader region.
Regarding the
American position, Barwari dismissed the notion that decision-makers in
Washington are pursuing a serious effort to dismantle the Peshmerga.
“I do not see
credible evidence of a US effort in that direction,” he said, describing such proposals
as political messaging linked to internal Iraqi dynamics that tend to surface
during periods of tension between Baghdad and Erbil.
Similar
assessments have come from American military figures who worked alongside the
Peshmerga during the campaign against ISIS. Retired US Army Colonel Myles
Caggins, former spokesman for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, went beyond
rejecting calls to dissolve the force, portraying it as a valuable security
partner whose capabilities should be strengthened rather than reduced.
Caggins, now
founder & CEO of Words Warriors, a consulting and government relations
firm, described the Peshmerga as “a long-standing security force fully
authorized under the Iraqi Constitution.” He emphasized its role in maintaining
internal security in the Kurdistan Region and its record as a dependable US
partner during key military campaigns, from the period following Saddam
Hussein’s fall to the fight against ISIS.
He argued that
locally established security forces recognized by the federal system reflect
Iraq’s geography, history, language, and social realities. Caggins also called
on the United States and allied countries to deepen cooperation with the
Peshmerga and expand support in areas such as technology, training, and
counter-drone capabilities.
Political
Balancing or State Consolidation?
Lahib Higel,
Senior Iraq Analyst at the International Crisis Group, rejected suggestions
that Washington is actively pressing for the dissolution of the Peshmerga or
its integration into federal forces. Instead, she viewed the discussion as a
domestic political maneuver linked to Baghdad’s internal balance of power.
Speaking to
Shafaq News, Higel observed that the proposal may represent an attempt by
federal authorities to reassure Iran-aligned factions facing pressure over
their weapons by presenting the issue as one affecting all forces operating
outside Baghdad’s direct control.
She cautioned,
however, that such an approach could have significant repercussions for
relations between Baghdad and Erbil while also intensifying divisions within
Kurdish politics, particularly between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, given existing disputes over Peshmerga reform and
unification.
That internal
dimension introduces another layer of sensitivity. Some researchers contend
that divisions within the Peshmerga’s military structure provide political
opponents in Baghdad with additional opportunities to use the issue as
leverage.
Yasser Kuoti, a
Middle East analyst and doctoral student in political science at Boston
University, pointed to signs of a broader US inclination toward strengthening
the authority of the federal government. At the same time, he stated that the
Peshmerga’s organizational structure remains partially influenced by the
historic division between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
Although Erbil
and its western partners have spent years pursuing reforms aimed at unifying
forces under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, Kuoti noted that “the issue
continues to supply some actors with arguments for bringing the force under
federal authority.”
He also
suggested that calls for integration may stem from pressure exerted by Iraqi
political groups seeking a parallel arrangement. In that context, factions
facing demands to submit to state authority may insist that any effort to
regulate weapons should apply equally to all armed forces.
Regional
Dynamics and the Weapons
Iraqi strategic
affairs researcher Kazem Yawar noted that restricting weapons to state control
remains one of the key objectives included in the government’s program. While
the issue is not new, he said, recent regional developments and the ongoing
confrontation involving the United States, Israel, and Iran have pushed it back
to the forefront of political and media discourse.
According to
Yawar, Washington has publicly advocated implementation of the principle that
weapons should remain under state authority, prompting extensive discussion
across official, media, and public spheres. The issue has also attracted
attention from both the United States and Gulf states because of concerns over
armed faction activity and its potential impact on American and Gulf interests.
Yawar noted
that the Kurdistan Parliament enacted the Ministry of Peshmerga Law No. 19 of
2007, and provided a clear legal framework for the Region Guard. He also
contrasted the Peshmerga’s legal status with that of the PMF. The PMF emerged
under exceptional circumstances and was later regulated through legislation
adopted in 2016, a law that can be revised through federal constitutional
mechanisms. The Peshmerga, by contrast, derive their status from constitutional
provisions and regional authorities, making dissolution or full integration
impossible without constitutional amendments or legislation issued by the
Kurdistan Parliament.
Kurdish Syrian
political analyst Shvan Ibrahim remarked that attempts to include the Peshmerga
in disarmament initiatives reflect a perception among some actors of Kurds as a
permanent adversary or threat to the state.
Speaking to
Shafaq News, Ibrahim described comparisons between the Peshmerga and factions
that he said “spread corruption, destruction, and devastation in Iraq and
neighboring countries” as historically and politically unjust.
“The Peshmerga
did not threaten neighboring states, did not attack Gulf countries, and did not
harm civilians or politicians,” he said, adding that “Instead, they protected
Kurdistan and millions of displaced people and refugees, including Iraqi and
Syrian Arabs who fled ISIS, armed factions, and militias.”
He further
indicated that the Peshmerga protected Iraqi political leaders during the early
stages of the Iraqi Governing Council, the provisional government of Iraq from
13 July 2003 to 1 June 2004, and parliament, contributed to the defense of
Mosul and other areas, and played a major role in the war against ISIS. Any
effort to dissolve the force, he warned, “would trigger one of Iraq’s most
serious national crises by reviving a centralized model of governance that
concentrates power in federal institutions and risks reproducing authoritarian
practices.”
Ibrahim also
addressed comparisons with Syria, where debates continue over the future
integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into state institutions. In
his view, “the parallel is flawed.” The SDF emerged during a civil war and amid
the collapse of central authority, whereas the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is a
constitutionally recognized federal entity with elected institutions, local
legislation, and security forces whose existence is explicitly protected under
Iraqi law.
Read more: Iraq to place armed factions’ weapons under state control: What we know so far
A Test of
Iraq’s Post-2003 Order
The dispute
over the Peshmerga’s place in Iraq’s weapons debate extends far beyond technical
discussions about security arrangements. It has become a political and
constitutional test of the state established after 2003.
Efforts to
include the Kurdistan Region’s forces in disarmament discussions may appear, on
the surface, to be attempts to distribute pressure more evenly or create
negotiating balance. Yet such efforts collide with a fundamental distinction
between a regional force grounded in constitutional authority and historical
experience, and armed formations whose relationship with the state remains
contested.
As Baghdad
seeks to reinforce centralized security decision-making under both domestic and
international pressure, Erbil regards any challenge to the Peshmerga as a
challenge to the foundations of federal partnership itself.
In that sense,
many observers believe that any approach failing to recognize this distinction
may not advance the goal of regulating weapons. Instead, it could open the door
to a new constitutional confrontation between Baghdad and the Kurdistan
Region—an outcome few actors appear willing to risk.
*In Twelver
Shiite doctrine, Imam Al-Mahdi is the hidden twelfth Imam who is believed to
remain in occultation until his return at the end of times. His reappearance is
expected to usher in an era of justice and righteousness after a period of
turmoil and oppression.
Written and
edited by Shafaq News staff.
